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Abstract
Information and communication technologies are not value-neutral.
I examine two domains, public health surveillance and sustainability,
in five papers covering: (i) the design and development of a software
package for computer-assisted outbreak detection; (ii) a workflow for
using simulation models to provide policy advice and a list of chal-
lenges for its practice; (iii) an analysis of design documents from three
smart home projects presenting intersecting visions of sustainability;
(iv) an analysis of EU-financed projects dealing with sustainability and
ICT; (v) an analysis of the consequences of design choices when cre-
ating surveillance technologies. My contributions include three em-
pirical studies of surveillance discourses where I identify the forms of
action that are privileged and the values that are embedded into them.
In these discourses, the presence of ICT entails increased surveillance,
privileging technological expertise, and prioritising centralised forms
of knowledge.
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PART I

Chapter 1
Introduction
Information and communication technologies, abbreviated as ICTs,
are not value-neutral. They are marked by power struggles that shape
their production, and they are affected by the materialities which sus-
tain them. These digital technological systems connect a broad spec-
trum of theories, practices, and discourses. The initial term, informa-
tion, holds the key to understanding the implications of the abbrevia-
tion ICT.
Two conceptualisations of information are common within com-
puter science. The first is Claude Shannon’s information theory (Shan-
non and Weaver 1948), which employs a definition that treats infor-
mation as a quantity expressed by signals, stored as states, and always
existing in relation to communication. As it provides methods for
quantifying information, it renders possible the quantification of ev-
erything else that can be translated into information.
The second conceptualisation locates information in the larger
process of constructing wisdom. Often referred to as the DIKW pyra-
mid (data, information, knowledge, wisdom), it proposes a narrow-
ing stack of dependencies, with data at the bottom and wisdom at
the top (Rowley 2007). In the pyramid, data represent a large collec-
tion of signals and signs that are not useful on their own except as
building blocks of information, and information appears as an inter-
mediate step in the journey from data to knowledge. By connecting
information to knowledge and wisdom, the act of knowing itself is as-
sociated with any activity that involves information. Information and
data become units of rationalisation, representing the infrastructure
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on which wisdom can be built. I am critical to these conceptualisa-
tions as will be evident from the below analysis.
Although the DIKW pyramid places data at the very bottom as the
basic units of wisdom, without any trace of their pasts, innumerable
standards and infrastructures support the creation, transmission, and
maintenance of data. Similarly, for information there are very few
traces of the work required to construct the information, and to keep
it stable, although there is an emphasis on its construction from data
(or from signal, in the case of information theory).
Above all, both conceptualisations allow information to be ab-
stracted away from its source while remaining stable; in other words,
information stands alone, independent of its past, future, medium, or
producer. These interpretations of information disconnect it from so-
cial and political consequences. They implicitly assume that informa-
tion can stand independently, unmarked by power struggles that have
shaped its production, and unaffected by the materiality that sustains
them. Additionally, both conceptualisations posit a type of informa-
tion free from subjects involved in its production and consumption
as social and political entities. For example, although senders and re-
ceivers are necessary for information to be transmitted in information
theory, the characteristics that would distinguish those senders and re-
ceivers from others are non-existent. They are disembodied, and their
differences are abstracted away (French 2009).
Within the ICTs I have designed, developed, and analysed, infor-
mation appears mostly as a collection of stable facts (Latour and Wool-
gar 1979) that describe the world. In outbreak detection, information
tells us what we know about now, so that we can know what to do
next. In simulation, it tells us what the world is, to allow us to create
it within the machine. In the smart home, it defines resource con-
sumption, so that we may change it. I emphasise that these are claims
about information. What is claimed and what happens are two stories
among many, and by analysing ICT discourses I demonstrate that such
stories also have implications for the types of knowledge produced by
them.
ICT is put to use in a wide variety of contexts, and in those con-
texts it is most often described as an unproblematic good, a technol-
ogy that benefits everyone. To challenge this representation, I turn to
the field of surveillance studies. The digital technological systems that
I examine are all used in observing, analysing, and constructing the
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outside world. They are used to gather and classify observations regu-
larly, and the classifications are used to generate information about the
observed subjects. Surveillance is linked to sustaining public health,
providing welfare services, and preserving and protecting the envi-
ronment. In all three cases, ICTs are strongly tied to the practice of
surveillance. In short, they act as surveillance systems, and I discuss
this aspect in further detail in the following chapter.
I aim my critique at the tacit assumption that the development
and usage of ICTs are always beneficial to society. When a technolog-
ical system is described as ICT, it is easier to portray it as part of the
neutral background, or the way things are. Describing it as a surveil-
lance system, on the other hand, makes it more noticeable, as surveil-
lance draws forth associations to social concerns and political impli-
cations. If they were to benefit everyone equally, then there would
be a lesser need to problematise. However, given the impossibility of
anything benefiting everyone equally, and indeed, the impossibility
of even defining everyone, in my analyses I find it important to ask:
who benefits from the design, development, and use of surveillance
technologies, and who suffers its costs?
1.1 Aim
My aim is to identify how ICT and surveillance are linked in different
discourses and to describe the implications of this connection. I inves-
tigate how the link between the two is motivated, and what knowl-
edge and truth claims are made in relation to it. I identify the subject
positions, practices, values, and the forms of knowledge that are pri-
oritised in ICT discourses. The research questions for my empirical
investigations are:
1. What is the role of surveillance in the discourses of ICT design
and development for sustainability and for public health?
2. How are surveillance subjects positioned in relation to ICT-
based surveillance in these two discourses?
3. What are the implications of these positionings?
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1.2 Scope
I investigate ICT-based surveillance systems two domains, public health
surveillance and sustainability, through five papers included in this
thesis. Within public health, I analyse methods of computer sup-
ported outbreak detection. Within sustainability, I examine texts that
propose systems that deal with energy consumption, especially in con-
nection to smart homes where inhabitants are monitored using ICTs.
The two initial papers are a result of my participation in the design
and development of two systems: one for Swedish national outbreak
detection, and another for providing suggestions to policy makers. In
the final three papers, I analyse texts that describe the design, develop-
ment, funding policy and prescribed use of various technologies in the
two domains. In this section, I describe the two domains in further
detail to provide a background for the papers.
Computer-Supported Outbreak Detection
Within public health, outbreak detection refers to the monitoring of
the spread of communicable diseases within a population. The pri-
mary goal is to identify the increase in the number of individuals who
suffer from a communicable disease as quickly as possible, because it
becomes increasingly difficult to control the spread of diseases as the
proportion of the population suffering from the disease rises (Lom-
bardo and Ross 2007). This proportion is called prevalence, and it is
one of the two most commonly used measures of disease frequency
when reasoning about the spread of disease. The second one is inci-
dence, which is defined as the probability of an individual becoming
infected with a disease. Although it is more accurately expressed as a
rate, in practice it is also used to refer to the number of newly diag-
nosed cases within a given time period.
In these definitions, there is a tension between the diagnosed cases
and the real number of people with the diseases. If infected individu-
als remain undetected by the health authority, the known prevalence
of the disease remains zero, but the real prevalence is higher. The
tension is due to the difficulty in distinguishing the series of construc-
tions that lead to an expression of prevalence. Although prevalence
is a simple numerical expression of the state of a communicable dis-
ease within a population, the chain of knowledge that concludes with
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its expression is highly complex and not easily visible. A prevalence
statement requires the tools and the trained staff to obtain and store
samples from the population, tests to determine the presence of the
disease, statistical methods to derive the appropriate numbers from
the tests, as well as a health authority that can coordinate all of these
activities.
Using the two epidemiological terms, outbreak detection can be
described as the practice of monitoring prevalence, and its goal can
be rephrased as determining unexpected increases in incidence. It is
performed regularly by epidemiologists, and it grows progressively
more difficult as more diseases and larger populations begin to be
monitored (Dato, Wagner, and Fapohunda 2004). The regularity of
the task, the quantitative means of accomplishing it, and the growing
computational demands make outbreak detection an ideal problem
for ICT-based solutions (Morse 2007; Hersh 2009). Since the detec-
tion itself relies on statistical methods, and the quantitative data is
easily stored and communicated digitally, computer support is highly
compatible with outbreak detection (Buckeridge et al. 2008; Hulth et
al. 2010; Pelecanos, Ryan, and Gatton 2010). The mobilisation of re-
sources to design and develop the systems, to make them function in
offices of epidemiologists, and to educate everyone involved in their
use and maintenance, however, requires much effort (French 2009).
Computer-supported outbreak detection relies on the existence of
a collection of records, called a case database, where reports of diag-
nosed or suspected cases of communicable diseases are stored. These
databases collect various details that relate to the diagnosis, most im-
portant of which are date and location. Using these two, and given
population size, prevalence and incidence can be calculated for dif-
ferent regions. Each field can also contain sub-categories specifying
properties of the disease that might be useful in future investigations.
For example, whether the disease was communicated within the na-
tional borders, or if the infected individual travelled from outside the
borders after being infected. Case databases collect the details of indi-
vidual cases of diseases together with date and location. Classification
and sorting are already at work as the cases themselves are categorised
into administrative regions, age groups, and disease types (Krieger
1992). Moving from case databases to computer-supported outbreak
detection, the cases are transformed into prevalences and incidences,
and the increases in incidence can be compared with calculations from
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previous periods (weeks, seasons, or years) to detect outbreaks.
The first paper included in this thesis describes the design of a
computer-supported outbreak detection system where I worked as a
designer and developer. It marks the initial stages of my involvement
in knowledge production using ICT-based surveillance. It demon-
strates the complexity of constructing a system to navigate the mul-
tiple and nested disease classifications. It also serves as an example of
an ICT discourse where concerns such as efficiency and timeliness are
valued over considerations of the effects of such systems on the organ-
isation of public health practice or the implications of their use for
the prioritisation of certain types of knowledge.
Syndromic Surveillance
The fifth paper in this thesis deals with a sub-domain of computer
assisted outbreak detection called syndromic surveillance. In that pa-
per, we analyse reports from an EU-funded project for developing a
syndromic surveillance system. In both their structure and in their
assumed audience, the reports resemble my first paper on outbreak
detection. Many such systems exist, and in my licentiate thesis, I pro-
vide a more detailed overview of these systems (Cakici 2011a).
Syndromic surveillance is a type of computer-supported outbreak
detection where a large number of data sources in addition to case
databases are used to decrease the delay between the event and its de-
tection by the health authorities (Buckeridge et al. 2005; Das et al.
2005). The earlier applications of syndromic surveillance were char-
acterised by the use of health-related data that precede diagnosis, and
the continual monitoring of disease indicators to detect outbreaks of
communicable diseases earlier than traditional methods (Mostashari
and Hartman 2003; Buehler et al. 2004; Burkom et al. 2004; Hen-
ning 2004). More recently, the definition of syndromic surveillance
has broadened to include the monitoring of non-communicable dis-
eases and other health conditions such as heat-related illnesses, injuries
caused by tornadoes, or respiratory illness after wildfires (Buehler et
al. 2009).
Two more terms are necessary to better understand the signifi-
cance of syndromic surveillance. The first, sensitivity, is the probabil-
ity that an outbreak is detected, given that it is occurring, or has oc-
curred (Kleinman and Abrams 2006). This measure can also be stated
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as the answer to the question: out of all the outbreaks that have oc-
curred in a given time period, how many have we detected? It is useful
in expressing the outbreaks that a system fails to detect. The second,
specificity, is the probability of not detecting an outbreak given that
no outbreak is occurring (or has occurred). As a measure, it is of-
ten used to answer the question: how many of the detected outbreaks
were false positives? Clearly, reasoning using sensitivity and speci-
ficity presupposes that an outbreak actually occurs or does not occur.
Outbreak, however, is an ambiguous term, and to detect an outbreak
is also to contribute to the construction of an event as an outbreak.
For the current discussion, I use a shortcut and reason about out-
breaks as they are reasoned about in outbreak detection literature (as
a detectable event that exists independent of the act of detection), but
in the fifth paper, we locate and analyse a similar construction mech-
anism at work in the term health threat with a more critical perspec-
tive.
An ideal outbreak detection method should detect all outbreaks
and give no false positives, that is, it should have 100% sensitivity
and 100% specificity. In practice, however, these two terms trade off
against one another; more sensitive methods also create more false
positives, and less sensitive methods miss more outbreaks (Bravata et
al. 2004; Buckeridge 2007). The issue is further complicated by the
context-dependent definition of outbreaks. While some diseases with
low prevalence may have outbreaks which consist of a handful of iden-
tified cases, the same number of cases may be considered insignificant
for diseases with high prevalence (Cooper et al. 2006; Buehler et al.
2008).
Syndromic surveillance aims to both reduce the delay in detec-
tion, and to increase the sensitivity of outbreak detection during the
early phases of an outbreak without affecting specificity adversely. To
accomplish this task, syndromic surveillance systems use data sources
collected for purposes other than outbreak detection such as ambu-
lance dispatch logs, emergency hotline calls, emergency room admis-
sions, and over-the-counter medicine sales. It is a broader public health
surveillance practice that takes advantage of the large number of ICTs
used for public health administration. In the fifth paper, we anal-
yse reports from a syndromic surveillance design and development
project, and we discuss some of the implications of using ICTs for
public health surveillance.
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Outbreak Simulation
The second paper in the thesis discusses issues in simulating outbreaks,
primarily with the aim to provide advice to policy makers on out-
break preparedness and response. In an outbreak simulation, a soft-
ware model of a population is infected with a communicable disease
to better understand how it spreads within that population. It is not
necessarily a software-bound method, but many contemporary mod-
els require long and repetitive mathematical computations unfeasible
to perform without a computer.
Outbreak simulations can be divided into two groups: compart-
mental models, and data-driven models. Compartmental models as-
sume the existence of a homogeneous population where individuals
can occupy a particular set of states, and transition between them. Its
most basic form is an SIR-model, named after the three states: suscep-
tible, infected, and recovered/resistant/removed (Anderson and May
1991). In this model, the whole population begins in the susceptible
compartment, and parts or all of it move first to the infected compart-
ment over time depending on the infectiousness of the disease being
simulated, and then to the recovered/resistant/removed after spend-
ing a certain amount of time in the infected compartment. This type
of model often produces clear graphs of the progress of the simulated
disease, and remains widely used as an estimate of communicable dis-
ease spread, both despite and because of its simplicity.
Data-driven models, on the other hand, require complex software
to execute, and rely on having access to a wealth of surveillance data
about the population to be simulated (Ferguson et al. 2005). While the
types of simulations vary based on the available data, in the second
paper we are primarily concerned with simulations that use popula-
tion data, that is, data gathered using different surveillance methods
on parts or the whole of the population. Simulation models that use
population data can be further categorised by the heterogeneity of
the populations they represent. The least heterogeneous are macro-
level simulations, where the individual members of the population
are differentiated by few features, and the most heterogeneous are the
micro-level simulations where the properties of each individual may
differ from the rest (Eubank et al. 2004). The amount of assumptions
that must be made to construct the models varies correspondingly, as
microsimulations require making more assumptions compared to the
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macro-level models.
The second paper highlights our experiences from working with a
simulation model for influenza outbreaks designed to provide advice
to policy makers. We detail some of the difficulties of representing
assumptions articulated by the policy makers in software, as well as
the limitations of regional population data when dealing with policies
pertaining to broader populations.
Sustainability
The second domain covered in this thesis is sustainability. The third
and the fourth paper contain analyses of ICT discourses where surveil-
lance systems are used to contribute to goals such as environmental
friendliness and lowering carbon emissions. Although I have chosen
the label sustainability to position papers three and four which both
focus on ICT design and development projects, the term itself refers
to a much broader set of issues. It originates from an earlier term,
sustainable development, defined in the Bruntland Report as “devel-
opment that meets the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (UN 1987).
Sustainability covers similar issues, but I interpret the term as not indi-
cating a particular focus on development, but emphasising the ability
to sustain needs. While a discussion of sustainability itself remains
outside the scope of my investigations, I recognise that ecological is-
sues are, and will continue to be, significant concerns for contempo-
rary society. For example, Bradley (2009) illustrates how strategies
for sustainability are underpinned by middle-class norms, and uses
a discursive approach to justice to demonstrate the consequences of
various official and everyday sustainability discourses. Shove (2004)
argues that policies designed to promote sustainable consumption use
very narrow models of human behaviour, and may even legitimise
ultimately unsustainable patterns of consumption. Similarly, in the
two papers dealing with sustainability, I have been motivated by the
importance of highlighting the social and political assumptions con-
nected to particular visions of sustainability.
In the texts I have examined for papers three and four, sustainabil-
ity appears as a goal of ICT-based surveillance systems. The systems
discussed in the texts are labelled as smart, which sometimes appears as
a synonym for sustainable, and sometimes works to emphasise a par-
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ticular technology as more desirable. Additionally, the word “smart”
attaches contemporary ICTs to other forms of technologies, including
other, older ICTs. Some examples of these are smartphones, smart
TVs, smart homes, smart grids, smart cars, etc. In all of these exam-
ples, a previously available technology is enhanced using data process-
ing features, and the proliferation of data also brings an increase in the
surveillance performed by and around these technologies.
One digital technological system in particular appears regularly in
papers three and four. Labelled the smart home, it refers to a collec-
tion of technologies that use ICT to monitor, detect, and control a
wide variety of features assumed to be found in homes. For example,
a home can be described as smart if it includes technologies to adjust
indoor temperature according to certain factors such as the outdoor
temperature, the number of people currently present, or the current
price of electricity. These technologies are not necessarily located in-
side the home, but the possibility of manipulating properties of the
indoor space allows the word smart to be associated with the interiors
of residential spaces.
In the third paper, I analyse the discourses of three different ICT
design and development projects that deal with smart homes and sus-
tainability. In these residential spaces, novel surveillance systems are
proposed to aid the inhabitants in behaving sustainably, which in the
texts stands for reducing carbon emissions or providing new ways to
schedule energy consumption within the home. In the fourth paper,
we analyse EU policy documents from the Seventh Framework Pro-
gramme and a collection of projects financed by it which describe
similar systems. In our analysis we focus on the assumption that be-
haviour can be changed using ICT-based surveillance, and problema-
tise this view of technology as a value-neutral vehicle for providing
information to drive behavioural change.
1.3 Contributions
The five papers included in this thesis focus on two domains, pub-
lic health surveillance and sustainability. The first three papers were
all published, and have been included here as published by the three
respective journals, with only type-setting adjusted, to adhere to the
thesis format. In all papers except the third, I have worked in collabo-
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ration with other researchers, and while describing the contributions
I use the first-person plural pronoun for those papers. The individual
contributions of each paper included in the thesis are as follows:
1. We provide a software package for computer-assisted outbreak
detection designed to ease the process of connecting a data source
containing reported cases to various detection methods which
require different ways of formatting the incoming data.
2. We present a workflow for using simulation models to provide
policy advice regarding communicable diseases. We argue that
it is challenging to use, verify, and validate regional and sensitive
data sets, and we emphasise the importance of ensuring that the
assumptions built into the model represent the wishes of the
policy makers.
3. I argue that design documents for smart homes present inter-
secting visions of sustainability entailing the wide-spread use of
ICT. In the documents, the inhabitants are made individually
responsible for living sustainably, and surveillance is positioned
as integral to this future with the help of ICT.
4. We argue that EU policy documents and project descriptions
within the Energy challenge of the ICT category of the Seventh
Framework Programme use models of social change that have
been widely criticised as unlikely to lead to substantial changes
in resource consumption. We show that these texts discuss only
the potential positive effects of technological surveillance, but
neither acknowledge nor require the handling of the potential
negative effects of surveillance within everyday interactions.
5. We argue that reports from a European Commission co-funded
syndromic surveillance project called SIDARTHa construct the
concept of a health threat as a sudden, unexpected event with
the potential to cause severe harm, and one that requires a pub-
lic health response aided by surveillance. We further argue that
syndromic surveillance discourse privileges expertise in devel-
oping, maintaining, and using software within public health
practice, and it prioritises standardised and transportable knowl-
edge over local and context-dependent knowledge.
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The five papers contribute to different fields of research with over-
lapping interests, and to bring them together, I outline my theoretical
framework and a longer discussion concerning methodology in the
following chapters. I also detail additional considerations which mo-
tivated the papers, but were not included in them due to their limited
scope. While working with and studying ICTs, I have encountered a
universalising discourse, one that does not place as much value in lo-
cal contexts and local differences, instead aspiring to create a smooth,
homogeneous body of knowledge in whatever domain it is applied
to. I have observed it as a hammer-and-nail issue: if the only avail-
able tool is ICT, every problem starts looking like a mix of factors
that can be sorted and classified, that is, problems do not exist out
there for ICTs to solve, but they are formulated to fit the available
ICT (Wihlborg 2000). In the last three papers, I have worked to iden-
tify specific examples of this universalising move, and to show what is
valued discursively in different domains.
In addition to the individual contributions of the papers, I have
had an overarching goal which I have been able to approach from
different directions in the last three papers. For that reason, I con-
sider my overall contributions to this goal to be located within those
papers: ICTs are not value-neutral tools that reflect reality; they priv-
ilege some forms of action, and they limit others. They are also im-
bued with values, and different subjects benefit or suffer from their use
differently. My contributions are three empirical studies of surveil-
lance discourses where I identify the forms of action that are privi-
leged and the values that are embedded into them. In these discourses,
introducing ICT entails increasing surveillance, privileging technolog-
ical expertise, and prioritising centralised forms of knowledge.
1.4 Disposition
In the following chapter, I introduce the theoretical framework for
my investigations. I position myself in relation to different theories I
have drawn from feminist theory, surveillance studies, and science and
technology studies. In the third chapter, I discuss my methodological
concerns with reference to the theoretical framework. I motivate why
I chose to study design documents to identify social and political im-
plications of ICT-based surveillance, and why discourse analysis is a
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suitable method for analysing design documents. In the final chapter
of part one, I provide a summary of the five papers, and I state the
answers to my research questions.
The second part includes the five papers in chronological order.
In the earlier papers, my concern is primarily technical, and I aim to
understand and discuss different issues in order to be able to construct
better, more efficient systems. Beginning with the third paper, my
focus shifts to understanding the discourses in which these systems
are described and constructed. The first three papers have already
appeared in academic journals, while the last two have not been pub-
lished yet.

Chapter 2
Theory
To explain how my contributions fit together, I outline my theoreti-
cal framework in this chapter. I begin with a personal account based
on my research experience to introduce issues relevant to my inves-
tigation. I then define my epistemological position, and describe my
interpretations of discourse and its constituents. I continue by in-
troducing theories concerning technologies, and by highlighting the
importance of classifications within them. I conclude with a discus-
sion of theories I have used to understand the different components of
ICT-based surveillance.
2.1 Borders
During my research, working between computer science and other
disciplines within the social sciences and the humanities, such as sci-
ence and technology studies (STS) or surveillance studies, required
that I modify my vocabulary when presenting the same work at dif-
ferent academic institutions. I often described my work as the critical
analysis of surveillance systems, but for audiences not familiar with
surveillance studies, I tended to substitute surveillance with informa-
tion, and then explained how the routine collection and processing
of information could be connected to theories of surveillance. The
terms I chose to modify or leave unchanged led me to question my
own assumptions about different disciplines, and the facts I assumed
to be accepted within them. When I added a slide explaining the term
information systems to a non-computer science audience, I encoun-
17
18 Chapter 2
tered within my thoughts previously unquestioned facts that I have
carried over from my natural science education. More importantly,
I was forced to realise that my classifications of audiences as “com-
puter scientists” or “STS researchers” fell short of describing the het-
erogeneity of any group I presented my work to. My computer sci-
ence affiliation, and my previous degrees from technical universities,
allowed others to position me as a system designer in the projects I
was involved in, providing me with a different kind of access to the
produced material (often in the form of project proposals and system
specifications). The proximity made it easier for me to communicate
with other designers, but also led me to continuously question the
limits of my own reflexivity, and hinted at the existence of questions
that may never occur to me due to the familiarity of the material. For
example, in my research on ICTs for sustainability that I discuss in
papers three and four, I tried to identify how the designers, in their
descriptions of the systems, formulated their problem using the vo-
cabulary of computer science, and how they described the problem as
a purely technical matter, separate from the social and the political.
The possibility of being mobile between different disciplines was
highly productive for my own research. At the same time, however,
I found my own physical mobility to be constrained regularly by my
Turkish citizenship, and the bureaucratic demands that it placed on
me while working in Sweden as a non-EU national. Although travel
within Europe is relatively free of paperwork for its own citizens, for
the non-citizen these issues are much more complex. Decisions from
the Migration Board take anywhere from six months to a year, and
those periods required that I either not leave Sweden, or not return
until the Board had reached a decision. My movement outside the
country was tightly coupled to the delays in the bureaucratic process,
requiring me to plan my attendance to conferences never as a cer-
tainty, but as a possibility that the decision would arrive in time. For
countries that require lengthy visa procedures prior to the visit the
complications were multiplied. For example, towards the end of my
third year, I gave up on trying to attend a conference in the United
Kingdom solely due to the complexity of the visa process, which I
had been informed could require one or more interviews in person.
My most immediate strategy to deal with these various mobility
limitations was to reinterpret the situation as “who is to say whether
borders keep me in, or keep everyone else out”, referring to com-
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monly advertised image of Sweden as a comfortable space. However,
this reinterpretation did not introduce sufficient change; conference
participation and visiting researcher positions that often seem an es-
sential part of academic conduct became simply impossible to accom-
plish for long stretches. I wrote this section originally as an extended
abstract for a workshop where I was inclined to add:
In a strange temporal shift, as I write this abstract, I wait
for yet another extension, hoping that it will arrive in
time to allow me to travel to Copenhagen, but if this doc-
ument has reached you, chances are that I have already
received my extension.
The decision arrived exactly eight months after submitting my
application to the Migration Board, fortunately in time for the work-
shop, allowing me to cross the borders of the Kingdom of Sweden
without risk of detainment. While I have now acquired a Swedish cit-
izenship, and the challenge of European border crossings has eased sig-
nificantly, my personal experience of borders, residence permits, pass-
port checks and endless waiting has remained as a vivid reminder of
a particularly unjust form of bureaucracy made highly efficient with
the help of ICT, and one that countless people continue to experience
while crossing borders every day. It has also informed and motivated
my research into the intersections of ICTs and surveillance.
The massive effort required to uphold a nation state border illus-
trates that it is extremely fragile, that it would disappear if it were
not upheld. Even in its fragility, however, it is a force to be reckoned
with, having immense potential to cause frustration, disturbance and
suffering. Inspired by my encounters with the state apparatus contin-
ually reconstructing its own borders through forms and applications,
I looked for the work of upholding borders in other domains. Aca-
demic disciplines, in close resemblance of nation states, also rely on
the idea of borders with the goal of creating a more homogeneous
mix within than without. Although this clean demarcation serves as
a shortcut for identity, as in “a computer scientist” or “a Swedish cit-
izen”, it is constantly challenged by the intersectionality of the iden-
tities that threaten to spill outside. In facets of identity, the border is
not a discrete line dividing one from another, but a continuum where
change occurs only gradually. When the border is one that surrounds
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a nation state, enforced by the threat of violence, its supporting net-
work extends into the paperwork that needs to be filled before receiv-
ing the right to cross the border, the regulations that need to be fol-
lowed in order to file that application, and the authorities that need to
be convinced that the applicant is a legitimate subject worthy of their
expertise. All play a part in imagining the borders that divide nation
states. The academic discipline also supports itself with less violent
but otherwise similar structures in the form of credentials and affilia-
tions that assert the authority to publish, the norms that must be fol-
lowed to create the suitable scientific article, and the subject that must
be shaped to be accepted by peers as a worthy producer of knowl-
edge. Moving closer to my own research topic, ICT-based surveil-
lance plays a major role in the maintenance of both types of borders.
Through passports, identification cards, no-fly lists, and databases of
movement, the nation states reaffirm the existence of their borders.
The reaffirmation of the borders of an academic discipline through
surveillance is more elusive, but the most recent tool of choice seems
to be the broadening usage of impact factors for journals, and ranking
algorithms such as the h-index for individual researchers, where pub-
lications in a single discipline tend to translate to scores higher than
their interdisciplinary counterparts, with some exceptions for a few
well-known interdisciplinary journals.
Another parallel between the academic and the residence-seeking
subject is in the act of applying: grants for the former, and permits
for the latter. While my experience with the grant-receiving-subject is
limited, I am intimately familiar with the permit-receiving one. Af-
ter participating in the residence permit process several times over the
past few years, I have gradually come to recognise the art of becom-
ing the ideal subject for a residence permit application with its own
collection of taboos and dangerous topics. The performance of this
role leaves material traces visible throughout the application process
(Does the form contain spelling errors? Is it filled out on a computer?
Is the form bent, creased, or folded?), but its most intense activity is
during residency interviews, and to a larger but less embodied extent,
in the free-text fields in application forms that allow deviation from
the standard template for a few lines.
In my performance of the applying subject, I found myself try-
ing to relate to different construction processes that transform the di-
verse into the similar and vice versa. While my residence application
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painted me as suitably similar to reside, my academic persona con-
tinues to gain from a certain difference marking me as the one that
possesses valuable experience of the Other. I pose the questions to
myself, and leave them open: What is it that makes me different, and
in what ways does my difference affect the institutions I participate
in? Additionally, am I different enough, and are my differences repre-
sentative enough of the Other to justify the ensuing privilege of being
granted a position? What role does my gender, race, and ethnicity
play in the perception of myself as a subject?
An academic career provided me sufficient disguise to craft my
own permit-eligible persona for the authorities, which is one facet of
the academic privilege that, like many other types of privilege, tends
to become invisible for those who possess it. Privileges of an academic
career include participating in knowledge production, greater social
mobility, and working further from the production of capital while
benefiting from the fact that we live in a capitalist society, among oth-
ers too numerous to list. I find it important to begin with a discussion
of existing privilege, as the act of occupying a margin seems danger-
ously easy to romanticise. Haraway notes:
But here lies a serious danger of romanticizing and/or ap-
propriating the vision of the less powerful while claiming
to see from their positions. To see from below is nei-
ther easily learned nor unproblematic, even if ‘we’ ‘natu-
rally’ inhabit the great underground terrain of subjugated
knowledges. (Haraway 1990, 191)
While speaking from the margin is certainly a potent resistance
strategy when trying to establish a position to speak from, it may be-
come counter-productive for analysis. That is, even while speaking
about margins of interdisciplinarity, or of citizenship, my discussion
is grounded by the intersections of an academic privilege and a male
privilege (Wennerås and Wold 1997), as well as other types of privilege
which are invisible to me simply because I possess them. Prior privi-
lege will always ground the interpretations power and equality, but it
is essential to acknowledge its presence, and to try to contextualise it if
I am to understand the limits of the knowledge I produce. Having said
that, there is much to be gained from the experience of occupying the
margins. Both in the possibilities of interdisciplinary mobility, and in
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the constraints of the lack of geographic mobility, I find inspiration
and questions waiting to be asked. I use these questions to construct
a stable narrative expressed partially as a thesis, but also as the iden-
tity of a researcher who works at the intersection between computer
science, STS, and surveillance studies.
2.2 Situating Knowledge
I begin with Harding’s (1995) account of strong objectivity to locate
my own role in knowledge production, and to understand my own
role in the intersections of various power relations. Harding argues
that not every subject can access all knowledge in all contexts, point-
ing out that “[s]tandpoint theories argue that what we do in our social
relations both enables and limits (it does not determine) what we can
know” (Harding 1995, 341). As an example, the statements I choose
to include in this thesis can travel far from their spatial and temporal
origins on academic networks, but at the same time they are produced
and distributed in a culture of peer-review that is grounded in confer-
ences and journals which exclude participation outside of a limited
and privileged group of academics. The conventions of the academic
writing format also exclude statements that are not of interest to the
academic community. These are not necessarily shortcomings, but
reflecting on them helps making tacit assumptions more visible. Con-
necting this position to my earlier discussion on privilege, the notion
of strong objectivity pushes me to reflect on my current subject posi-
tions. Specifically, since I am socialised as a man and others identify
me as such, I may not be able to know and understand the oppres-
sive effects of patriarchy, especially because I am more likely to bene-
fit from those structures, regardless of my awareness. This in no way
means that I should not try to know more, but simply that I first need
to acknowledge both the existence of the epistemological gap, and the
potential impossibility to bridging it, before I attempt to cross it.
Harding states the strong objectivity program draws on feminist
standpoint epistemology, which has its own limitations (331). While I
do not provide a discussion of standpoint epistemologies themselves,
I find it important to acknowledge its multiple and contested defini-
tions as a critical feminist theory first emerging in the 1970s and 1980s
by scholars concerned with the relation between knowledge produc-
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tion and practices of power (Harding 2004, 1). Longino argues that
the two claims of some standpoint theories, knowledge as a socially
situated, value-laden construct, and that marginalised standpoints of-
fer “epistemically superior” positions, are in conflict with one an-
other (Longino 1993). In response, Harding states that “[s]tandpoint
theory is not arguing that there is some kind of essential, universal
woman’s life from which feminists (male and female) should start
their thought” (Harding 1995, 344). In strong objectivity, the empha-
sis is not on the essential properties of a marginal subjectivity, but
on how that subjectivity is positioned in relation to knowledge pro-
duction with a necessarily a limited perspective. Continuing with
Harding’s definition, “[s]tandpoint theories, in contrast to empiricist
epistemologies, begin from the recognition of social inequality” (341).
This stance allows theories to be constructed not on a neutral space
shared equally by all, but on a contested ground where the positions
of different knowers influence the knowledge produced by them.
The notion of strong objectivity allows me to describe the place
where I know from, and to locate the knower as a historically and
culturally specific subject. Given this position, I also view knowledge
not as a universal constant, but as a bounded construct that is tied
to its local context. To detail this position further, and to describe
how such knowledge can be used, I turn to the notion of situated
knowledge. Haraway (1990) defines it as a “doctrine of embodied ob-
jectivity” (188), and at the same time as an alternative to relativism
as “partial, locatable, critical knowledges” (191). Situated knowledges
cast doubt on a scientific project that aims to understand everything.
I use the notion to acknowledge the incompleteness of knowledge,
and to be wary of universalising truth claims, especially those that
necessitate reductionism to argue for validity, as situated knowledge
emphasises the locality of knowledge production, and necessitates the
reflexivity of the knower. As Haraway notes:
Feminists don’t need a doctrine of objectivity that promises
transcendence, a story that loses track of its mediations
just where someone might be held responsible for some-
thing, and unlimited instrumental power. (187)
There is a clear tension between what this position entails, and
the truth claims that underlie much of the knowledge production in
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the disciplines of natural science and technology. Through strong ob-
jectivity and situated knowledge, I construct a position to question
these truth claims. Although Harding and Haraway have debated
the compatibility of their programs in detail in their earlier texts (cf.
Harding’s response to Haraway in Harding 1986, 193-194, and Har-
away’s commentary on strong objectivity in Haraway 1996 438-439),
I interpret an emphasis on the subjects involved in knowledge produc-
tion through strong objectivity, and the limitations of the produced
knowledge through situated knowledge as compatible positions in my
own research. Having said that, both concepts have implications for
method choice, on what can and cannot be said through academic in-
quiry (of texts, in my case), which I discuss in the following chapter
on methodology.
Since I have performed my research across several disciplines, first
as part of a health authority, then within two different academic de-
partments, as well as at an applied research institute, I find it essential
to ground my concerns about knowledge production, and the role
of the researcher in theories. One final part of conducting research
across several disciplines, and working in domains which involve the
public (primarily as surveillance subjects in both public health and in
smart homes) from a critical perspective is the issue of speaking for
others. During my studies, I was occasionally asked not only to iden-
tify problems, but to provide more correct ways to solve them as well,
and in these more normative forms (such as project reports), I have
tried to highlight the importance of the voices of those that are not
involved in crafting the solutions. If the answer to the question, “Can
we speak for others?”, is not taken for granted as affirmative, norma-
tive statements about what should be done for others become much
more difficult.
I have found Spivak’s (1988) analysis of the subaltern to be in-
formative when grappling with speaking for and about others, where
she emphasises the importance of acknowledging the potential im-
possibility of hearing and interpreting some statements. As Spivak
suggests, in attempts to speak for the Other, privilege can be consid-
ered as a loss, a condition that makes the subject unable to understand
others. As privilege itself is implicated in creating the marginalised
Other, those who possess it may not be able to detach themselves
from the forces that sustain the divisions. To give up the privilege is
not a solution either, as it is often not possible to begin with, but even
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when possible it may entail giving up the possibility of being heard,
thus rendering the attempt at speaking for others useless. Recognising
these conflicts, I use the notion of privilege as loss (Spivak 1988) to
acknowledge the existence of the subject positions and discourses that
cannot be seen, heard, or interpreted from an academic standpoint
alone.
I use the theories outlined above as their combination enables a
productive meta perspective on my work, and helps me to acknowl-
edge and handle the fluctuating demands of the different disciplines I
attempt to bridge with this thesis. In the course of my work, I have
interpreted texts that describe different types of ICTs used for surveil-
lance, while drawing from my own experiences as a system developer
responsible for designing such technologies. In this attempt, I have
encountered and occupied many different subject positions: computer
scientist, philosophy of science teacher, STS scholar, Turkish citizen,
Middle Eastern immigrant, Swedish citizen, to name a few. I have
tried to incorporate this attempt at understanding whom I speak for
in which context into my research.
2.3 Discourse Theory
Embracing situated knowledges requires questioning the link between
truth and knowledge further, and to do that, I turn to discourse the-
ory and introduce parts that relate to my work. Although my use
of discourse theory, and of discourse analysis which I discuss in the
following chapter, does not concern itself with the validity of truth
claims, investigating the discursive construction of any reality remains
productive for analysis, and necessary for the formulation of situated
knowledges. In the thesis I have followed Foucault’s theories on dis-
course. In a comment on the usage of the term discourse between his
own works, Foucault provides three different definitions (Foucault
1972, 80, cited in Mills 2004, 6):
1. the general domain of all statements
2. an individualisable group of statements
3. a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements
In the first and the broadest definition, discourse is singular, and
every statement belongs to it. The second definition implies that state-
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ments within a particular discourse share a common property that al-
lows them to be separated from others, and to be treated as a group.
The third definition combines statements with regulation and prac-
tice. This is the most productive definition for my work, because it
allows me to focus on rules in discourses, and to investigate how these
rules are expressed in texts. Additionally, the third definition provides
both a non-universal theory for understanding textual exchange, and a
way of locating it in practice. By using the third definition, it becomes
possible to ask: What is considered to be true in a given text?
The role of truth is essential to discourse analysis, and Foucault’s
theories on discourse provide additional tools for their investigation.
Three concepts are essential to understanding the effects of discourses:
power, knowledge, and truth. The first, power, refers to a force im-
manent in all relations, inherently productive, and possible to resist,
or rather, that constitutes resistance (Foucault 1978, 92–96). It is not
only repressive, but also constructive. Power connects the social body,
and it is a precondition of knowledge.
The second element, knowledge, is tied to power. It arises from
power struggles (Mills 2004, 14), implying that wherever we encounter
knowledge, we also encounter the traces of a power struggle which
establish, or have previously established, some objects as belonging
to the body of knowledge. Knowledge and power are intrinsically
linked, and Foucault uses the term power/knowledge to emphasise
their entanglement.
The final element, truth, is a representation within a discourse,
and it is only accessible as part of a discourse. Jorgensen and Phillips
(2002, 12) identify two distinct conceptualisations of truth within
Foucault’s theories: as a system of procedures for the production,
regulation, and diffusion of statements during his earlier work (the
archaeological phase), and as embedded in and produced by systems
of power in his later work (the genealogical phase). Regardless of def-
inition, however, the analysis of truth does not concern itself with
whether a statement is true, or whether it reflects reality. Rather, it
seeks to establish how knowledge is positioned as occupying the posi-
tion of truth.
Although I deal with what I consider to be primarily theoretical
concerns in this chapter, and I revisit issues relating to method in the
next chapter, the two are intrinsically bound. Said (1978) argues that
truth is itself a representation, and describes its methodological impli-
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cations:
[. . . T]he real issue is whether indeed there can be a true
representation of anything, or whether any and all repre-
sentations, because they are representations, are embed-
ded first in the language and then in the culture, institu-
tions, and political ambience of the representer. If the
latter alternative is the correct one (as I believe it is),
then we must be prepared to accept the fact that a rep-
resentation is eo ipso implicated, intertwined, embedded,
interwoven with a great many other things besides the
“truth,” which is itself a representation. What this must
lead us to methodologically is to view representations (or
misrepresentations—the distinction is at best a matter of
degree) as inhabiting a common field of play defined for
them, not by some inherent common subject matter alone,
but by some common history, tradition, universe of dis-
course. (272–273)
The three elements of discourse theory allow the investigation
of how different texts construct their knowledge and present truth
claims. In discourses, the elements are associated with different sub-
ject positions, and the positions are configured in relation to knowl-
edge and truth claims. While the positions and their configurations
may vary endlessly depending on the discourses, two specific posi-
tions, the reader and the author, hold greater significance regardless
of the text. The former is expected to both interpret the text and to
simultaneously occupy different subject positions, for example as an
expert, a student, a citizen, an observer, etc. The latter, on the other
hand, is assigned the responsibility for having produced the text in
the first place. In this context, strong objectivity and situated knowl-
edge have allow me to acknowledge the effects of my own position
as a reader performing discourse analysis. I return to the issue of au-
thorship in the following chapter on material and methods to discuss
the importance of different authorship configurations for documents
written by committees, texts with a large number of authors, or texts
credited to institutions instead of human authors. Through strong ob-
jectivity, situated knowledges, and discourse theory, I have described
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the basis for my epistemological stance. In the following sections, I
turn to issues that relate closely to ICTs as the objects of my study.
2.4 Studying ICTs
To understand ICTs as systems with social and political consequences,
I rely on texts and theories from the field of STS, where many schol-
ars have long been concerned with theorising the technology-society
relationship (Bijker and Law 1992; MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999).
In the domains I have studied as well as in the offices where I have
conducted my research, the word technology is almost always used to
describe digital technological systems. Computers are considered to
be technologies, while other common artifacts such as pencils, sheets
of paper, tables, books or even bridges are not included in the set
of technological objects. Using an STS perspective, I have been able
to understand technology much more broadly as “things that people
have made” (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999, xiv), which has allowed
me to locate ICT as a historically contingent set of relations with ori-
gins in a long history of constructing, using, and modifying tools.
In the previous chapter, I began by stating that ICTs are not value-
neutral (Forsythe 2001). Although this is considered common knowl-
edge by contemporary STS scholarship, it remains a fairly radical
statement in most computer science discourses. While engaged in the
well-known debate on the politics of artifacts, Winner states:
No idea is more provocative in controversies about tech-
nology and society than the notion that technical things
have political qualities. At issue is the claim that the ma-
chines, structures, and systems of modern material cul-
ture can be accurately judged not only for their contribu-
tions to efficiency and productivity and their positive and
negative environmental side effects, but also for the ways
in which they can embody specific forms of power and
authority. (Winner 1980, 19)
The ensuing debate within STS has ventured into questioning the
facticity of the examples (Joerges 1999), and the role of narratives
in constructing knowledge (Woolgar and Cooper 1999), while in a
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computer science context the original argument retains its provoca-
tive power. Especially in discourses that tend toward technological
determinism, stating that technologies are not driven merely by their
own internal logic is controversial enough.
Faced with this conflict, where a statement about the political
qualities of technologies would be considered novel in the discipline
where I received most of my academic training, but common knowl-
edge in other fields I intend to contribute to, I chose to focus on in-
vestigating the specific qualities that would allow me to state the so-
cial and political implications of ICTs. I reasoned that the former
(computer and systems sciences) would benefit from discussions of
ICT beyond efficiency and productivity, while the latter (STS and
surveillance studies) would have room for empirical studies demon-
strating specific implications. Specifically, I have consulted STS litera-
ture while investigating two issues in my analyses of ICTs: the role of
classifications, and the designer-user narrative.
Searching and sorting are fundamental operations for computer
science, and algorithms for performing them are usually the first to
be discussed in most introductory computer science textbooks. Both
activities involve forms of classification where different elements are
placed in different categories. These operations are integral to ICTs as
well. For example, classification is at work when an outbreak detec-
tion system separates some reports of communicable disease belong-
ing to an outbreak from those that are not, or when a smart energy
meter identifies excessive electricity consumption.
Bowker and Star (2000) state that “[t]o classify is human” (1), and
that “[each] category valorizes some point of view and silences an-
other” (5). As an activity both humans and ICTs engage in regularly,
and one that often involves surveillance, I focus on classifications as
constructs with the power to make things appear value-neutral and
natural. If subjects fit into a classification smoothly, they can eas-
ily appear as part of the background. Conversely, those that do not
fit may be burdened with the shortcomings of the classification even
when they are not responsible for the ill-fitting categories. This pos-
sibility marks classifications as important sites when investigating the
social and political implications of ICTs. In a discussion of the race
classification systems under apartheid in South Africa, Bowker and
Star note:
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The advantages are those whose place in a set of classifi-
cation systems is a powerful one and for whom powerful
sets of classifications of knowledge appear natural. For
these people the infrastructures that together support and
construct their identities operate particularly smoothly
(though never fully so). For others, the fitting process of
being able to use the infrastructures takes a terrible toll.
To ‘act naturally,’ they have to reclassify and be reclassi-
fied socially. (Bowker and Star 2000, 225)
By using classifications and sorting subjects, privilege can be as-
signed or withdrawn. Subjects can also be made invisible in a classifi-
cation if there are no categories that can contain them. The categories
that the system can see necessarily exclude other categories deemed to
be unrelated to the problem at hand by their designers. While nec-
essary and not inherently bad, classification involves ethical choices
about what is silenced, and what is valorised (5-6). Their effects also
influence the practice surrounding the classified objects. For exam-
ple, in their discussion of the International Classification of Diseases
(ICD), Bowker and Star state that the discoveries compatible with
ICD are much more likely to occur than a different set of discover-
ies, as the established data collection routines are themselves based on
the ICD, which increases the cost of data collection for alternative
efforts (82). Pargman and Palme (2009) also discuss the implications
of classifying language representation schemes for ICTs in their study
of the ASCII standard, and Lee (2009) describes how particular vi-
sions of about knowledge, education, and learning are inscribed into
technical standards.
Surveillance systems also rely heavily on classification, to iden-
tify, sort, and exclude their subjects (Burrows and Gane 2006; Gra-
ham 2005). Murakami Wood et al. (2006) argue that ICTs, as auto-
mated systems of surveillance, control, and enforcement, divide cit-
izens into separate socio-technical realms of the premium and the
marginal while their agency remains largely invisible. Similarly, Ball
(2005) notes that “[s]urveillance involves the mobilization of informa-
tion categories that order by hidden criteria” (105). Just as functioning
infrastructure fades into the background (Edwards 2003), ICT-based
surveillance also tends to become less visible for those that benefit
from it. This invisibility further strengthens the undisturbed, smooth
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functioning of the technologies that measure and record the outside
world through their sensors. Graham states:
Digital surveillance systems tend to be developed, designed,
and deployed in ways that hide the social judgements that
such systems perpetuate. (Graham and Wood 2003, 242)
When it is difficult to observe systems under development or in
action, it is also difficult to link them to desirable or undesirable out-
comes. At the same time, they do not always function smoothly, and
they can still be overwhelmed by the diversities of their local con-
texts (Graham and Wood 2003). ICT-based surveillance does not al-
ways function as intended, and even when it does, it is challenging to
identify whose intent it is. Often, the term designer is used to denote
a subject position where intent can be located. However, the agency
of the designers or who can be considered in the group of designers is
by no means trivial.
The designers are only one of many groups of actors that play
a role in creating the technologies, and even the act of categorising
designers or users as distinct groups tends to obscure the continually
shifting boundaries of design and use (Suchman 1994a, 2002; Woolgar
1991). While designs can have aims that are articulated explicitly, and
attempts can be made to prescribe their usage both discursively and
materially, the eventual uses of the technologies cannot be inferred
solely from aims or the designers’ intentions (Latour 1988, 22–29).
Within STS, many scholars have demonstrated that technologies are
often used in ways that are not intended or foreseen by the designers,
and that no single, essential use exists for any technology (Oudshoorn
and Pinch 2005).
Both in my earlier work in developing technologies, and in my
later work in analysing texts that describe ICTs, the categories de-
signer and user recur. Initially, I interpreted the work I was involved
in as a design process, providing me with the subject position of a de-
signer. From that position, it seemed easy to label those who would
use the system as users. This framing has been critised as placing the
concerns of technology producers above the concerns of those not di-
rectly involved in the production process (Dourish and Mainwaring
2012). When analysing the discourses of design documents, I have re-
turned to the act of labelling others as users as an important claim
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that aims to establish what the user category should include, that is,
which subjects are considered to be users, and what sorts of agency
are ascribed to them (Suchman 1994b).
2.5 Studying Surveillance
I view ICTs not only as solutions to specific problems, but also as ex-
pressions of a large collection of intersecting positions on how knowl-
edge should be organised and distributed in societies. To develop this
view, I turn towards the field of surveillance studies. I use theories
and findings from the field to frame my discussion of the social and
political implications of using ICT in knowledge production. As I
have stated in the previous chapter, I aim my critique at the tacit as-
sumption that the development and usage of ICTs are always bene-
ficial to society. Describing an ICT as a surveillance system empha-
sises associations to social concerns and political implications. Surveil-
lance practices have been shown to negatively affect those who are
already underprivileged, whether they are ICT-based (Gilliom 2001;
Rooney 2010; Bozbeyog˘lu 2011; Maki 2011) or not (Goffman 2009;
Finn 2011). However, it is also important to recognise that surveil-
lance is not simply an oppressive force to be resisted at every turn.
Depending on the context, it may also entertain (Albrechtslund and
Dubbeld 2002) and empower (Koskela 2002; Shilton 2010), although
this potential is strongly tied to the ability to control interpretive
choices (Ottinger 2010).
Surveillance Society
Within the field, a commonly cited definition of surveillance is “the
focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for the
purposes of influence, management, protection or direction” (Lyon
2007, 14). Although I interpret Lyon’s definition to include non-tech-
nological forms of watching and sorting as surveillance, in this thesis
I am primarily concerned with surveillance performed using ICTs.
Following the definition, it is not difficult to classify the vast major-
ity of ICTs as surveillance systems. They are highly compatible with
surveillance applications, and correspondingly, contemporary surveil-
lance is commonly performed using ICTs as they are especially suited
to performing routine tasks systematically.
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While stating that most ICTs are surveillance systems explains the
connection between surveillance studies and my analyses of ICT de-
sign and development, it does not lead to analytical insights, since
stating that all members of a set are also members of another does not
automatically provide the means to distinguish the differences within
the set. As Ball and Haggerty (2005, 133) point out: “Merely labelling
different sociotechnical relationships as ‘surveillance’ does little to en-
lighten us as to the dynamics of the control, resistance, emergence and
development of surveillance practices.” (133)
To help direct the analysis of the similarities and the differences
of surveillance systems, Lyon provides five “common threads”: ratio-
nalisation, technology, sorting, knowledgeability, and urgency (Lyon
2007, 26–27). I use examples from my studies of sustainability tech-
nologies to clarify the implications of these five threads on the study
of ICTs. Paper three and paper four provide further analyses of these
technologies.
The first thread, rationalisation, appears as a demand to quantify
an ongoing process. For example, in a system for monitoring energy
distribution and consumption, rationalisation drives towards systems
to count the duration, amount, and price of consumption for both
providing and consuming energy. The quantification drive is also
helpful in understanding the second thread, technology. Computers
are highly useful for recording and monitoring, and as these activities
are performed using computers with increasing frequency, the mean-
ing of the activity itself also changes. Technology does not simply
enable an activity, it changes the process. It is a highly complex con-
cept where discourse, practice, and materiality intersect, and an analy-
sis of technology necessitates addressing questions of agency (Johnson
1988). As I have discussed earlier in this chapter, the field of STS pro-
vides a wealth of theories and empirical studies to tackle these ques-
tions.
Sorting, the third thread, and the differential treatment that results
from it are highly important consequences of living with surveillance
systems. How categories are constructed, and how subjects are placed
in those categories (Bowker and Star 2000) are especially important
to investigate when the object of study is ICTs. In these digital tech-
nologies, categories are programmed into the system, either at the
level of hardware or software. This additional conversion allows the
classification to function, but the criteria for deciding membership in
34 Chapter 2
a particular category are made further inaccessible especially if the
program itself is executed as compiled code that is nearly impossible
for humans to decipher. As an example, sorting appears in multiple
forms in ICTs designed for a smart city district: the sorting of waste
as an activity to performed by the inhabitants for recycling, the sort-
ing of activities as energy wasting and energy saving (driving alone in
a private car versus using the public transport), and the sorting of in-
habitants as leading sustainable lifestyles or non-sustainable lifestyles.
The fourth thread, knowledgeability, refers to the knowledge or
awareness of the surveillance subjects about the ongoing surveillance.
Lyon points out that surveillance works best with the cooperation of
its subjects, but “what they do know and what they do with what
they know makes a difference” (Lyon 2007, 27). Some surveillance
systems require or encourage the active cooperation of users, for ex-
ample smart energy meters which offer different consumption and
billing plans. Others also require the explicit agreement of the user,
but once in use they are designed to fade into the background and
achieving a smooth integration with daily life, for example wearable
sensors monitoring bodily signs. Questions of knowledgeability point
to political consequences of surveillance with regards to knowledge
distribution, but they also emphasise the importance of the subjective
experience of surveillance: How much are the surveillance subjects in-
formed about the ongoing monitoring while their traces are recorded
by the systems? Are they able to influence the monitoring process or
the classifications it relies on? Do they resist surveillance, and if they
do, how do they do it?
The final thread, urgency, is particularly important for ICTs where
the speed of searching, storing, retrieving, and analysing are common
concerns. With ICT, records can be transmitted rapidly from place to
place. However, urgency does not necessarily imply short time scales.
For smart electricity meters which motivate their use as sustainable
activities, there are two time scales where urgency is visible: the ev-
eryday time scale, where systems monitor consumption and generate
reports regularly (daily, weekly, monthly, etc.) and urgency appears
as the wish to transfer the reports rapidly; and a longer time scale ex-
tending into the future where consumption methods must be made
sustainable urgently to prevent environmental catastrophes (within
the next 50 years, within two centuries, etc.).
In the definition of surveillance, Lyon includes the phrase “atten-
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tion to personal details”. However, systems which do not deal with
personal details can still be included in the broad category of surveil-
lance systems. For example, environmental monitoring for detecting
temperature spikes, heat waves, or pollution do not directly deal with
personal details, but certainly fit the rest of the definition, and their
use also has social and political consequences.
The five threads of surveillance as defined by Lyon provide dif-
ferent perspectives to analyse and understand surveillance systems.
Through them, I have shown the parallels between ICTs and surveil-
lance systems, and discussed how these elements can be applied to un-
derstand the motivations for constructing surveillance technologies.
The five threads explain what I refer to when I use the term ICT-based
surveillance.
Elements of Surveillance
While the five threads are highly useful in connecting ICT to surveil-
lance and suggesting research directions, an earlier framework, ele-
ments of surveillance (Ball 2002) provides tools for identifying the
social and political implications of surveillance. In the framework,
surveillance comprises four interconnected elements: re-presentation,
meaning, manipulation, and intermediation.
Re-presentation refers to the material aspects of surveillance sub-
jects captured by surveillance technologies. These technologies re-
present the gathered traces, and they allow observers to interpret them
differently. Through technology, these traces are moved between dif-
ferent contexts, taking on different meanings. Much like the technol-
ogy thread suggested later by Lyon (which I have described above),
re-presentation ties knowledge produced by surveillance to specific
technological capabilities to present that knowledge in different forms
and contexts. In the third paper where I discuss smart home tech-
nologies, this aspect of surveillance is especially evident in connecting
ICTs to sustainability. The traces of everyday life at home are re-
presented as consumption stories, which are then used to interpret
whether the surveillance subjects life their lives sustainably. Descrip-
tions of the technical capabilities of the wide variety of sensors present
in the smart home illustrate the facets of re-presentation in the surveil-
lance practice. Movement, temperature and acts of consumption are
routinely observed with the help of sensors placed in the smart home.
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The second element, meaning, refers to interpretations of surveil-
lance, and Ball details its three common meanings, as knowledge, as
information, and as protection from threat, although it is not lim-
ited to these three. According to Ball, knowledge is “held by the
people within the surveilled domain, enabl[ing] it to function as a
socio-technical network” (Ball 2002, 581). It is a type of knowledge
held both by those who perform the surveillance and those who are
watched by it. Another common meaning, information, is one of
the end-products of surveillance for those operating the systems, and
it allows classifications of the surveillance subjects to be made. In
the smart home case from paper three, the collected data are given
meaning by situating them in the process of creating sustainable city
districts, life styles, and travel patterns. With the help of surveillance
technologies, the city district is transformed from a polluting space of
excessive consumption to a clean space of responsible living.
The third element, manipulation, “refers to the inevitability of
power issues under surveillance, not the least because surveillance
practice captures and creates different versions of life as lived by surveil-
led subjects” (583). This element also highlights the subject positions
and the forms of agency available to those under surveillance. Ball’s
definition of manipulation suggests that different interpretations of
technologically mediated events can used by different parties to fur-
ther their own interests, connecting analyses of surveillance to subject
positions of both the watched and those who watch.
The final element, intermediation, “binds (or unbinds) networks
of individual actors or institutions” (Mansell 2002, 4, cited in Ball
2002, 584). Intermediaries mobilise meanings to sustain forms surveil-
lance. For example, demonstrators which provide narratives about
how fictional inhabitants would live sustainably with the help of ICT-
based surveillance (paper three), or project reports that describe sys-
tems to monitor emergency data sources (paper five), act as interme-
diaries in both sustaining and resisting surveillance. When the useful-
ness of a particular technology is questioned, such reports can be used
to argue for their benefits, or for their undesirable effects (paper four).
Ball poses several questions to understand surveillance that arise
from this framework, and two of the questions are applicable to the
last three papers in this thesis:
• “What kind of processes determine the categories used by indi-
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viduals who design software which sorts through surveillance-
generated information?” (587)
• “What kind of power relations are created under different align-
ments of the elements of surveillance?” (587)
The research questions I have stated in the previous chapter have
been based on the above. Referring back to my earlier discussion of
power/knowledge and truth, searching for answers to these questions
also leads to the need to identify the specific forms that truth and
knowledge take in surveillance domains.
In this chapter I have described the theoretical framework that I
use in my investigation of ICT that spans different domains as well as
multiple academic disciplines. This particular configuration of theo-
ries provides me with the tools to analyse ICT-based surveillance crit-
ically, and to both situate and question the truth claims that arise dur-
ing their production. In the next chapter on methodology, I discuss
the challenges of combining practices and findings from different dis-
ciplines while working towards this goal, and I describe my research
process to contextualise the five papers.

Chapter 3
Methodology
The theoretical framework I have presented in the previous chapter is
tightly connected to methodological issues. In this chapter, I discuss
my methodological concerns with reference to my theoretical frame-
work. I motivate why I chose to study design documents to identify
social and political implications of ICT-based surveillance, and I dis-
cuss why discourse analysis is a suitable method for analysing design
documents. Given my theoretical assumptions, deduction is not pos-
sible when analysing texts, as every statement of analysis acts on the
analysed texts. Hence, what is analysed does not remain constant, it
shifts as the analysis proceeds. For that reason, my use of discourse
analysis is necessarily inductive. As I have mentioned in the first chap-
ter, I consider my overall contributions to be located primarily in the
last three papers, with the first two papers serving as the background
that shaped my understanding of ICTs and their implications. That
said, the first two papers constitute an important and necessary back-
drop also for my more recent research. Hence, this chapter focuses
on the methodological issues relating to my overall contributions as
represented in the last three papers, although the discussion remains
relevant for the first two papers as well.
3.1 Design Documents
In ICT design and development, texts can take on different roles, as
research funding applications, project descriptions, system specifica-
tions, policy guidelines, user manuals, scientific publications, etc. In
39
40 Chapter 3
these roles, they influence the shaping and distribution of material and
other resources (Smith 2001). Texts describe what is worthy of obser-
vation and contain valuable pointers when trying to critically analyse
the consequences of living with ICTs. In the projects I have analysed,
the design process is characterised by the occurrence of many meet-
ings, the production of a large number of reports, and development
of deliverables including the technologies. I use the term design doc-
uments to refer to all the texts written during this lengthy process.
These documents express a collective position of a large group of ex-
perts including system designers, project managers, developers, fund-
ing agencies, etc., who may have different or even conflicting goals
individually. The things worthy of monitoring and analysing in data
sources for syndromic surveillance, or in smart homes, are discussed,
selected, and written down in this phase. Star (1999) argues:
In information infrastructure, every conceivable form of
variation in practice, culture, and norm is inscribed at the
deepest level of design. Some are malleable, changeable,
and programmable—if you have the knowledge, time, and
other resources to do so. Others—such as a fixed-choice
category set—present barriers to users that may only be
changed by a full-scale social movement. (389)
These documents contain many indicators of the designers’ inten-
tions, describing what is assumed to be true, and the relationships
between knowledge production and the different subject positions.
However, they may just as easily mislead if the goal is to understand
how the actual implementation functions. For this reason, I focus on
the discourses formed partially by these documents and their impli-
cations. During the design process, these documents are written to
describe the systems fully, to ensure that they can be developed in the
future. Many choices that become invisible later when the system is
operational are clearly described in the design documents.
Differing from interviewing designers, another potential method,
studying design documents makes it possible to describe the system
as it is being constructed. As these documents are also addressed at
other experts, they make it possible to capture the assumptions shared
between different actors involved in the project. They are mostly writ-
ten for an audience that is considered to be part of the design process,
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and they tell stories of how ICTs come to be. Due to these assump-
tions, documents produced during an ICT design and development
project allow interpretations of the expected implications of the tech-
nologies being designed. Bowker and Star (2000) state that “software
is frozen organizational and policy discourse” (135). In design doc-
uments, the specifics of how software comes to freeze at particular
points and not at others can be gleaned from the design documents.
Graham and Wood (2003) emphasise the need to “get inside” the sys-
tems when studying them from a critical perspective, and add:
This might mean switching the focus of research to the
social and the political assumptions that software produc-
ers embed (unconsciously or consciously) into their algo-
rithms years before and thousands of miles away from the
site of application. (242)
What a system is designed for and what it eventually comes to
be used for may differ greatly, but design discourses engage in truth
claims and position subjects, and the implications of these can still
be analysed critically before the systems are constructed. Analysing
ICTs at the design stage opens new possibilities for voicing concerns
about their implications before they become operational. As Winner
(1980) observes, following the implementation of socially demanding
technologies, those who cannot accept the difficult requirements tend
to be dismissed as “dreamers and fools” (38). Discussing design doc-
uments allows concerns about how these systems might affect their
surroundings when they are operational to be raised before they are
implemented.
3.2 Discourse Analysis
Referring back to the definition of discourse I have discussed in the
previous chapter, “a regulated practice that accounts for a number of
statements”, discourse analysis is an attempt to understand textual ex-
changes. It involves identifying what are represented as truths in texts,
and how those truths are constructed. Within the analysis, justifica-
tions that the texts provide, the issues they problematise, as well as the
issues they leave out, are all essential in understanding the construc-
tion of truths in discourses. Beginning with the question of what is
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considered to be true in a given text, other related issues such as the
positionings of different subjects and objects, or the possibilities made
available or unavailable by them can be discussed.
Discourse analysis is a suitable method for locating the possible
implications of ICT-based surveillance in design documents, because
it provides the tools required to investigate the roles assigned to dif-
ferent groups in these texts, and how those roles relate to knowledge
production. In other words, it is possible to identify particular con-
figurations of power relations in texts using discourse analysis. These
configurations can then be used to interpret which groups are given
access to knowledge and the means to issue truth claims, and which
groups are considered to be outside knowledge production. Since de-
sign documents contain not only technical details about how systems
should be implemented but also motivations about why they should
be implemented, their contents necessarily declare what is considered
valuable and hence worth doing. Discourse analysis allows me to re-
late these value assignments to existing power relations, and to inter-
pret their possible implications.
My theoretical framework is compatible with discourse analysis
only if I position myself in relation to the discourses I analyse. I
acknowledge that there is no neutral ground detached from all dis-
courses from which I can provide my interpretations. Every sub-
ject position, including my own, is deeply embedded in different dis-
courses simultaneously, and the act of analysis does not free the text
from all discourses, but merely places it in a different one. As Mills
(2004) explains:
[T]he process of finding a position for oneself within dis-
course is never fully achieved, but is rather one of con-
stantly evaluating and considering one’s position and, in-
evitably, constantly shifting one’s perception of one’s po-
sition and the wider discourse as a whole. (87)
While performing discourse analysis, I position myself as a reader
who will first interpret a discourse, and following the analysis, partic-
ipate in the production of another kind of discourse. While I identify
implicit assumptions in the documents I analyse, I make implicit as-
sumptions myself. Just like any interpretation, my work constructs a
narrative based on the analysed texts, and my analyses construct and
contribute to other discourses.
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Limitations
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the texts I have analysed have
different authorship configurations: some are written by committees
and have a large number of authors, others are credited to institutions.
Additionally, they are often written by a majority of non-native En-
glish speakers. For these reasons, I decided that focusing on language
features such as grammar and wording (which is necessary in a dif-
ferent method such as Critical Discourse Analysis, for example (Fair-
clough 1989)), would not be as productive for answering my research
questions, and that I needed to interpret the texts with more flexibil-
ity, focusing less on factors such as syntax and word choice. In my
analyses, my concern is not identifying the actual intent of the au-
thor(s), but engaging the implications of the objects being described.
The intentions of the authors are necessarily discursive constructions
themselves (hence the impossibility of declaring a singular, actual in-
tent), and these texts circulate and affect the world around them inde-
pendently of the intentions of their authors. Although the subject po-
sition of the author serves different and contested purposes (Foucault
1979), in my interpretations I have focused on the generated discourse.
That is not to say that the author position in general is irrelevant to
my analyses of implications. My point is simply that the intentions of
the authors do not occupy an epistemologically privileged position as
evidence in explaining why certain statements are made, but they do
play their roles in making truth claims as elements of the discourses I
analyse.
I have argued that discourse analysis is suitable for identifying the
possible social and political implications of design, development, and
use of ICT-based surveillance in design documents. However, a con-
sequence of focusing on discourse and on texts to understand surveil-
lance is that the experiences of surveillance subjects are not visible in
my analyses. For example, the experience of being watched by a video
camera differs from that of touching a fingerprint scanner, but provid-
ing a fingerprint to unlock a personal computer also differs from pro-
viding it for a criminal investigation even when the underlying ICT is
identical. Additionally, the same surveillance system may have differ-
ent effects on different embodied subjects depending on their positions
in different power relations (Conrad 2009). Equally important, the ef-
fects of the same surveillance system may be experienced differently by
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different subjects. As Ball argues, “we lose something analytically if
we focus on just, for example, a discursive notion of the subject.” (Ball
2009, 652) Although my investigations concern discursive representa-
tions of surveillance, I acknowledge that subjects are not constituted
solely within discourses. In my research, this translates to grounding
my own claims in the specific discourses of specific design documents,
and recognising that these claims are shaped by my partial perspec-
tive. Although knowledge and truth claims are discursive acts, they
are influenced by the materiality of the contexts they occur in, and
embodied experience remains an essential part of any context. Em-
bodiment matters, because as humans we have access to a vast collec-
tion of subjective experiences of being surveilled, and insights derived
from those experiences matter to studies of surveillance.
3.3 A Collection of Papers
In this section, I describe the five papers included in the thesis. I re-
flect on issues and insights which did not fit into the papers, and I
provide additional details about where and how the papers were writ-
ten, as well as a more detailed description of my method. As I have
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, my contributions are pri-
marily located in the last three papers, and therefore my theoretical
and methodological concerns have primarily dealt with those three.
To highlight the role the first two papers have played in my research,
I discuss them in further detail below.
In the last three papers, I followed a similar procedure for analysing
each document: I began by reading through the text and marking all
sentences that made knowledge or truth claims related to the overall
argument, stated hypotheses, or presented research questions. I also
marked sentences which defined subject positions, either as subjects
acting in some capacity, or as being acted upon. I continued by mark-
ing sentences which informed the reader about the existence of entities
outside of the text, such as external objects. In this category I included
any statements that refer to uncertainty, because such statements also
provide insights into what is considered to exist only partially out-
side the text. After the marking process was complete, I reviewed the
marked sentences for each paragraph, section, and chapter, and tried
to group them according to common themes based on either the top-
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ics they discuss, or the frequency of the words they use (Ryan and
Bernard 2003). I examined these themes in relation to claims about
knowledge, truth, and subject positions. In my analysis, I repeatedly
asked the question “what is considered true in this statement?”, and
answered it by referring to the themes, the collection of marked sen-
tences, as well as the unmarked sentences referenced by the marked
ones.
Paper One
In September 2007, I was employed part-time by the Swedish Institute
for Communicable Disease Control (Smittskyddsinstitutet, abbrevi-
ated SMI) to work as a developer for a software model simulating the
spread of pandemic influenza. After about four months, my employ-
ment became full-time, and my tasks were split between program-
ming the simulation model, and developing a system for computer-
supported outbreak detection. The first paper describes the design
and development of that system.
During this time, I worked with Paul Saretok in programming the
first prototype system, and Anette Hulth led the project and commu-
nicated SMI’s requirements as well as the wishes of the epidemiolo-
gists who were to be the future users of the system. As the project
progressed, we were also joined by Maria Grünewald who worked
on the statistical detection methods used by the system, and Kenneth
Hebing, who initially aided us in connecting the system to the exist-
ing databases at the institute, and took over all software development
and maintenance duties when the project was complete. The system
has since been developed further and remains in regular use at the
institute.
The primary goal with developing a system to detect outbreaks
automatically was to aid the epidemiologists in handling large sets of
data. Our aim within the project was to create a tool that would
be able to provide an up-to-date overview of existing data daily, and
to automate the statistical detection of outbreaks. We hypothesised
that if the system could accomplish these goals, the epidemiologists
would have more time to commit to other tasks that are not possi-
ble to automate, such as the investigation of events that may or may
not be classified as outbreaks, following up on earlier investigations,
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and contacting local health authorities for additional information in
ongoing investigations, to name a few.
My role throughout this project was to program the software. Al-
though we already had access to SmiNet, the Swedish communicable
disease case database (Rolfhamre et al. 2006), which included classifi-
cations of diseases and their subtypes, attempting to transfer that in-
formation into an easily accessible interface was a complex challenge.
Many of the diseases had a large number of subtypes with different
transmission vectors, which meant that they were impossible to ag-
gregate. In the end, we allowed subtypes to inherit the settings from
their parent diseases, but also allowed them to be configured inde-
pendently, meaning that different statistical methods and different pa-
rameters could be used when performing detection for a particular
subtype. During development we received regular feedback from the
epidemiologists about how they performed their work, what indica-
tors they looked at, and how much information they would want
from the system. It quickly became clear that almost every disease
required different parameters, and these depended on a wide variety
of factors impossible to generalise. To support this style of detec-
tion, Maria Grünewald worked with epidemiologists individually to
choose suitable statistical methods, and to come up with parameters
that would allow the detection software to produce the output in line
with the epidemiologists’ wishes. After the initial software develop-
ment stage was completed, we released the source code with a GPLv3
license (SMI 2013b). At this point, Kenneth Hebing took over the
further development and maintenance of the software, and I started
working on the publication describing our work. This period also
coincided with my admission to the Royal Institute of Technology
(KTH) to begin my studies for a licentiate degree.
Although I had already examined many similar systems used in
outbreak detection while developing CASE, performing a literature
review for the first paper also allowed me to systematically investi-
gate the field of syndromic surveillance, where many different data
sources were combined to form indicators for early outbreak detec-
tion. The research in the field promised earlier detection, lower costs,
and highly complex software, all of which appealed to me at the time.
Part of this work informed the first paper, but also provided the ma-
terial that I used later in my licentiate thesis (Cakici 2011a). In 2012,
researchers from SMI published an evaluation of how the epidemi-
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ologists perceived the system (Kling, Grünewald, and Hulth 2012),
which is also described in an SMI report (SMI 2012).
Paper Two
As mentioned earlier, I was initially employed by SMI to work as
a developer for a software model simulating the spread of pandemic
influenza. The second paper, co-authored by Magnus Boman, is based
on our experiences while working with this model. I worked on the
simulation model between the second half of 2007 and the end of
2010, initially part-time, and as part of my licentiate work after 2009.
During this period, I developed a large set of tools to aid in the analysis
of the data, worked on various parts of the code, and developed a
module for testing vaccination strategies within the software model.
In early 2010, after roughly two years of experience with the model,
I started to question the methodological limits of testing vaccination
strategies in simulation models. As my final task in the project, I
prepared the source code for open sourcing using GPLv3 (SMI 2013a).
At the end of the year, I asked for a leave of absence from SMI to finish
my graduate degree and returned to KTH full-time.
The second paper was written during the transition period from
SMI to KTH, and it was published in August 2011. It arose from ex-
tended discussions I had with Magnus Boman on the issues we faced
simulating influenza in software. We converted our experience into
a scientific paper that could inform others in similar situations. We
framed it as a workflow, and provided a set of statements as “lessons
learned”. Many of the lessons were translated directly from issues we
both experienced during the two years which culminated in my depar-
ture from the project. During this time, my familiarity with concepts
such as reflexivity and voice in the text were limited, and revisiting
the text today I find the detached position we assumed in relation to
our material to be a strong indicator of the type of discourse we par-
ticipated in at the time.
Although I had been interested in surveillance systems and the
consequences for their subjects ever since I applied for my first resi-
dence permit to study in Sweden, my experience in this project mo-
tivated me to take into account academic perspectives on surveillance
in my own research.
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Following the submission of the second paper, I started working
on my licentiate thesis based on the research I had performed at SMI. I
successfully defended it in June 2011. The thesis includes my research
on syndromic surveillance, as well as the first two papers I have also in-
cluded in this thesis (Cakici 2011a). After my licentiate defence, I was
informed that my department at the time would not be financing my
studies past licentiate level. Although I remained at KTH for six more
months, I was not able to continue with my PhD work. During this
time, I received funding from the European Institute of Innovation
and Technology, and I worked on a report dealing with syndromic
surveillance and digital cities (Cakici 2011b). This six-month period
gave me the chance to re-evaluate my thoughts on surveillance, and to
start familiarising myself with the field of STS.
Paper Three
In January 2012, I was admitted to Stockholm University as a PhD
student, with 50% co-funding from the Swedish Institute of Computer
Science (SICS). The third paper is based on the research I performed
during my first year at SICS. The projects that financed my PhD were
primarily concerned with sustainability, which meant that I had to
leave public health as a domain of study, although I did eventually
return to it for the fifth and final paper. During this period, I retained
my surveillance focus, and gradually brought in more insights from
the field of science and technology studies into my research.
In the third paper, I investigated how different projects linked sus-
tainability and surveillance with the help of ICT, and how they rea-
soned about the future users of the proposed technologies in their
design documents. In this publication, I switched roles: Instead of
writing design documents and developing systems, I started analysing
them. I found design documents to be open to investigation using dis-
course analysis, and my training as a computer scientist provided the
background to interpret the more technical implications of the sys-
tems described in the documents. At the same time, I was constantly
aware that due to my familiarity with the discipline I was likely to be
blind to many of the assumptions in the texts, and that I risked leav-
ing many problematic constructions unquestioned. As I detailed in
the previous chapter, I believe that everyone who engages in discourse
analysis has to deal with their own relation to text, and to be able to
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proceed with the analysis one solution is to remain aware of the limi-
tations posed by (un)familiarity during the process, and to receive all
criticism from a position of partial perspective.
The paper includes a section describing the three ICT design and
development projects that I analysed. Through my employment at
SICS, I was involved in one of the projects, Stockholm Royal Seaport
(SRS) – Smart ICT. During this time, I authored a report discussing
social concerns related to ICTs for the project (Cakici 2012). The is-
sues I raised in the report were the initial inspirations for the third
paper.
Paper Four
In the fourth paper I collaborated with Markus Bylund. Together, we
identified some common assumptions that appear regularly in texts
related to research on ICT. We chose the Seventh Framework Pro-
gramme (FP7) as it is the most significant source of research funding
in Europe, and correspondingly, the texts used in their calls are highly
influential in shaping European ICT research discourses.
This paper differed from papers three and five because it involved
analyses of policy documents and project descriptions instead of de-
sign documents. Although the form and content of project descrip-
tions resembled design documents closely, dealing with policy doc-
uments introduced new challenges. These described different areas
of research that were being funded by FP7, but they had undergone
many revisions. Additionally, the documents belonged to a large set of
supporting policies which remained constant throughout FP7. One
of the first tasks was to separate the documents that remained un-
changed, and to identify the changes in the revised texts. The pa-
per includes a methodology section providing additional details about
their revision history and how we arrived at the relevant texts.
A much broader question I considered while working on this pa-
per was: Where can the influence of discourses on material flows re-
garding scientific research be located? One candidate was the texts
produced by institutions that finance research, since the process of
writing research applications is essential to contemporary academic
practice. I felt that since applying for funding plays such a large role
in research, texts that describe how and in which fields to apply for
funding would contain potentially problematic assumptions of their
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own. Hence, my participation in the paper was also driven by the
wish to understand the role of critical research, and where it could
potentially make a difference in current practices in a field as broad as
ICT research.
Paper Five
In the fifth paper, I worked together with Pedro Sanches. We began
with a much broader focus on health-related ICT-based surveillance,
and we gradually narrowed it down to syndromic surveillance for this
paper. For my part, the choice was motivated by my previous experi-
ence with computer-supported outbreak detection, and my wish to re-
visit the role of ICTs in public health surveillance from a more critical
perspective. We started from a review of disease surveillance systems
I had included in my licentiate thesis, and we originally intended to
conduct a study involving multiple systems. However, the amount of
documentation available for the different systems was highly varied,
and we eventually settled on examining only one, SIDARTHa, as the
project publicly provided many documents which described different
stages of the design, development, and testing process in detail.
Compared to CASE (the system described in paper one), the scope
of SIDARTHa is much larger, involving multiple member states and
many health institutions. However, the algorithms used in the soft-
ware, and the technical problems described in the design documents
mirrored many of my experiences while working on the development
of CASE. As I began my studies in ICT design and development for
public health surveillance, I felt that it was important for me to return
to the field and to view my earlier work from a different perspective,
and the fifth paper allowed me to do so.
Chapter 4
Conclusion
Surveillance is often an uncomfortable topic to think about, and the
discomfort it causes highlights its importance. My aim was to iden-
tify how ICT and surveillance are linked in different discourses and
to describe the implications of this connection. In this chapter, I pro-
vide a summary of the five papers, I state the answers to my research
questions, and I conclude with some reflections.
4.1 Summary of Papers
The five papers contribute to different fields of research with overlap-
ping interests, and as I have mentioned, I consider my overall contri-
butions to be located primarily in the last three papers, with the first
two papers constituting an important and necessary backdrop for my
more recent research. As before, I use the first-person plural pronoun
when summarising the papers with multiple authors.
In the first paper, “CASE: A Framework for Computer Supported
Outbreak Detection”, we describe the design and development of a
system for national outbreak detection at the Swedish Institute for
Communicable Disease Control. The software package we provide
draws data from a database of case reports, and processes the retrieved
cases using statistical methods that can be selected by the epidemiolo-
gists that use the system. If an outbreak is detected, the system sends
an automatically generated email to those included in the list of recip-
ients for that disease. The system simplifies the process of connecting
a case database to multiple detection methods, all which may require
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different ways of formatting the data. The software package includes
input generators and output parsers for handling the data, and it is
available as open source software, licensed under GNU General Pub-
lic License Version 3. As I noted in the previous chapter, researchers
from SMI have performed an evaluation and found that the epidemi-
ologists consider the system to be valuable for their daily surveillance
work (Kling, Grünewald, and Hulth 2012).
In the second paper, “A Workflow for Software Development With-
in Computational Epidemiology”, we present a workflow for using
simulation models to provide policy advice regarding communicable
diseases. We ground our discussions on our experiences with a spa-
tially explicit micro-meso-macro model for the entire Swedish popu-
lation built on registry data, and we collect the lessons learned into
a check list intended for use by computational epidemiologists and
policy makers. We argue that it is challenging to use, verify, and vali-
date regional and sensitive data sets, and we emphasise the importance
of ensuring that the assumptions built into the model represent the
wishes of the policy makers. The main result is arguably the depic-
tion of the workflow itself.
In the third paper, “Sustainability Through Surveillance: ICT Dis-
courses in Design Documents”, I examine design documents from
three different ICT design and development projects. I argue that
design documents for smart homes present intersecting visions of sus-
tainability entailing the wide-spread use of ICT. In these visions, the
technologies provide ways of judging the inhabitants who are described
as behaving compatibly with such technologies. The inhabitants are
made individually responsible for living sustainably, and surveillance
is positioned as integral to this future with the help of ICT. In my
analysis of the visions from the three projects, I also identify a transla-
tion process that captures the traces of the inhabitants’ lives and clas-
sifies them according to different criteria for sustainable living. These
classifications are later returned to the tapestry of everyday life to con-
vince the users to behave differently. I conclude that in the discourses
of these documents, surveillance translates the traces, and the transla-
tions exert new pressures on existing power relations.
In the fourth paper, “Changing Behaviour to Save Energy: ICT-
Based Surveillance for a Low-Carbon Economy in the Seventh Frame-
work Programme”, we analyse Seventh Framework Programme pol-
icy documents within the Energy challenge of the ICT category pub-
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lished by the European Commission, and descriptions of research
projects granted funding from it, to highlight the uncritical develop-
ment and application of surveillance technologies to change human
behaviour. We identify a belief that human behaviour can be moni-
tored at the individual level to generate different signals, and that these
signals can be used to influence individuals to behave differently. We
argue that EU-financed projects dealing with sustainability and ICT
use models of social change that have been widely criticised as unlikely
to lead to substantial changes in resource consumption. Additionally,
we show that these texts discuss only the potential positive effects of
technological surveillance, but neither acknowledge nor require the
handling of the potential negative effects of surveillance.
In the fifth paper, “Detecting the Visible: The Discursive Con-
struction of Health Threats in Syndromic Surveillance System De-
sign”, we analyse reports describing the design, development, test-
ing, and evaluation of a European Commission co-funded syndromic
surveillance project called SIDARTHa. We show that the reports con-
struct the concept of a health threat as a sudden, unexpected event
with the potential to cause severe harm, and one that requires a pub-
lic health response aided by surveillance. Based on our analysis, we
state that when creating surveillance technologies, design choices have
consequences for what can be seen, and for what remains invisible.
Finally, we argue that syndromic surveillance discourse privileges ex-
pertise in developing, maintaining, and using software within public
health practice, and that it prioritises standardised and transportable
knowledge over local and context-dependent knowledge. We conclude
that syndromic surveillance contributes to a shift in broader public
health practice, with consequences for fairness if design choices and
prioritisations remain invisible and unchallenged.
4.2 Answers
In this thesis, I posed the following questions: (i) What is the role
of surveillance in the discourses of ICT design and development for
sustainability and for public health? (ii) How are surveillance sub-
jects positioned in relation to ICT-based surveillance in these two dis-
courses? (iii) What are the implications of these positionings? I detail
answers to each question with pointers to the relevant papers below.
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I identified the role of surveillance in the discourses of ICT de-
sign and development for sustainability in paper three and paper four,
and for public health in paper five. In these discourses, surveillance
is a method of knowledge production where individuals are viewed
as a source of information. ICT makes the collection and processing
of information possible at a large scale, and different claims are made
about the monitored world based on the gathered traces. When de-
signing systems for smart homes, the traces of the inhabitants tracked
by ICTs are essential to claims of sustainability, environmental friend-
liness, and low carbon emissions. These claims are made stronger by
surveillance because they are linked to subjects outside the system. In
public health, surveillance is necessary for understanding the current
health state of the population. In paper one, case databases contain-
ing records of individuals who have contracted communicable diseases
are essential to the outbreak detection. Surveillance is used initially to
produce knowledge about the population, and the outbreak detection
system contributes to the produced knowledge with statistical detec-
tion methods and ways of linking different data sources. In paper five,
surveillance is not only necessary for understanding, it is essential to
constructing the notion of a health threat as a sudden, unexpected
event with the potential to cause severe harm.
As mentioned above, surveillance subjects are positioned in rela-
tion to ICT-based surveillance as sources of information. Addition-
ally, in the discourses I analyse in paper three and paper four, they
are made individually responsible for changing their behaviour based
on the information they receive, and living sustainably using the ICTs
designed and developed for that purpose. This also entails a kind of ex-
pertise that the inhabitants must acquire to operate the technologies.
The systems described in the design documents make the differences
in subjects commensurable with one another, aiding the creation of
new categories such as the smart home inhabitant and the sustainable
city district. The subjects are sources of information, but within the
discourse, the classifications used by the systems to make truth claims
remain invisible to the subjects. They are not given the agency to
contest the produced knowledge.
One implication of these positionings is that ICT-based surveil-
lance appears as value-neutral, seemingly representing the world as it
is, instead of actively constructing it. This position is also instrumen-
tal in reducing social and political concerns about knowledge produc-
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tion to issues of efficiency and productivity. It prioritises competence
in building ICTs, as well as technological advancement and economic
growth aided by surveillance. In syndromic surveillance discourses,
such expertise is prioritised within public health practice, and the
needs of those who will use the systems are made secondary to con-
structing standardised and transportable knowledge. Furthermore,
subjects under surveillance are represented as passive sources and re-
ceivers of information, and as paper four argues, representing them
as such is unlikely to lead to the substantial changes that the design-
ers aim at. Finally, in the domain of sustainability, ICTs are assumed
to be valuable for society as a whole simply because their domain is
sustainability, but on the contrary, social inequalities and discrimina-
tory biases can also be sustained by these technologies (Alaimo 2012),
necessitating critical investigations of ICT-based surveillance.
The high technical complexity of the ICTs represented in the texts
suggest proportionally high costs of development. The implications
of these costs are essential to understanding the effects of developing
the systems, especially if the motivations include sustainability or low-
ering carbon emissions. As with many other infrastructural projects,
it is possible that the benefits created by these systems remain local to
where the systems are installed while their harmful effects are pushed
away, e.g., electricity consumption is decreased in the new city dis-
trict while natural resources from another region far from the new
city district are exhausted in creating the computer screens that visu-
alise electricity consumption.
To build ICTs is to encode a particular way of seeing the world
into software and hardware. As Bowker and Star (2000) note, in clas-
sification “[p]olitically and socially charged agendas are often first pre-
sented as purely technical and they are difficult even to see.” (196) The
categories that these systems are designed to construct and uphold
come at the expense of other categories and alternative classifications
that are deemed unrelated to the problem at hand by their design-
ers. Excluding and sorting may very well be necessary for the systems
to function, but the decisions about what the system should observe
must be made with the constant awareness of the possibilities that are
not followed when the decision is made, as those that would have ben-
efited from the paths not followed may consider the resulting systems
to be severely inadequate for their own needs.
56 Chapter 4
4.3 Conclusion
I set out to locate the influence of discourses on material flows for
scientific research, and my investigation led me to design and policy
documents. I aimed my critique at the tacit assumption that the de-
velopment and usage of ICTs are always beneficial to society. I iden-
tified this assumption as part of a universalising discourse, one that
does not place as much value in local contexts and local differences,
instead aspiring to create a smooth, homogeneous body of knowledge
in whatever domain it is applied to.
As I state in the third paper, sometimes ICT might be the wrong
answer. ICTs can be oppressive, even when that is not the designers’
intention, because they embody complex power relations expressed
in software and hardware. Categories embedded into ICT can be un-
derstood as attempts to control and discipline those who use the sys-
tems, although as with any other expression of power, they can be
contested and resisted as well. On the other hand, they can also em-
power subjects by encouraging cooperation, granting a sense of safety,
and allowing companionship to prosper over great distances. The pro-
ductive potential of ICT-based surveillance is always present, but it is
fraught with danger. Foucault asserts:
My point is not that everything is bad, but that every-
thing is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If
everything is dangerous, then we always have something
to do. (Foucault 1982, 343)
ICTs are not disconnected from contexts, and they are never with-
out values. Hence, it is not possible for them to be neutral in any sense
of the word. As I have demonstrated, the discursive move to portray
them as value-neutral is highly problematic. It is not that the texts
and their authors occupy this position to actively avoid being tied to
a particular perspective, but that they are unaware of occupying any
perspective, as if viewing the world from nowhere. As wide-spread
as this view may be, there are other ways. Bowker and Star (2000)
argue that “a key for the future is to produce flexible classifications
whose users are aware of their political and organizational dimensions
and which explicitly retain traces of their construction” (326). ICTs
need not be judged only on their cost-efficiency, or their feasibility.
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As social and political constructs, it is possible to reason about them
differently, not simply as tools for solving problems, but as histori-
cally and culturally specific methods for organising knowledge pro-
duction in societies. Adopting these perspectives, it becomes possible
to reach beyond a deterministic view of technological progress, and
reason about alternatives. Haraway explains:
So, with many feminists, I want to argue for a doctrine
and practice of objectivity that privileges contestation,
deconstruction, passionate construction, webbed connec-
tions, and hope for transformation of systems of knowl-
edge and ways of seeing. (Haraway 1990, 191–192)
Different configurations of knowledge production are always pos-
sible, and in guiding alternative ways of knowing, the essential ques-
tion remains unchanged: Who benefits from ICT-based surveillance,
and who suffers its costs?
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CASE: A Framework for
Computer Supported
Outbreak Detection∗
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Grünewald‡, Paul Saretok‡, and Anette Hulth‡
Abstract
In computer supported outbreak detection, a statistical method
is applied to a collection of cases to detect any excess cases for
a particular disease. Whether a detected aberration is a true
outbreak is decided by a human expert. We present a techni-
cal framework designed and implemented at the Swedish In-
stitute for Infectious Disease Control for computer supported
outbreak detection, where a database of case reports for a large
number of infectious diseases can be processed using one or
more statistical methods selected by the user. Based on case
information, such as diagnosis and date, different statistical al-
gorithms for detecting outbreaks can be applied, both on the
disease level and the subtype level. The parameter settings for
∗Cakici, Baki, Kenneth Hebing, Maria Grunewald, Paul Saretok, and Anette
Hulth. 2010. “CASE: A Framework for Computer Supported Outbreak Detection.”
BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 10 (1): 14.
†Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), 164 40 Kista, Sweden
‡Swedish Institute for Communicable Disease Control (SMI), 171 82 Solna, Swe-
den
71
72 Chapter 5
the algorithms can be configured independently for different
diagnoses using the provided graphical interface. Input genera-
tors and output parsers are also provided for all supported algo-
rithms. If an outbreak signal is detected, an email notification is
sent to the persons listed as receivers for that particular disease.
The framework is available as open source software, licensed
under GNU General Public License Version 3. By making the
code open source, we wish to encourage others to contribute
to the future development of computer supported outbreak de-
tection systems, and in particular to the development of the
CASE framework.
5.1 Background
In this paper, we describe the design and implementation of a computer
supported outbreak detection system called CASE (named after the pro-
tagonist of the William Gibson novel Neuromancer), or Computer
Assisted Search for Epidemics. The system is currently in use at the
Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease Control (SMI) and performs
daily surveillance using data obtained from SmiNet (Rolfhamre et al.
2006), the national notifiable disease database in Sweden.
Computer supported outbreak detection is performed in two steps:
1 A statistical method is automatically applied to a collection of
case reports in order to detect an unusual or unexpected number
of cases for a particular disease.
2 An investigation by a human expert (an epidemiologist) is per-
formed to determine whether the detected irregularity denotes
an actual outbreak.
The main function of a computer supported outbreak detection sys-
tem is to warn for potential outbreaks. In some cases, the system
might be able to detect outbreaks earlier than human experts. Addi-
tionally, it might detect certain outbreaks that human experts would
have overlooked. However, the system does not aim to replace human
experts (hence the prefix “computer supported”); it should rather be
considered a complement to daily surveillance activities. To a smaller
extent, the system can also aid less experienced epidemiologists in
identifying outbreaks.
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Systems for outbreak detection which support multiple algorithms
include RODS (Tsui et al. 2003), BioSTORM (Crubezy et al. 2005)
and AEGIS (Reis et al. 2007). Additionally, computer supported out-
break detection systems operating on the national level have been used
previously in a number of countries, including Germany (Krause et
al. 2007) and the Netherlands (Widdowson et al. 2003).
Health Care in Sweden
The health care system in Sweden is governed by 21 county councils.
Each county has appointed a medical officer, who is in charge of the
regional infectious disease prevention and control. Every confirmed
or suspected case of a notifiable disease is reported both to the county
medical officer and to SMI. At SMI, the regular national surveillance
is currently performed by thirteen epidemiologists, each in charge of
a number of different diseases.
All 21 county medical officers as well as the majority of the hos-
pitals and the laboratories in Sweden are connected to the SmiNet
database. The database collects clinical reports and information on
laboratory verified samples. In 2008, a total of 174811 reports were
submitted to SmiNet. 87 per cent of these reports were submitted
electronically and those that were not submitted electronically were
entered into SmiNet manually. Of the 92744 lab reports, as much
as 97 per cent were submitted electronically and 62 per cent fully au-
tomatically. The reports were subsequently merged into 74367 case
reports. These reports form the basis of the data used by CASE to
perform outbreak detection.
5.2 Implementation
CASE is designed to be administered using a graphical interface, and
can operate on all of the 63 notifiable diseases in Sweden. One or more
statistical detection methods can be applied to each disease. If more
than one method is activated, result reports are generated indepen-
dently. By default, the data are aggregated over all disease subtypes,
but the system allows detection of single subtypes as well. When an
outbreak signal is generated, an alert is sent by email to all members
of the notification list for that particular disease.
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CASE is composed of three interconnected components for config-
uration, extraction and detection. The configuration component pro-
vides a graphical user interface for modifying detection parameters
and editing the list of recipients for generated alerts. The extraction
component is used to copy data from the national case database to the
local database. The detection component is scheduled to run at regu-
lar intervals and automatically applies the chosen statistical methods
to the currently selected diseases.
System Description
CASE is developed using Java to ensure platform-independence of all
components. Currently at SMI all three components run on Ubuntu,
a Linux-based operating system. The local database for CASE is MySQL
and the national database, SmiNet, is Microsoft SQL Server 2005.
Figure 5.1 shows the flow of information within the framework.
The extraction and detection components are scheduled to run once
every 24 hours at midnight using the standard Unix scheduling service
cron. When the extraction component is executed, it transfers data
from SmiNet to the local database. The local database stores the case
data and the configuration parameters for all algorithms. The config-
uration module can be used to view and modify the parameters. The
detection component is executed automatically after all required data
have been extracted from SmiNet. It applies the detection methods
with the given parameters to the case data for the selected diseases,
and emails notifications if any alerts are generated. Detailed logs of
these processes are generated automatically.
Configuration
The configuration component is a graphical user interface that allows
the administrator to mark diseases for detection, choose the detection
methods to be applied to each diagnosis/subtype and manage the list
of epidemiologists that will receive alerts in case a warning is gener-
ated. The settings are stored in a local database that is also accessed
by the other two components. The system can be administered by
multiple users who access the same local database.
Figure 5.2 shows a screenshot of the graphical user interface for
the CASE administrator. The notifiable diseases are displayed in the
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Figure 5.1: A flowchart demonstrating the detection process in
CASE.
left column. These entries can be expanded using the arrow to display
their subtypes. Parameters for the current selection are shown on the
right hand side. The Algorithms tab lists the available methods. Pa-
rameters for the selected method can be modified by double-clicking
the name of the method. The E-mail tab contains a list of recipients
for the selected disease and/or subtype. If an alert is generated after
detection, the algorithm that generated the alert is highlighted in red.
The flag is automatically cleared every night before a new detection
batch is executed.
Extraction
CASE uses data retrieved from SmiNet to perform outbreak detec-
tion. A case report is created in SmiNet when a clinical or a labo-
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Figure 5.2: A screenshot of the graphical user interface for the
CASE administrator.
ratory report is received, provided that this patient does not already
exist in the database. When additional reports arrive, the original
case report is automatically updated with the new information. De-
pending on the number of days that have elapsed since the last time
a patient received a particular diagnosis, a new case report might be
created for the same diagnosis and patient. For a detailed technical
description of SmiNet, see Rolfhamre et al. 2006.
The extraction component populates the local database with data
from the case reports stored in SmiNet. Diagnosis, lab species, date,
and reporting county are copied for every case, except those with in-
fections that are reported to have originated abroad. No information
that can reveal a patient’s identity is used in the outbreak detection
process. There are approximately twenty dates in SmiNet for each
case report, ranging from dates that are automatically generated by
the system to dates entered by the clinician or the laboratory. There
is, however, only one date that is available on all case reports, namely
statistics date. This automatically set date corresponds to when a pa-
tient first appears in SmiNet with a particular diagnosis. The date that
would best reflect when a patient fell ill is the date when the sample
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was taken from the patient. However, many case reports do not con-
tain this date. For example, for 2008 this date is missing in 29 per cent
of the case reports. When the case information is copied from SmiNet
to the local database, the extraction component fetches the statistics
date as the date for the case.
Detection
CASE is developed by the Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease
Control, and has a national perspective on outbreaks. Its primary
role is to find outbreaks that cover more than one county, especially
those with few cases in each affected county, as these might be difficult
to detect for the local authorities.
The detection component uses the selected statistical method(s)
on all activated diseases and sends notification emails if any alerts
are raised. If there are too few data points for a detection algorithm
to produce a result — which is often the case for detection on the
subtype level — this information is written to the log file. The sys-
tem currently supports four different statistical methods for detec-
tion: SaTScan Poisson (Kulldorff 1997), SaTScan Space-Time Permu-
tation (Kulldorff et al. 2005), an algorithm developed by Farrington et
al. (1996), and a simple threshold algorithm. The methods are briefly
described below. Three of the four methods are freely available im-
plementations, while the fourth was developed within the project and
is included in CASE’s source code. For the external programs, input
generators and output parsers are also contained within the source
code. It is possible to extend the system with additional statistical
methods, although this requires a certain familiarity with the Java
programming language. We are currently in the process of adding
the OutbreakP method (Frisén, Andersson, and Schiöler 2009) to the
core package.
SaTScan is a freely available spatial, temporal and space-time data
analysis platform (SaTScan). Two algorithms from this application
are used in CASE: SaTScan Poisson which uses the discrete Poisson
SaTScan model to search for spatial clusters and SaTScan Space-Time
Permutation, which searches for spatio-temporal clusters. Both mod-
els are applied to data at the county-level resolution. The population
data required by SaTScan Poisson are obtained from Statistics Swe-
den (SCB). The SaTScan Poisson parser, developed specifically for
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CASE, raises an alert if a detected cluster ends within the last week.
The third detection method was developed by, and is in regular use
at the Health Protection Agency in England and Wales (Farrington et
al. 1996). In CASE, we use the surveillance R-package implemen-
tation (Höhle 2007) of the method and we refer to it as the Farrington
algorithm. The algorithm is used on data aggregated at the national
level, to investigate if the current disease incidence exceeds that of the
reference data from previous years. The CASE parser for the Farring-
ton output ensures that an alert is sent only if an exceedance occurred
during the last two weeks. The required window size is implemented
as a sliding window of seven days and detection is performed daily.
The threshold algorithm is used to generate alerts when the number
of cases for a particular disease rises above a manually defined value,
with the number of cases aggregated at the national level.
For all methods, as long as an outbreak is ongoing according to the
results of the statistical analysis, a new alert is raised every night. Fig-
ure 5.3 shows an alert email that is sent to the recipients of “MRSA in-
fection”. The graph is automatically generated by the detection com-
ponent and shows all computed alarms on the x-axis. The computed
threshold is denoted by the blue curve (the graph in Figure 5.3 was
generated using simulated data). The email also includes a brief de-
scription of the algorithm that generated the alarm.
5.3 Results and Discussion
CASE is a technical framework designed to ease the process of con-
necting a data source with reported cases to various statistical meth-
ods requiring different input formats. When using CASE, the user
can select the methods that are best suited to the characteristics of a
particular disease.
CASE can also be used as a platform for comparing different de-
tection algorithms, although that is not its primary purpose. Since
all algorithms use the same data, running multiple detection methods
on the same disease regularly and comparing the successful detections
and the false warnings can provide insights into the accuracy of a cer-
tain method for a given disease. Comparisons and evaluations of the
statistical methods currently included in CASE can be found in, for
example, Rolfhamre and Ekdahl (2005) and Aamodt, Samuelsen, and
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Figure 5.3: A sample email for a disease alert.
Skrondal (2006). Here, the importance of calibrating the parameters
for the detection methods must be emphasized, something which is
still an ongoing work at SMI.
At present, the evaluation of the system is mainly qualitative, con-
sisting of frequent discussions between the epidemiologists and the
CASE developers. There is, however, a need for more systematic eval-
uations of the system, including a questionnaire assessing the users’
experience, in addition to quantitative evaluations of the performance
of the algorithms and the parameter settings. To facilitate the quan-
titative evaluations, we plan to extend the functionality of CASE to
incorporate an evaluation module allowing the algorithms to be run
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retrospectively, with analysis carried out for each day in a specified
time period. The main objective is not a general comparison of the
algorithms, but an assessment of their performance in the specific con-
text of the data they are used on. Where external data telling when
actual outbreaks have occurred are available, measures such as sensi-
tivity and specificity can be calculated. The evaluation module would
provide valuable guidance in the choice of algorithms and parameter
settings for the end user. Another evaluation feature we consider im-
plementing is the possibility to run simulated data in the system.
CASE currently uses emails for notification. The advantage of this
approach is that it presents information to the users in a familiar way
and does not require them to learn how to operate a new interface.
The disadvantage, on the other hand, is that the system becomes one-
sided if the emails do not include a feedback mechanism. Regardless
of the actual implementation, a system for providing feedback from
the receivers of the signals is essential. Currently, users who would
like to provide feedback on CASE output are instructed to email the
administrator.
As expected, a relatively simple method operating on accurate and
informative data produces better results than a complex method oper-
ating on noisy data. Therefore, the most important factor for creating
a reliable outbreak detection system is to ensure the quality of the
input data. If the input is not reliable, improving the data collection
process from local medical centres is a much better investment than
trying to perform automatic detection on inaccurate data. Addition-
ally, expectations from an automated detection system must be realis-
tic. For a computer, detecting ongoing outbreaks and seasonal regular
outbreaks is possible, but predicting an outbreak at onset is currently
not feasible.
CASE is designed primarily to analyze case reports and does not
provide syndromic surveillance support using external data sources,
unlike RODS (Tsui et al. 2003) or BioSTORM (Crubezy et al. 2005).
The only requirement for the operation of CASE is access to a case
database for notifiable diseases. All scripts to create and configure the
intermediate local database are included in the software package. The
local database is used to selectively copy and store case reports after re-
moving all information that can reveal a patient’s identity. We believe
that the ease of configuration and maintenance in addition to the pos-
sibility of operating without storing highly sensitive data make CASE
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a strong candidate for use in national infectious disease surveillance.
5.4 Conclusions
In this paper we have described the design and implementation of a
publicly available technical framework for computer supported out-
break detection. The source code is licensed under GNU GPLv3 (FSF)
and is available from https://smisvn.smi.se/case.
The CASE framework is designed to be a complete system for
computer supported outbreak detection at the national level. We are
aware that any outbreak detection system must always be adapted to a
particular context, where national requirements and regulations will
affect the implementation of the system. Such adaptations can easily
be made within the described framework. By making the code open
source, we wish to encourage others to contribute to the future de-
velopment of computer supported outbreak detection systems, and in
particular to the development of the CASE framework.
Availability and Requirements
The source code for CASE is licensed under GNU General Public Li-
cense Version 3 (GPLv3), and is available for download from https:
//smisvn.smi.se/case. The provided documentation and the in-
terface are written in English. The following software must be in-
stalled on the target system in order to use CASE:
• Linux or Windows operating system that can run Sun Java Run-
time Environment 6.0 (or higher)
• MySQL 5.1 (or higher)
• SaTScan version 8.0.1 (or higher)
• R version 2.9.1 (or higher)
• ImageMagick 6.5.4 (or higher)
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Abstract
A critical investigation into computational models devel-
oped for studying the spread of communicable disease is pre-
sented. The case in point is a spatially explicit micro-meso-
macro model for the entire Swedish population built on reg-
istry data, thus far used for smallpox and for influenza-like
illnesses. The lessons learned from a software development
project of more than 100 person months are collected into a
check list. The list is intended for use by computational epi-
demiologists and policy makers, and the workflow incorporat-
ing these two roles is described in detail.
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6.1 Introduction
Computational Epidemiology
In 1916, Ross noted that mathematical studies of epidemics were few
in number in spite of the fact that “vast masses of statistics have long
been awaiting proper examination” (Ross 1916, 205). In the 90 years
which followed, the studies made were analytic, and the micro-level
data available were largely left waiting, to leave room for systems
of differential equations built on homogeneous mixing. This is re-
markable not least because the modeling problem remains the same
throughout history: “One (or more) infected person is introduced
into a community of individuals, more or less susceptible to the dis-
ease in question. The disease spreads from the affected to the unaf-
fected by contact infection. Each infected person runs through the
course of his sickness, and finally is removed from the number of
those who are sick, by recovery or by death. The chances of recov-
ery or death vary from day to day during the course of his illness.
The chances that the affected may convey infection to the unaffected
are likewise dependent upon the stage of the sickness.” (Kermack and
McKendrick 1927, 700). Heterogeneity is present already in this clas-
sic description, in several places; susceptibility, morbidity, and also
contact patterns, if only implicitly. Only with the advent of powerful
personal computers, were micro-level data given a role in the modeling
of epidemics. Executable simulation models in which each individual
could be modeled as an active object with its own attributes (Boman
and Holm 2004), often referred to as an agent, began to appear (Eu-
bank et al. 2004; Ferguson et al. 2005; Longini et al. 2005). A new area
within computer science, computational epidemiology, has recently
become established as the scientific study of all things epidemiological
except the medical aspects. This area is turning into computational
science (see, e.g., Balcan et al. 2010), following the example of compu-
tational biology, computational neurology, computational medicine,
and several other new areas focusing on building computationally ef-
ficient executable models. This development also includes the social
sciences, as in computational sociology (Epstein 1999).
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Model Description
The model on which the analysis below is based has been continu-
ously developed since 2002 by a cross-disciplinary group of researchers
from the fields of medicine, statistics, mathematics, sociology and
computer science. Since 2004, a team of developers have implemented
various versions of a software tool, representing the computational
part of the model, recently made available as open source software and
licensed under GNU General Public License Version 3 (SMI 2010). In
parallel with the implementation, the requirements on the model have
changed many times. It began as a model for predicting the effects of
a possible smallpox outbreak in Sweden (Brouwers et al. 2010), which
was later transformed into a model for studying pandemic influenza,
and is now a model that could be used for many different kinds of
communicable disease studies (excluding vector-borne diseases, i.e.,
diseases with animal reservoirs). The model is a detailed representa-
tion of real situations, sometimes referred to as a tactical model, as op-
posed to simpler strategic models (Coelho, Cruz, and Codeco 2008).
For instance, the model was recently used to study a fictitious scenario
of H4N6: a new influenza virus strain that was assumed to be deadly,
highly contagious, and introduced into a completely susceptible pop-
ulation. In all, the development project has included more than 100
person months of implementation work, and consists of more than
5000 lines of C++ code.
The parameters used to represent individuals in the model are age,
sex and current status (alive or deceased). Each individual is also as-
signed a home, a workplace, and a department within that workplace.
The movement of individuals outside of home and workplace are rep-
resented using travel status (home or in another location), emergency
room visits, and hospitalizations.
Infections caused by social contact outside of work or home are
classified as context infections. When the context infection process
is active, there is a probability that an infectious individual will infect
those that live within a fixed radius. Context contact radius defines the
size of neighborhoods, mirroring the interaction of every individual
with others, based on geographical proximity and the social network.
The disease affects every individual through three parameters: in-
fectiousness, death risk, and place preference. The infectiousness pa-
rameter influences the probability that the infected individual will
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infect others in the same home, workplace, or neighborhood. The
death risk depends on the disease level and is expressed as a proba-
bility. Place preference is the probability distribution used when de-
ciding where the individuals will spend their day (workplace, home,
primary care, or hospital). These parameters are defined for five levels
of severity: asymptomatic, mild, intermediate, severe, and critical. In
addition, there are four disease profiles: asymptomatic, mild, typical,
and atypical.
The model description is combined with Swedish data on work-
places, households, and individuals. Workplaces include companies,
schools, healthcare, and other state institutions. For each workplace,
the data indicate the total number of workers, geographical coordi-
nates, and workplace type. The current version of the simulation
platform uses data from the Swedish Total Population Register, the
Swedish Employment register, and the Geographic Database of Swe-
den (cf. SCB 2010).
Because the model was developed with the purpose of being run
with data for the country of Sweden, it has been used solely for study-
ing outbreaks in that country. Sweden has relatively many infec-
tion clinics and good international reputation for detailed clinical re-
ports of communicable disease. Thus, in some areas of disease con-
trol, Sweden works well as a role model. Other countries face spe-
cial local problems, however, and results have sought to be generaliz-
able, for example contributing to the complicated model of EU care-
seeking behavior. Generally speaking, the project goals have included
to sensitize policy makers to the scope of possible disruption due to a
newly emergent disease event, and to identify a range of policy han-
dles which can be used to respond to such an episode.
A sample case description illustrates how an experiment would be
described using the executable model. The sample case simulates the
effects of pandemic influenza in Sweden, without any interventions,
for 300 days. The simulation is initiated with 50 infected individuals,
randomly selected from the entire population. Since the data set is
registry data for the entire country, any random selection procedure
is uniform, i.e., an individual has a 50 in nine million chance of being
initially infected. This does not mirror realistic spread, which would
more typically be an airplane or a boat arriving to Sweden with one
or more infected individuals on board, but in the sample case it at
least provides an opportunity to discuss the complex matter of how
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epidemics start. The maximum size for an office is set to 16 individ-
uals and all workplaces with more than 16 employees are split into
departments, each containing 16 or fewer members. This value is not
arbitrary, but corresponds to the average size of a Swedish workplace.
Context contacts—the parameter representing the average number of
contacts outside the home or the workplace—is set to 15. Even if
that number was recommended by the sociologists in the project, it is
somewhat arbitrary, and is therefore subjected to sensitivity analyses
in our sample case. Naturally, such analyses would be extensive in a
real policy case; here the reason for their inclusion is chiefly pedagog-
ical.
Disposition
A report on lessons learned from the software development project
constitutes the bulk of the analysis below. It starts with a descrip-
tion of the workflow in a computational epidemiology project, and
observations on the micro-meso-macro link follow. More detailed de-
scriptions of what it actually means to manage and run a simulator are
then provided, before discussing the scientific merits and challenges of
this kind of research, and the concluding check list is presented.
6.2 Workflow
Model Development
The process of developing a model for outbreaks today often includes
the development of a simulator, allowing for scenario execution and
relatively swift sensitivity analyses. The simulator does not capture
the entire model, but only those parts that are subject to uncertainty
or those that involve stochastic parameters. The instigator is typi-
cally a policy maker (PM), knowledgeable in public health issues, and
seeking to evaluate various scenarios. The PM may well have medical
training, or even be an epidemiologist. The implementer of the sim-
ulator is a computational epidemiologist (CE): a modeler knowledge-
able in computer science, and the social sciences, typically without
much medical training. Naturally, both PM and CE could denote a
team instead of a single person. A schematic workflow for develop-
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ing and using a simulator, depicting the roles of both PM and CE, is
presented in Figure 6.1.
As in all development projects, work begins with a requirements
specification, to which the PM contributes user requirements and the
CE contributes technical expertise. From this specification, the sim-
ulator is built. It consists of a software package with two parts: a
simulation engine and a world description. The latter is not the com-
plete description of the world under study, but covers only those parts
that have a bearing on the executable model. This modeling work is
carried out by the CE, with considerable assistance from medical pro-
fessionals. The CE implements the simulator in accordance with the
specification and medical expertise. The CE will also seek to verify
the accuracy of the simulator (e.g., through extensive testing, or even
logical proof). The CE works in two distinct sequential steps that can-
not be combined: design and implementation. Software engineers are
taught not to modify their design during the implementation stage to
“improve” the model, no matter how tempting this might be. If de-
sign decisions leak into the implementation stage, the software project
quickly becomes impossible to maintain. What software design means
in the area of computational epidemiology is the craft of knowing
which parameters to vary, being aware of their mutual dependence,
and how to openly declare all simplifying assumptions.
Once the simulator is complete it is given a version number, and
one may proceed to experiments. For an experiment to be meaning-
ful, the PM must envisage scenarios. The PM must also provide values
for some input parameters. Each parameter in the model is important,
and even slight changes to an input value might have a drastic effect on
the output. The kind of model considered here is a complex system: a
system which cannot be understood through understanding its parts.
Before the CE can run the system, the world description must be pop-
ulated with data, which typically need a significant amount of post-
processing to allow for smooth use in the simulator. In addition, one
must then attempt to ascertain that the resulting data set is accurate
and noise-free. The data set in the here described model was sensitive
with respected to personal integrity, as it consisted of registry data on
the entire Swedish population of approximately nine million individ-
uals. This sensitivity rendered many kinds of replication experiments
impossible.
Once the system runs, it will produce a vast amount of output,
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so experiments must be set up carefully to avoid information over-
load. The so-called induction trap—the lure of running too many
experiments for each scenario because it is easy to produce more out-
put, and then jumping to inductive conclusions too swiftly (Popper
1957)—must also be avoided. The output and logs of a set of runs typ-
ically do not lend themselves to straightforward reading, but require
post-processing. In practice, this means turning huge text files into
calculable spreadsheets, and further into graphs and diagrams. Those
outputs can then be presented back to the PM, who can then call for
more experiments, sensitivity analyses, or even a revision of the re-
quirements specification. The CE in this process makes certain design
choices, e.g., which output data to present and how. It is important
that this process is iterative and that the PM is given the option of
making informed choices, by having at least some grasp of what is re-
alistic to do, given the constraints of computational complexity. The
CE must provide technical specifications on further experiments, and
the technical competence used also comes with a responsibility to in-
form: the PM must know what options there are, and why and how
certain results were omitted or deemed irrelevant. Because the PM is
typically the one responsible for acting upon results obtained, a chain
of trust to the CE must be upheld. Likewise, the CE should react
if the PM, for example, calls only for certain experiments to be run,
or if the selection is made so as to confirm a preconceived truth, in a
pseudo-scientific fashion (Lakatos 1977).
In principle, the output of the executable model can finally be
validated by comparing its predictions to real outcomes of actual pol-
icy interventions for the population modeled, given that the input
parameters adequately model the real population prior to those in-
terventions. Naturally, some scenarios could be considered extreme
(e.g., the introduction of an entirely new influenza virus to a popu-
lation without native immunity) and are simulated precisely because
they cannot be studied in the real world. In such scenarios, validation
can, at best, pertain only to parts of the model. More importantly,
simulations of outbreaks are difficult to validate because the simulated
event is rare. Catastrophic events are characterized by low probabil-
ity and disastrous consequences (see, e.g., Thom 1993), and yet the
input data are collected from the normal state of the population in
non-outbreak situations. Using this input, the simulator is expected
to produce one possible yet highly unlikely scenario to provide re-
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searchers and policy makers with more opportunities to observe and
learn about the unlikely event.
Since computational epidemiology is problem-oriented and con-
stitutes applied science, models are often pragmatic in the sense that
they are adapted to their use as policy-supporting tools. Any provi-
sos made have to be grounded in the culture of the decision making
entity, such as a government or a pharmaceutical company, making
alignment studies, in which models are docked for replication stud-
ies (Axtell et al. 1996) difficult.
The Micro-Meso-Macro Link
In microsimulation models of outbreaks, individuals are exposed to
the disease and may infect other individuals that they come into con-
tact with. The most primitive unit is the individual and the focus is on
the activities of the individual, for the purposes of studying transmis-
sion. By contrast, macrosimulation focuses not on the individual, but
on the whole society. All members (i.e., the whole, possibly stratified,
population) share the same properties and move between different dis-
ease states such as susceptible, infected, and resistant.
Even if originally conceived as a pure microsimulation model,
the executable model discussed here has macro-level parameters, e.g.,
workplace size. This parameter governs how many colleagues a work-
ing individual interacts with during a working day. To “interact with”
here means that there is an opportunity for infection, given that ei-
ther the individual or the colleague is ill. Even though micro data are
available for each workplace—including the number of employees at
each company—it is defensible not to use these data in full, since large
workplaces have so many employees that it makes no sense to assume
that the individual interacts with them all. In reality, the individual
might not even see more than a fraction of the total number of col-
leagues on a given day. The workplace size is therefore set to a precise
value, meant to capture an average number of colleagues, which is
kept constant throughout a set of runs.
By definition, macro models do not represent local interaction.
However, in any dynamic model utilizing micro data, including SIR-
inspired individual-based models (Roche, Guegan, and Bousquet 2008),
local interaction will affect the output. If there appear discernible pat-
terns in the output that are not explicitly stated by the model descrip-
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tion at the outset, they are referred to as emergent patterns. In the
described model, all output logs are mapped onto a real population.
This means that every discernible pattern has an interpretation that
can be understood in the epidemiological context, using terms such
as “spread” and “giant component”, and also in the societal context,
using terms like “number of infected” and “absenteeism”. Hence, pat-
terns discernible at the macro level resulting from local interactions at
the micro level are easily made understandable to the PM.
The meso layer (Liljenström and Svedin 2005) includes everything
that is more general than the properties of single individuals but less
general than the properties of the whole society. In the model at
hand, this is most visible in neighborhoods, defined by the geograph-
ical proximity of different households. Adding the meso layer to an
epidemiological model enables researchers to represent a crucial part
of human interaction: social contacts outside the home or workplace.
This includes encountering others while shopping, and social gather-
ings of neighbors.
Variables in the executable model represent properties of the real
population, but many of them cannot be observed directly. There-
fore, the argument goes, a suitable value for the executable must be
determined by experimenting with the simulator. In the implementa-
tion phase, the CE strives to get a handle on the parameter space, i.e.
the value space for all parameters that can be subject to variation. To
illustrate this, a sample case is now considered.
To find a suitable value for the parameter context contacts, repre-
senting the average number of contacts outside the home or the work-
place, the behavior of the simulated outbreak is observed using the
total number of infected individuals per week for a large interval of
context contact values. The interval is set to start from zero, where
the model behavior is undefined, to where the parameter no longer
has an observable impact, i.e. when it is high enough to exhaust the
population regardless of all other parameters. Within the [8,20] in-
terval, changing the context contacts parameter had, in this example, a
significant effect on the behavior of the model. Repeating the same se-
ries of experiments with a smaller step size within the [8,20] interval,
a smaller region of interest was obtained within the [14,16] interval.
Finally, the analysis was repeated one last time for the [14,16] interval
with a smaller step size. Figure 6.2 shows the number of infections per
week for five runs where all parameters except context contacts were
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Figure 6.2: Number of infections per week for five runs where all
parameters except context contacts were kept constant.
kept constant. Further simulations were run to observe the effects of
variation due to random seeds when contacts was set to 15. Figure 6.3
shows the number of infections per week for three runs with different
random seeds where all other parameters were kept constant.
Other variables in the executable model that should be decided
using a similar process include (but are not limited to): number of
initially infected, office size, place choice based on disease level, place
choice based on age, length of a work day, and the probability of
receiving a symptomatic disease profile.
Stochasticity
An outbreak of pandemic influenza is a rare event. To trigger such
an outbreak, either the simulations must be run repeatedly for a long
period until an outbreak occurs, or the model must be configured in
such a way that outbreaks will occur with higher frequency than in
the real world. The former is not practical since it might take millions
of runs before anything happens, and the latter comes with the risk
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Figure 6.3: Number of infections per week for three runs with
different random seeds where all other parameters were kept
constant. Each random seed is a vector of numbers generated by a
pseudo-random number generator.
of compromising the validity of output by introducing exogeneous
variables that change the effects of the simulated outbreak.
All random events in the model use a series of numbers that are
generated at run-time using the initial seeds provided by the user.
Therefore, the outcome of every “random” event in a simulation run
depends only on the initial seeds. By using the same seeds, identical
results can be obtained using different computers, operating systems,
or compilers.
In the present model, one highly influential parameter is the num-
ber of initially infected. When 50 randomly selected individuals are
infected, an outbreak is triggered in nearly every run. If only three in-
dividuals are selected instead, the outbreaks become much more rare.
This is due to the heterogeneity of the population: individuals with
more contacts are more likely to initiate outbreaks if infected, and it
is more likely that a highly connected individual would be infected if
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50 rather than three are infected initially.
It is often assumed in executable models that in a few genera-
tions, a simulation with three infected would reach the stage with
50 infected, and that the difference between them would be negligi-
ble. Certainly every simulation with three initially infected would
reach a stage with 50 infected, given that an outbreak occurs during
the run. Therefore simulations can be started from the stage where 50
individuals are infected since that is the minimum number at which
the simulation platform produces outbreaks in the majority of runs.
This assumption is far from ideal. The simplest observable effect is
that no runs will have less than 50 infected. This is acceptable because
the object of study is nation-wide outbreaks. However, the difference
between the two approaches is not negligible because 50 randomly se-
lected individuals will not have the same geographical distribution as
50 individuals whose infections originate from three individuals. The
50-from-three group will most likely have overlapping social networks
because they were all infected by three individuals, as opposed to be-
ing randomly selected from a population of nine million. As the out-
break grows to one thousand or one hundred thousand infected, the
difference may lose its significance, but quantifying that significance
remains challenging for all executable models that use heterogeneous
populations. Hence, this is a good example of a simulation in which
the CE makes an assumption about things beyond the PM’s control,
or even grasp. Good software development requires that such assump-
tions be made explicit and communicated to the PM.
6.3 Conclusion
The lessons learned from the software development project described
above can be summarized in the form of a check list. Even if the list
is not exhaustive, developers of computational epidemiology models
could check off the items on the list, as applicable to their project.
The presented workflow and checklist do not include surveillance in
computational epidemiology and instead focus on modeling and simu-
lation. A more comprehensive workflow for computational epidemi-
ology would have to incorporate computer-assisted infectious disease
surveillance, often performed using complex software platforms tai-
lored to the task (Espino et al. 2004; Crubezy et al. 2005; Abramson
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et al. 2010; Cakici et al. 2010), and the interaction of its users with the
actors already identified in the preceding sections.
Computational epidemiology is a new area, and many of the meth-
ods and theories employed have yet to benefit from thorough scientific
investigation. Even if important steps towards amalgamating mod-
els and performing alignment experiments have been taken (see, e.g.,
Halloran et al. 2008), the area is in need of extensive methodological
advancement. The following checklist is intended to be a contribution
to such development. Not every item in the check list introduces new
issues for policy makers or computational epidemiologists, but, de-
pending on the reader’s area of expertise, one or two are highly likely
to be more significant than the others. Much of it is part of the folk-
lore of the area, and could be classified as procedural and pragmatic
know-how. More specifically, the contribution is to have these items
made explicit as one concise list, and tied to working procedures as
demonstrated by our workflow description (Figure 6.1).
1. All population data sets are regional
To have access to data on the entire population on the planet is not
a realistic goal. Hence, most studies are limited to one geographic
region, such as a city, a state, or a country (Chao et al. 2010). This
means that the universe of discourse includes not only the individuals
in this geographic region, but also that a certain proportion of the in-
dividuals must be allowed to leave the region. Moreover, visitors and
immigrants from other regions should be included in the population
data. Some computational epidemiology projects employing micro
data use census data, others extrapolate from samples, and yet others
use synthetic data. In the rare cases where registry data is available for
a large population—as is the case for the Swedish population—hard
methodological questions must still be answered regarding the gener-
alizability of results: which parts of a scenario execution in Sweden
are likely to be analogous to ones in Norway, Iceland, or the state of
Oregon?
2. Population data are sensitive
Even after extensive post-processing, any data set with real population
data is subject to privacy and integrity concerns. In almost all coun-
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tries, this means that running a simulator with the data set is subject
to applying to an ethics board. If approved, data must be kept safe
and experiments may be run in designated facilities only. This makes
replication studies difficult, and it also restricts alignment studies to
less interesting data sets.
3. Verifying the simulator is a serious engineering challenge
To formally verify that the simulator produces adequate results, is
free from programming bugs, and can handle the computational com-
plexity of modeling large outbreaks is, in general, not possible. The
software is too large, as is the variation of possible input values and
the spectrum of sensitivity analyses. Extensive testing—varying the
hardware environment and the parameter values, including the ran-
dom seeds for stochastic processes—yields evidence for adequacy, but
no guarantees. This does not entail that the simulator is without use,
or not to be trusted, but merely that its construction and maintenance
is an engineering challenge.
4. Validating the simulator output is hard
Pandemics have been few and far between. Modeling a future scenario
on a real outbreak of the past has been done with some success in the
area of epidemiology. The structural properties of current and future
societies may vary greatly from those studied in the past, however. Air
travel, hygiene, and working conditions are three out of many factors
that affect the spread of communicable disease and that vary greatly in
the historical perspective. The low probability of catastrophic events
such as a pandemic makes it very hard to validate any simulation ex-
periment against real-world events.
5. Assumptions and hypotheses should be stated and controlled
by the policy maker
Placing assumptions on top of assumptions will only create a gap be-
tween the policy maker and the computational epidemiologist. As
illustrated by the example of selecting different initially infected in-
dividuals, the description of a single assumption can be interpreted
in multiple ways, and the implementation of different interpretations
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can diverge significantly from the respective intention. The complex-
ity of communicating all assumptions implied by the decisions of the
policy maker arises from the tremendous difficulty in identifying im-
plicit assumptions at every step of development. Because every ad-
dition to the model carries the risk of modifying the interaction of
existing parameters, ensuring that all assumptions have been made by
the policy maker becomes a formidable challenge.
6. Triggering outbreaks in the simulator is nontrivial
To implement a simulator that always produces outbreaks is easy. In-
creasing the infectiousness of a disease (as done, e.g., Roche, Guegan,
and Bousquet 2008) or the number of initially infected, quickly yields
a disease pattern affecting the entire giant component, i.e. every in-
dividual connected to other individuals through the social network
or by geographical proximity (cf. Youssef, Kooij, and Scoglio 2011),
forming the largest connected subgraph of the population graph (cf.
Newman 2003). If such settings are inconsistent with empirical data,
or with assumptions and hypotheses declared, however, then the ad-
equacy of the model should be questioned. There is evidence for the
fact that the initial stages of a pandemic require a different kind of
modeling than the later stages (Bonabeau, Toubiana, and Flahault
1998). It would therefore be naïve to think that increasing the number
of initially infected—in order to trigger outbreaks in a larger propor-
tion of runs—would not affect the model of the entire pandemic.
7. Hybrid models need constant refinement
A model in which the micro, meso, and macro properties are inte-
grated has the potential to mirror reality in a relatively accurate way.
Under the proviso that model adequacy yields better prediction, one
could discard the simplest models in favour of such hybrid models.
The level of ambition, however, comes at the price of the model never
being finished, and model-dependent artifacts becoming more diffi-
cult to identify. Since the world to be modeled is a moving target, and
since macro data can often be replaced by micro data as it becomes
available, there are always refinements to be made. The devil is in the
details.
Conclusion 101
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Chapter 7
Sustainability Through
Surveillance: ICT
Discourses in Design
Documents∗
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Abstract
In this paper, I examine design documents from three dif-
ferent ICT design and development projects. I argue that they
present intersecting visions of sustainability entailing the wide-
spread use of ICT, describe the properties of users compatible
with such ICT, and provide ways of judging the users. In the de-
sign documents, the inhabitants are made individually responsi-
ble for living sustainably, and surveillance is positioned as inte-
gral to this future with the help of ICT. Underlying the visions,
I identify a translation process that captures the traces of the in-
habitants’ lives, classifies them according to different criteria of
sustainable living, and returns them to the tapestry of everyday
life to convince the users to behave differently. In the discourses
of these documents, surveillance translates the traces, and the
translations exert new pressures on existing power relations.
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7.1 Introduction
Just before they get home her youngest daughter asks her
mother to stop in front of the public installation. They all
stop and one of the daughters drags her card on the instal-
lation and sees their own household blinking. “Mum our
symbol is much bigger this week than last week. And it
seems that our block is doing much better than my friend
Milla’s block” she says. “That’s good news” her mum an-
swers. (SRS 2011, appx. III, 51)
The fictional conversation between Anne and her daughter Maria
appears in a report that details how information and communication
technology (ICT) can be developed to encourage sustainable living
within a residential city district. As an example, the report describes
a brief interaction between the inhabitants and a kiosk that visualises
the energy consumption within the district. While using the kiosk,
the characters reflect on their behaviour, guided by the signals that
indicate the value placed on their energy consumption by the system.
The fiction of Anne, her daughter, and the kiosk provides a window
into a broad discourse on using technology to contribute to sustain-
able futures.
In current European Union initiatives for sustainable development,
ICT plays a major role. The European Commission’s recommenda-
tion report on the issue states that “ICTs can enable energy efficiency
improvements”, and “provide the quantitative basis on which energy-
efficient strategies can be devised, implemented, and evaluated” (Eu-
ropean Commission 2009, 3). In the report, the umbrella term ICT
covers a range of technologies designed to monitor, sort, classify, vi-
sualise, and optimise. These technologies are defined as tools that can
aid in overcoming environmental, social, and economic challenges. To
promote them, the recommendation presents three measures: invit-
ing the ICT sector to reach a common measurement methodology, to
identify where and how ICTs can play a role in reducing emissions,
and a call for the Member States to “enable roll-out of ICT likely to
trigger a shift in the behaviour of consumers, businesses and commu-
nities” (5). Partly due to vast financial resources that the framework
programmes provide for scientific research, the motivations of a wide
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variety of projects combining ICT and sustainability are both echoed
in and shaped by these measures.
In this paper, I examine three different ICT design and develop-
ment projects with similar motivations. I argue that they present
intersecting visions of sustainability entailing the wide-spread use of
ICT, describe the properties of users compatible with such ICT, and
provide ways of judging the users. First, the three projects share a
vision where sustainability can be achieved through the employment
of ICT. In the vision, the primary agents responsible for change are
identified as the users of the technologies, and they are made individ-
ually responsible for creating sustainable lifestyles with the help of
ICT. Second, the users are viewed as rational, technologically com-
petent decision makers who are cooperative with the vision of ICT
as an aid for behavioural change. Third, the users are judged accord-
ing to different criteria that are established by the systems. In the
reports, achieving sustainability through the use of ICT is expressed
as the right way to live, and the users are provided with social and
financial incentives to live in this way. Connecting these three issues,
I identify a process of translation where values are inscribed into the
systems, and the surveillance of energy use is positioned as integral to
sustainability with the help of ICT.
Surveilling the Smart Home
A highly vibrant intersection of sustainability and ICT is called the
smart home. While it seemingly refers to an isolated housing unit,
it is physically connected to infrastructures as much as any other ur-
ban structure, and its information networks reach even further into
central servers that collect data at the street, district, city, and nation
level. In the smart home, a wide variety of surveillance systems gather
sensor and usage data from the surroundings. The gathered data are
used by system designers, managers, other technological systems as
well as the inhabitants themselves to interpret the activities within
the home and to manipulate the home environment. In this descrip-
tion, the home is smart because it is populated by sensor systems.
However, it is also a home, because it is populated by the inhabitants.
While they go about their daily lives, the sensor systems continually
record the interior temperature, water and electricity consumption,
and the movements within the home. These measurements are gath-
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ered to create representations of the inhabitants’ behaviour over time
using central databases and statistical methods for analysis. The data,
collected from many smart homes simultaneously, are used to recon-
figure the image of a standard home: how much energy is consumed,
how much movement occurs in it, how many humans live together,
etc. The data collection is made invisible, but certain results are com-
municated back to the inhabitants in the form of logs, graphs, and
bills.
In the smart home and its surroundings, sustainability is linked to
ICT through surveillance. Following David Lyon’s definition, surveil-
lance takes the form of routine attention to personal details with the
intention to sort and classify (Lyon 2007, 14). Personal data are col-
lected not only to make systems more efficient, but also to provide
ways of creating categories, comparing different individuals, and sort-
ing individuals into groups. The consequence of bringing ICT into
the smart home resembles that of any other surveillance system any-
where else; it generates and expresses power (23). I refer here to the
Foucauldian notion of power: it is immanent in all relations, inher-
ently productive, and possible to resist, or rather, constitutes resis-
tance (Foucault 1978, 92–96). The power expressed by surveillance
links sustainability and ICT by making possible the formulation of
knowledge about a population of smart home inhabitants. In the
smart home domain, it appears as categories, groupings, and classi-
fications. These can collectively be seen as normalisations:
In a sense, the power of normalization imposes homo-
geneity; but it individualizes by making it possible to
measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialities and
to render the differences useful by fitting them one to an-
other. (Foucault 1977, 184)
As Foucault describes the process, the creation of averages also
provides a way of combining differences. The “inhabitant” category
is constructed by measuring the differences in consumption and link-
ing them using statistical methods to produce a whole. In the case
of energy consumption, those that consume less and those that con-
sume more (themselves categories constructed through surveillance),
can be connected to form a single category under the label “smart
home inhabitants”. With such a construction, the differences of the
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category are made useful in the quest for sustainability. For example,
by regularly monitoring the events in and around the home, it be-
comes possible to translate traces of everyday life into values such as
“avoiding excessive consumption” that the inhabitants are encouraged
to recognise and support in their lives.
Categories and classifications are imbued with values, because they
make some things visible while concealing others (Bowker and Star
2000). Donaldson and Wood (2004) have emphasised the importance
of categories by defining surveillance itself as a process of translat-
ing worldviews, denoting systems of categorisation, into materialities.
Categories embedded into ICT have also been understood as attempts
to control and discipline those who use the systems (Suchman 1994a),
although as with any other expression of power, they can also be con-
tested and resisted. In the case of the smart home, surveillance systems
categorise and classify traces of consumption behaviour. However, the
categories themselves have to be created somewhere. In this paper, I
examine acts of category creation in design documents.
Designing ICT
In the projects I analyse, the design process is characterised by the
occurrence of many meetings, the production of a large number of
reports, and development of deliverables including the material form
of the technologies. I use the term design documents to refer to all
the texts written during this lengthy process. These design docu-
ments express a collective position derived from texts written by a
large group of experts including system designers, project managers,
developers, funding agencies, etc., who may have different or even
conflicting goals individually. For the types of ICT under considera-
tion, the majority of the design processes take place after the funding
for the project has been secured, but before the technology has been
developed. The things worthy of monitoring and analysing in the
smart home are discussed, selected, and written down in this phase.
The participants, methods, and the length of the process vary greatly
depending on the requirements of each project and the configurations
of their actors both geographically and organisationally.
Although the design process aims at prescribing the uses of tech-
nologies, the eventual uses cannot be inferred from it. Scholars in
the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) have demonstrated
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that technologies are often used in ways that are not intended or fore-
seen by the designers, and that no single, essential use exists for any
technology (Albrechtslund and Glud 2010; Bijker and Law 1992; Oud-
shoorn and Pinch 2005). Furthermore, the designers constitute only
one of many groups of actors that play a role in creating the tech-
nologies, and even the act of categorising designers or users as distinct
groups tends to obscure the continually shifting boundaries of design
and use (Suchman 1994b, 2002; Woolgar 1991).
In my analysis, I trace the discursive construction of the surveil-
lance technologies in the design documents which precede their mate-
rial form, with the awareness that once these systems are operational
they are bound to be shaped and configured by a multitude of ac-
tors in many different ways that are impossible to predict. Although
users actively co-construct the surveillance systems they encounter
by appropriating, modifying, and resisting (Dubbeld 2006), the sys-
tems themselves are much more open to change, although by a smaller
number of actors, before they fully materialise in their software and
hardware incarnations. Starting from classifications, Bowker and Star
highlight the negotiations that lead from decisions to technologies:
Someone, somewhere, must decide and argue over the
minutiae of classifying and standardizing. . . Once a sys-
tem is in place, the practical politics of these decisions are
often forgotten, literally buried in archives (when records
are kept at all) or built into software or the sizes and com-
positions of things. (Bowker and Star 2000, 44–45)
The extended process of arguing over minutiae binds project man-
agers, system designers, funding agencies, programmers, as well as
software standards, keyboards, chairs, and compatible word proces-
sor extensions. Somewhere between stand the design documents, de-
scribing the decisions for those who will construct the systems. From
a collection of discussions, decisions, and limitations both material
and temporal, the designers craft texts in the form of project propos-
als, specification documents, and pre-study reports. In the construc-
tion of ICT, the design process is a bridge from discourse to materi-
ality. Often, material is constructed discursively in use cases where
fictional scenarios depict future users and usage. However, sometimes
the bridge allows movement in the opposite direction; discourse is
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materially grounded in non-functional prototypes, objects that stand
for the idea of a thing that is yet to be imbued with function.
The documents produced during the design process aim to de-
scribe the systems fully, to ensure that they can be developed in the
future. Many choices that become invisible later when the system is
operational are clearly described in the design documents. The ambi-
tion to produce a complete textual description aids the application of
discourse analysis. Their discourses describe what is worthy of obser-
vation and contain valuable pointers when trying to critically analyse
the consequences of living with the systems.
7.2 Material
I draw my material from three different ICT development projects
with similar goals regarding sustainability. All three projects are con-
temporary collaborations between 15 or more partners, and the ma-
jority of these are European companies developing ICTs. Other mem-
bers include universities, research institutes, and electric utility com-
panies. These three projects were chosen primarily based on their
goals to develop information infrastructures, particularly for residen-
tial areas, with the participation of a large number of organisations.
The first, Home Gateway Initiative (HGI), is a consortium of
broadband service providers, and manufacturers of digital home de-
vices, chips, and software (HGI 2012). HGI publishes guidelines and
requirements on the digital home infrastructure. The report I analyse,
“Home Gateway Initiative—Use cases and architecture for a home en-
ergy management service” (HGI 2011), includes eight use cases that
aim to reduce the energy consumption in homes.
The second, Future Internet for Smart Energy (FINSENY), is
part of the Future Internet Public-Private Partnership Programme
(FI-PPP) launched by the European Commission (FINSENY 2012).
In the projects, partners from ICT and energy sectors aim to identify
the requirements of smart energy systems. The report I use in this pa-
per, “Future Internet for Smart Energy—Smart buildings: Use cases
specification” (FINSENY 2011), includes forty use cases that list the
requirements for a smart energy infrastructure in five different con-
texts: homes, residential buildings, office buildings, data centres, and
hotels.
112 Chapter 7
The third, Smart ICT, is part of the Stockholm Royal Seaport
(SRS) project. SRS is one of Europe’s largest urban development
projects, and its goal is to develop a new city district in Stockholm,
Sweden (SRS 2012). Smart ICT, a much smaller sub-project within
SRS, aims to detail a generic ICT infrastructure for SRS. A report
from the Smart ICT pre-study, “Stockholm Royal Seaport—Smart
Communication” (SRS 2011), describes possible ICT applications that
can be deployed within the district. It includes eighteen use cases,
called demonstrators, that describe fictional events in which future
inhabitants interact with the proposed technologies.
The HGI and FINSENY reports describe technologies that can be
deployed, in theory, at many different sites regardless of context. The
Smart Communication report, on the other hand, describes applica-
tions specifically designed for the Stockholm Royal Seaport district,
and provides much finer detail about user interaction and the imag-
ined futures of the proposed technologies. To avoid repetition, I use
the terms “HGI report”, “FINSENY report”, and “SRS report” when
referring to the three documents.
7.3 Analysis
The analysis is divided into three parts: first, I describe the intersect-
ing visions of sustainability in the three projects that entail the wide-
spread use of ICT. I then list the properties of the users who are tasked
with using the ICTs proposed by the projects within and around the
smart homes. Finally, I illustrate the mechanisms that the reports pro-
pose to judge these users according to different criteria. Additionally,
I identify a process of translation where values are inscribed into the
systems.
Visions of Sustainability
The three projects share the common goal to design and develop ICT
to accomplish sustainability goals. These goals are defined under four
headings in the SRS report: climate change, ecological sustainability,
economic sustainability, and social sustainability (5). The HGI report
only refers to the concept of sustainability in the abstract, favour-
ing the terms “energy efficiency” and “reduction in energy consump-
tion” instead (HGI 2011, 9). The FINSENY report motivates its fo-
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cus through its understanding of the users, where the “generic home
dwellers” are willing to accept optimising technologies if the services
are kept at the same level, and a few who are “energy conscious” and
thus more likely to be proactive (FINSENY 2011, 20). I return to the
definition of the user in the next section.
In all three reports, similar future urban environments are de-
scribed as being rendered more environmentally sustainable by intro-
ducing ICT. Many of the technologies rely on the wealth of sensors
proposed for inclusion in smart homes. The properties of the in-
habitants of these homes are made visible by the wide-spread use of
surveillance systems in the form of sensor networks. Additionally, in
the SRS report, the phrase “the ease of doing the right thing” appears
in several sections, denoting a specific right thing, a way of behaving
sustainably with the help of ICT.
Regarding the evaluation of a population and the ordering of indi-
viduals through ICT, the HGI report cites the European Union direc-
tive 2006/32/EC in its introduction, which states that member states
should ensure that energy distributors make available “comparisons
with an average normalised benchmarked user of energy in the same
user category” (European Parliament 2006, 72). In accordance with
the directive, the use case “Visualization of historical data” proposes to
allow the customers to “compare their own energy consumption with
other similar customer/communities types” (HGI 2011, 27). These
comparisons are motivated in the “business rationale” section of the
HGI report:
Environmental degradation and global warming are among
the major challenges facing society. . . The most pressing
challenge is to reduce the rate of increase of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere and ultimately to decrease the
absolute level of these gases. . . ICT technologies can
help reduce energy consumption and manage scarce re-
sources, improve efficiency and contribute to cutting car-
bon emissions. . . Smart Metering, Smart Buildings and
Smart Grids, are among the most important ICT-enabled
solutions with the highest potential to reduce CO2 emis-
sions. (15)
The HGI report constructs a particular society in which all in-
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habitants of the smart homes are compelled to act to counter envi-
ronmental degradation through the use of technological solutions. By
framing the reduction in the rate of increase of greenhouse gases as the
most pressing challenge, and proposing management and efficiency as
potential solutions, the report links ICT to environmental sustainabil-
ity.
In the three reports I have analysed, energy is conceptualised pri-
marily as a commodity to be bought and sold. The HGI report states
that “instead of measuring energy use at the end of each billing period,
smart meters provide this information at much shorter intervals” and
“[e]nergy companies will also be able to innovate and offer their cus-
tomers new types of tariffs that will allow customers to take advantage
of cheaper deals at off-peak times” (HGI 2011, 15). In the FINSENY
report, the consumer is defined as having “signed a contract with the
electricity provider to access electricity” (FINSENY 2011, 23), and
that “for many customers, monitoring energy consumption is in fact
monitoring the bill” (21).
In these proposals, sustainability is interpreted as something that
can be achieved in the future and only through change. Since the abil-
ity to sell energy, and hence the structure of the participating organisa-
tions, is conserved, the partner that is designated as being compatible
with change is users. After locating the potential of change in the
users, ICT solutions are proposed to utilise that potential and to effect
change. Viewed from this perspective, the status quo is preserved for
the organisations that provide the energy, and the home dwellers be-
come individually responsible for creating sustainable lifestyles with
the help of ICT.
Describing the User
Alongside the descriptions of the proposed systems, the three reports
also describe the users of these technologies. These descriptions neces-
sarily refer to a group that does not exist at the time the documents are
written, since the technologies themselves have not yet materialised.
In other words, the texts discursively construct their users, and assign
them certain properties that are essential for operating the proposed
technologies.
The necessity of gathering and processing of personal data is a
widely held assumption (Murakami Wood 2006). Building on the as-
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sumed necessity, the three reports describe a type of user whose data
are always available for gathering. The following paragraph from the
FINSENY report, describing the differences between the home do-
main and the residential building domain, illustrate some properties
of this user:
In the home domain use cases there is a single user or a
number of users with commonly aligned interests (being
members of the same household) so they can be assumed
to be capable to make timely and coordinated economic
decisions. . . In contrast, in the building use cases there
is not a single agent who makes cost-optimising decisions
so many such scenarios [sic] and use cases are not applica-
ble. In other words, there exists a multitude of different
economic agents with access to common resources, giving
rise to situations where these individuals, rationally con-
sulting their self-interest, might engage in what will ul-
timately be wasteful behaviour. Individualised metering
can be used to maintain economies of scale while provid-
ing incentives to avoid waste. (FINSENY 2011, 38)
The user is viewed as being rational, willing to operate the inter-
faces provided by the projects, and ultimately, cooperative with the
systems. In the “home domain use cases”, the user exists as part of
a group of agents that coordinate and decide rationally. When the
users’ goals are identified as not necessarily overlapping with those of
the systems, as in “building use cases”, the aim of the systems is stated
as a way of steering the inhabitants’ rationality towards financial de-
cisions that align with the vision of the project. The user is charac-
terised as homo economicus, a self-interested agent making decisions
individually based on a personal utility function, and users compat-
ible with the systems are constructed based on the assumption that
a shared motivation mechanism is inherent to all individuals. While
the reports do not describe how the proposed systems would interact
with non-compatible users, scholars of surveillance have thoroughly
documented systems that explicitly assume the existence of the non-
cooperative user, and the complications that await such “neoliberal
deviants” (Gilliom 2001; Maki 2011).
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The assumption that financial gain and self-interest guide the in-
habitants plays a key role in the argument that ICTs for scheduling
electricity usage to take advantage of lower electricity prices at night
can contribute to sustainability goals. The rational cooperative user
assumption is compatible with the existing commercial activities of
the project partners because it does not challenge the practice of buy-
ing and selling electricity or other forms of energy. The SRS report
extends the commercial frame even further with the following state-
ment: “Research is to use money to create knowledge. Innovation is to
use knowledge to create money” (SRS 2011, 23). In the three reports,
commercial interests of the project partners form the central pillar
around which other concerns such as sustainability and comfortable
living are structured.
The necessity of discursively constructing compatible users be-
comes visible primarily in scenarios that describe the interactions be-
tween the users and the systems. The HGI report includes an exam-
ple:
The system will provide the end user with an easy way
to access the appliance configuration web page. When the
end user opens the remote page general options to control
an appliance are available (stop and start), and other more
specific ones for various appliance (e.g. for a washing ma-
chine skip the spin cycle or use a lower temperature). The
user will be informed of the current consumption and the
impact of any configuration change. (HGI 2011, 32)
The user referred to in this scenario is both a technically compe-
tent individual that can operate the system, and one that wishes to
operate the system. The proper functioning of the system depends
on both: if the user cannot understand how the system works, or
does not wish to invest time in its functioning, then none of the
options provided in the application configuration web page accom-
plish any positive outcome (Darby 2010). The scenarios detailed in
the reports emphasise individual choice, but the systems constrain
the consequences of that choice severely. In most cases, the bene-
fit to the customer is a lower energy bill, and possibly lower energy
consumption. However, to accomplish the outcome, the inhabitants
are expected to modify their behaviour to suit the systems, that is,
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to understand and configure them, while the practices of the energy
providers remain largely unchanged. Even for the inhabitants who
fit the described user profile and choose to cooperate with the sys-
tems, there remains the possibility that the financial gain of using the
systems would not be worth the time they need to invest in it. Ad-
ditionally, the emphasis on choice has a very significant consequence
that remains undiscussed in the three reports: inhabitants might make
the “wrong” choice. Depending on the nature of the choice, this fail-
ure may lead to undesired, or unintended consequences for all actors
involved in the system. The possibility of choice does not solve prob-
lems by itself, and even more critically, it places the responsibility for
the wrong choices on the inhabitants using a narrative of consumer
empowerment (Ottinger 2010).
Within the three reports, the users are also described as gendered.
Anne-Jorunn Berg has criticised a much earlier incarnation of the
smart home as “unlikely to initiate any developments that would sub-
stitute or save time in housework” (Berg 1994, 312). While acknowl-
edging the impossibility of determining the use of technology solely
from design, she observes the gendering of design in the smart home.
She argues that the smart home is “gendered in what it leaves out—its
lack of support for changes in the domestic sexual division of labour”
(312). This argument finds support in the three reports.
The scenarios in the reports discuss running dishwashers and wash-
ing machines as examples of housework. The proposed projects make
these tasks more energy efficient by scheduling them at different hours.
The HGI report does not use any pronouns or names, the activities
it describes are performed by “the customer” or “the user”. The ma-
jority of the FINSENY report follows the same pattern, but the sce-
narios that do include a user always use the masculine pronoun, and
women are entirely absent. The pronoun “he” is used in multiple de-
scriptions to refer to the “home dweller” category (FINSENY 2011,
21, 27, 39). The SRS report differs from the previous two by provid-
ing names for the users that appear in their demonstrators. However,
the division of labour remains clear as the report describes women
engaged in housework and care work much more often than men.
For example, Beda and Bertil’s daughter follows the updates on their
health generated by the smart home (SRS 2011, appx. III, 15). Jimmy’s
daughter helps him adapt to changes in the smart home systems after
he suffers a stroke (appx. III, 19). Anna, in her role as Bertil’s “contact
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person”, warns him to take a shower and hurry to the day centre using
a speaker placed in the home (SRS 2011, appx. III, 19). Julia ensures
that the stove is off and the washing machine is running using her mo-
bile phone, and goes shopping for food while both Anna and Anne
pick up their or somebody else’s kids from school (appx. III, 20, 51).
In other examples, Charlotte and Anna use the car pool while Lars
remains unconvinced about its benefits and drives to work (appx. III,
32, 41), and Emil, aged 11, becomes an “agent against power waste”
in an activity at his school (appx. III, 52). These constitute the major-
ity of the characters that appear in the SRS demonstrators. As noted
earlier, while the use of the technologies cannot be determined from
their designs or descriptions, both still exert influence over how these
technologies should be perceived by others, and what is expected of
them as users.
The systems that make the home smart also describe the proper-
ties of the inhabitants that matter. The SRS report includes a detailed
description of the site itself and the available tools for the surveillance
of the inhabitants: sensors for monitoring water and electricity con-
sumption, sensors for monitoring temperature in all rooms, near-field
communication access control system in the outer door, light control
system to monitor power consumption of all outlets (appx. III, 23).
Within the home, the everyday behaviour of the inhabitants is mon-
itored continually, and the traces of their behaviour, relieved from
their context by the sensors, are transported to databases for storage
and further analysis. By generating measures such as the mean, the
median, and the standard deviation, the similarity and the difference
of the recorded instances are quantified (e.g., the average smart house-
hold consumes 21 litres of water per day). The statistical measures
enable both the evaluation of the performance of a population col-
lectively, and the ordering of individuals separately. They are used
to create the smart home inhabitant category, where differences are
fitted to one another to form a whole.
In describing their users, these project proposals also illustrate
how the systems begin to translate the traces of energy consumption
into a form of knowledge that is used to judge the inhabitants. The
translation proceeds according to values inscribed onto the systems,
emphasising technological expertise, rational choice, and individual
responsibility, which are used to position the ICT-based surveillance
of energy use as integral to sustainability in these proposals.
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Judging the User
The translation process continues with the communication of the
quantified differences back to the inhabitants in the form of usage logs,
recommendations, and visualisations. This communication allows the
judging of the users, both by the users themselves and by others, on
the basis of different criteria.
In the HGI report, the mechanisms for judging appear only when
the user engages in an activity that involves energy consumption. For
example, the use case “Alarms” describes a way of informing the user
in case of “abnormal appliance consumption (e.g.: possibly indicat-
ing a fridge with a door left open)” (HGI 2011, 28), and the use case
“Visualization of current energy and power data” describes how to
“[i]nform the consumer of the energy implications of selecting differ-
ent operational modes, in particular different washing machines cy-
cles, before initiating the activity” (26). In both cases, the activities
of the user are observed by the system, categorised according to the
processes described earlier, and the final evaluation of the system is
communicated back in the form of a judgement about whether the
activity is abnormal, or with a list of consequences (“energy implica-
tions”) of consumption. The latter stops short of delivering a final
judgement, but in the report it is followed by the statement “[s]tudies
have shown that an energy saving of 10-15% could be achieved as a re-
sult”, implying that some users will choose to behave differently if the
system judges the future activity as involving high energy consump-
tion.
The SRS report broadens the scope of both the activities that can
be judged and the judgements that can be delivered by stating that
“[t]he overarching sustainability goals of SRS stipulate that it should
be easy to do the right thing” (SRS 2011, 12). In the report, the right
thing is assumed to be the same for all inhabitants, and the role of
ICT in the district is interpreted as encouraging the doing of the right
thing. One of the proposed projects, titled “A sustainable commu-
nity”, illustrates the interpretation:
We propose a set of mechanisms for increasing the so-
cial belongingness of a sustainable lifestyle. By applying a
point based system on the use of resources (such as water
and electricity), bonus points of active choices of trans-
120 Chapter 7
portation, and otherwise effective uses of green alterna-
tives where others are available, this information can be
used and presented in different ways. . . Furthermore
publicly available top lists can be made available on a com-
munity web site, and also on public displays. (SRS 2011,
appx. III, 47)
The proposal combines the data collected from the smart home
with a categorisation of the activities by assigning scores and declar-
ing winners. In the description, desirable behaviour is defined by the
system designers, and the inhabitants are encouraged to participate in
the vision with a promise of the public acknowledgement of their ac-
tivities. Although this proposal only mentions “top lists”, the public
acknowledgement of scores can also serve as a threat for those who do
not score high. More broadly, “increasing the social belongingness of
a sustainable lifestyle” implies that the proposed systems are charged
with making some lifestyles belong in the district. Conversely, the
lifestyles that do not rank high in the categorisation are made to be-
long less. The passage continues by motivating the need for such sys-
tems: “It is not enough that ‘it’s easy to do the right thing’—it must
also be shown what that this [sic], how one can do it, and why (incen-
tives)” (appx. III, 47). In the SRS report, the method that shows the in-
habitants what the right thing is and how it should be done often takes
the form of a visualisation. It is formed by processing surveillance data
using statistical methods to categorise the inhabitants (“your energy
consumption is below average”), and it provides a value judgement
for the observers (“your energy consumption meets the sustainability
goals of the city”). Starting from the traces of energy consumption,
surveillance aids the creation of a social marker that can be reflected
on, discussed, and connected to value judgements. A device used for
these purposes appears in the demonstrator titled “Participatory In-
stallation”:
Input for the installation are peoples’ environmentally
related decisions, concerning registered [sic] on “smart
cards”. . . Output of the installation will give some kind
of indication of the environmental effects of people’s ac-
tions. This output will serve as feedback to participating
people and visitors. Although individuals will be able to
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identify their own contribution in the installation, con-
tributions of others will not be recognizable. (appx. III,
50)
The demonstrator describes devices that can be placed in pub-
lic spaces within the district to reveal the traces of consumption be-
haviour and the associated value judgements. In this case, the vi-
sual representation of the collected data is taken not only from the
smart home, but also from the surveillance of other activities with
the help of “smart cards”. The results are displayed to the inhabi-
tants to invoke reflections, as exemplified by the youngest daughter
in the opening quote of this paper, taken from the same demonstra-
tor: “[I]t seems that our block is doing much better than my friend
Milla’s block” (appx. III, 51). The mother verbalises the value judge-
ment provided by the system with her reply: “That’s good news”. In
the fictional scenario, the inhabitants reflect on the graphical represen-
tation of the collective consumption of the neighbourhood with the
help of surveillance technologies. The exchange between the mother
and the daughter illustrates the final step of the translation where the
inscribed values are inserted into the social fabric of everyday life in
the form of value judgements.
The system proposed in the “Participatory Installation” demon-
strator sets up a way for inhabitants to monitor one another to encour-
age energy-saving behaviour. This type of activity where individuals
are provided with surveillance tools to keep track of one another has
been called lateral surveillance (Andrejevic 2005). In lateral surveil-
lance, the populace is made responsible for monitoring itself, and ev-
eryone is “invited to become spies” (494) for their own good. Another
example of lateral surveillance appears in the demonstrator titled “Ed-
ucational Game” (SRS 2011, appx. III, 52). In the game, participants
play the role of “special agents” who are responsible for reducing en-
ergy consumption in their homes, which is measured by connecting
their mobile phones to the electricity meters in their homes. They are
organised into teams, and the example from the report describes one
team as fifth grade students in a school in the district:
The team competes with another team of agents located
in another town. A successful player persuades every-
one in the household to conserve as much electricity as
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they can during the mission, which on most days takes
place between 17.00 and 22.00. Throughout the mission,
the game monitors electricity consumption in the partic-
ipants’ homes. The winning team is the one who made
the combined largest relative decrease in energy consump-
tion. (SRS 2011, appx. III, 52)
In this demonstrator, surveillance is used as the basis of a com-
petition, and the participants are encouraged to align their behaviour
with the goals of the system to overcome their competitors. During
the “mission” hours, the players become responsible for the traces of
consumption that originate from their smart homes. Once again, the
consumption act is freed from its original context through surveil-
lance, and translated into an orderable quantity that is associated with
a player contributing to the performance of the team as a whole. The
players in this educational game are placed under immense social pres-
sure to either change the behaviour of other members of the house-
hold, or risk contributing negatively to the performance of the team.
The FINSENY report also includes a system that utilises social
pressure to change the behaviour of the inhabitants. The project ti-
tled “Support Online Community” describes a system where all the
tenants in the building are invited to participate in the judging of con-
sumption behaviour:
The basic idea behind this use case is that energy con-
servation and a greener life-style can also be encouraged
by facilitating the formation of an online community of
like-minded people who can use the online platform to
share ideas, experiences, know-how, or even participate
in competitions. . . [T]he building can comprise ICT
infrastructure that collects information / statistics of the
various apartments, possibly also including the bills, and
exports this information to a web front-end where it can
be charted and visualized. This can allow the tenants to
monitor the historical trend of their apartment in terms
of energy and bills paid and also compare it against apart-
ments of a similar profile. (FINSENY 2011, 42)
Although this system is meant to be accessed from private devices
such as smartphones and personal computers, it shares the same goal
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as the public and semi-public systems described in the SRS report. It
provides the inhabitants with methods of comparing themselves to
others on the basis of the categories defined by the system designers,
and to form value judgements about consumption behaviour. The
quantified differences in the monitored traces are provided to the in-
habitants who are expected to identify other apartments with “similar
profiles” against which to compare themselves. They are also encour-
aged to communicate with each other about the similarities and dif-
ferences in the traces of consumption behaviour. The “support online
community” provides support for the construction of the smart home
inhabitant category by the inhabitants themselves and allows the fit-
ting of the differences within the group to one another.
7.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I examined a shared vision of a future society from three
different ICT design and development projects where inhabitants are
made individually responsible for living sustainably, and I argued that
the surveillance of energy use is positioned as integral to this future
with the help of ICT. Underlying the vision, I identified a translation
process that captures the traces of the inhabitants’ lives, classifies them
according to different criteria of sustainable living, and returns them
to the tapestry of everyday life to convince the users to behave differ-
ently. The systems described in the design documents make the dif-
ferences in populations commensurable with each other, and aid the
creation of new categories such as the smart home inhabitant and the
sustainable city district. In the discourse of these documents, surveil-
lance translates the traces, and the translations exert new pressures on
existing power relations.
The examples of ICT-driven surveillance I analysed present an or-
dering of society where surveillance and sustainability are linked to
one another. Moreover, echoing the findings of Graham and Wood
(2003), they support processes of individualisation and emphasise con-
sumption. A significant shortcoming of this vision of a future society
is the invisibility of the institutional and systemic causes of the prob-
lems addressed under the banner of sustainability. Even if the nec-
essary change is defined merely as reduced energy consumption and
carbon emissions, holding the inhabitants individually responsible for
124 Chapter 7
effecting this change is not only unlikely to succeed, but also risks ob-
scuring a deeper understanding of the problems.
As the design documents illustrate, ICTs do not materialise from
thin air: considerable resources are expended to propose, design, and
develop them. If they become operational, they require constant
maintenance, and continue to consume energy. Any proposal to use
ICTs to create sustainable or “green” futures must weigh such costs
against the theoretical gains. Additionally, the categories and the clas-
sifications that the proposed systems use to describe all users privilege
a particular type of user that is already privileged within the context
of ICT use. As Oudshoorn, Rommes, and Stienstra (2004) note, de-
sign practices to create ICTs for everybody remains “an inadequate
strategy to account for the diversity of users”(54).
If the challenge to be tackled is reducing energy consumption, or
creating more sustainable ways of living, the answer does not neces-
sitate the development of new technologies. ICT does not need to
be everywhere, and it does not need to be involved in solving every
problem. Sometimes ICT might be the wrong answer. Even in cases
where ICT development simply has to be involved in sustainability
initiatives, it can be used for purposes other than the surveillance of
inhabitants. For example, ICT can be used to understand how other
technologies in residential spaces can be constructed differently to last
longer, or to waste less energy, without falling back on the common
solution of monitoring the users. Finally, if ICT simply has to be
used for surveillance, that surveillance can be aimed at larger institu-
tions rather than the individual inhabitants. It can provide ways for
the inhabitants to hold accountable companies that develop wasteful
technologies, or energy suppliers that attempt to classify and sort their
customers using smart metering schemes.
Given the role of ICT design documents as plans for constructing
technological systems, their descriptions of the envisioned users serve
as a method of discursively constructing new categories such as the
smart home inhabitant. In the texts, these categories serve to demon-
strate to the reader how values related to technological expertise and
rational choice fit into the visions of sustainability. Clearly, the con-
sequences of living with these systems cannot be determined by only
examining the design documents: once the systems are operational,
they are likely to be used, resisted, and configured in ways never in-
tended by their designers. However, their influence on the agencies of
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the inhabitants, and how they encourage certain uses and discourage
others, remains worthy of attention, because the development pro-
cesses of these technological systems are much more open to change
before they assume their material forms.
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Abstract
In research and development of information and commu-
nication technologies for sustainability, there is a strong be-
lief that human behaviour can be monitored at the individual
level to generate different signals, and that these signals can be
used to influence individuals to behave differently. We anal-
yse Seventh Framework Programme policy documents pub-
lished by the European Commission, and descriptions of re-
search projects granted funding from it, to highlight the un-
critical development and application of surveillance technolo-
gies to change human behaviour. We argue that EU-financed
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projects dealing with sustainability and information and com-
munication technology use models of social change that have
been widely criticised as unlikely to lead to substantial changes
in resource consumption. Additionally, we show that these
texts discuss only the potential positive effects of technological
surveillance, but neither acknowledge nor require the handling
of the potential negative effects of surveillance.
8.1 Introduction
The assumption that energy consumption behaviours can be altered
by prompts from computer-supported systems is common in research
and development of information and communication technologies
(ICTs) for sustainability. Most often, it is assumed that behaviour
can be monitored at the individual level to generate different signals,
and that these signals can be used to influence individuals to behave
differently.
Shove (2010) identifies this assumption as belonging to a domi-
nant paradigm of understanding social change as a combination of
attitudes, behaviour, and choices within environmental policy. In ear-
lier work, she states that “policies designed to promote sustainable
consumption are generally founded upon an extraordinarily narrow
understanding of human behaviour” (Shove 2005, 111) and argues that
this model overemphasises the influence of individual behaviour and
individual choice while ignoring many other factors involved in re-
source consumption. In a similar direction, Dourish (2010) details
the limitations of systems that frame problems of sustainability as is-
sues of personal choice, and argues for a broadening of the theoretical
framework to allow systems to be developed for scales other than the
individual.
Focusing on systems that aim to persuade their users to behave dif-
ferently, Brynjarsdóttir et al. (2012) state that such systems are based
on a narrow vision of sustainability as resource optimisation, and ar-
gue that many such systems tend to provide technological solutions to
social problems. These systems reflect specific definitions of sustain-
ability chosen by the designers, and “their framing of sustainability
as optimization of a simple metric places technologies incorrectly as
objective arbiters over more complex issues of sustainability” (947).
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Other studies within human-computer interaction highlight dif-
ferent targets for intervention aside from individual choices. For ex-
ample, researchers emphasise the importance of studying everyday
interactions (Pierce, Schiano, and Paulos 2010; Strengers 2011), and
recommend designing systems to actively promote trust among users
(Rodden et al. 2013). Additionally, Dillahunt et al. (2009) show that
research on sustainability technologies tends to focus on aﬄuent house-
holds which make up a narrow demographic, and neglects marginalised
groups such as low-income households. The authors also demonstrate
that these households engage in energy saving behaviours even when
there are no financial incentives.
To these critiques we add an analysis from the perspective of surveil-
lance studies. As DiSalvo, Sengers, and Brynjarsdóttir (2010) point
out, it is important to engage with questions about “who gets to decide
what change should happen and how, whose needs are met and whose
values matter in the end” (1981) when designing ICTs for sustainabil-
ity. We argue that insights from the field of surveillance studies are
well-suited to considering such questions. Ball, Lyon, and Haggerty
(2012) describe the field as follows:
The contribution of surveillance studies is to foreground
empirically, theoretically and ethically the nature, impact,
and effects of a fundamental social-ordering process. This
process comprises the collection, usually (but not always)
followed by analysis and application of information within
a given domain of social, environmental, economic, or
political governance. (1)
Surveillance systems are used to categorise and classify, and ques-
tions about who is included in which categories, and who remains
excluded follow from their use. Lyon (2007) states that surveillance
depends on “modes of categorizing populations and treating people
differently according to socio-economic status, ethniciy, gender, re-
gion, age, and so on” (177). These categorisations may benefit their
subjects unequally, and as Gandy (2006) argues, the differential treat-
ment may become discriminatory.
Surveillance systems and the classifications that they rely on are
not neutral. The key point is that there are moral and political conse-
quences of classification (Bowker and Star 2000, 324). Classifications
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that divide information into different categories are affected by the
contexts in which these systems are designed in, and they reflect the
worldviews of their designers. Cakici (2013) discusses issues of classi-
fication, and the judgements that result from their use, in the design
of ICT-based surveillance systems for smart homes.
In this paper, we are primarily concerned with the uncritical de-
velopment and application of surveillance technologies. We describe
how reliance on the attitude-behaviour-choice model and the use of
ICT-based surveillance appear in the Seventh Framework Programme
(FP7) policy documents published by the European Commission.
With a total budget of 32.4 billion Euros (EC 2013a), FP7 is highly
influential in steering research within European research institutions,
and its prominence makes it a good starting point for a critique of
ICT-based surveillance. We focus on Challenge 6, ICT for a low carbon
economy, within the ICT theme of the Co-operation sub-programme.
Based on an empirical investigation of FP7 policy documents and
project descriptions that have been financed within the challenge, we
argue that EU-financed projects dealing with sustainability and ICT
use models of social change that have been widely criticised as unlikely
to lead to substantial changes in resource consumption. Additionally,
we show that these texts discuss only the potential positive effects of
technological surveillance, but neither acknowledge nor require the
handling of the potential negative effects of surveillance within every-
day interactions.
8.2 Methodology
FP7 collects all research-related European Union (EU) initiatives (EC
2013a). It is composed of four sub-programmes: Co-operation, Peo-
ple, Capacities and Ideas. Co-operation is defined as the core pro-
gramme of FP7. It aims to support collaborative research within
and beyond the EU, and it is divided into ten themes: health; food,
agriculture and fisheries and biotechnology; information and commu-
nication technologies; nanosciences, nanotechnologies, materials and
new production technologies; energy; environment; transport; socio-
economic sciences and humanities; space; and security.
Our analysis covers the ICT theme of the Co-operation sub-prog-
ramme within FP7. Each call within Co-operation is associated with
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a set of documents describing both the content of the call and the ap-
plication procedures. The primary policy reference in our analysis is
the Cooperation Work Programme: Theme 3 – ICT document, which
has been with revised six times over the course of FP7, initially ap-
pearing in 2007, and with the most recent revision in 2012. Three
of these revisions (in 2007, 2009, and 2011) introduce major changes
to the challenges and objectives listed in the document, such as re-
named or merged items, whereas the intermediate years (2008, 2010,
and 2012) bring only minor modifications. The ICT calls are bro-
ken into smaller categories called Challenges. Each challenge is further
divided into sub-categories called Objectives, and these use a consis-
tent numbering scheme throughout FP7. For example, the label ICT-
2009.1.4 refers to the fourth objective within the first challenge of the
2009 version of the policy document.
In our analysis, we used the three major versions of the policy
document, and identified the objectives that are of interest for each
challenge. To choose the relevant objectives, we searched primar-
ily for descriptions of surveillance targeting humans, that is, systems
which monitor, sort, and classify properties of humans and human
behaviour directly or indirectly. We conducted the analysis by mark-
ing all references to the hypothesis that individual behaviour can be
shaped through a combination of surveillance and feedback mecha-
nisms in the collected documents. From this material, we compiled a
collection of expected societal impacts of these types of technologies,
in particular those that referenced optimisation and rationalisation.
We also compiled references to different surveillance activities and ex-
pected behavioural changes. From the three versions of the policy
document, we selected 15 objectives for further investigation using
the same criteria. These objectives were distributed over four chal-
lenges which are modified and moved during the three revisions (see
Appendix for a detailed list). Using the search engine of the Commu-
nity Research and Development Information Service (CORDIS) (EC
2013b) we identified 173 projects which were financed under the ob-
jectives we selected.
To limit our material for this paper, we chose to focus on a single
challenge originally titled Challenge 6: ICT for Mobility, Environmen-
tal Sustainability and Energy Efficiency, and renamed in 2011 to Chal-
lenge 6: ICT for a low carbon economy. Out of the 15 objectives we had
originally picked, five fell under this challenge, and they contained a
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total of 55 projects. In terms of the number of financed projects,
Challenge 5: ICT for Health, Ageing Well, Inclusion and Governance in-
cluded a comparable amount of projects. Given the two options, we
chose to proceed with Challenge 6 in our analysis primarily due to
our greater familiarity with ICT within the domain of sustainability.
We retrieved the project descriptions for the 55 projects from COR-
DIS. Our analysis is based on these project descriptions as well as the
policy documents described earlier. In some cases where we required
more detail or found the descriptions insufficient, we also consulted
the web pages and the deliverables produced by the projects, but due
to the high number of projects under consideration, this has been the
exception rather than the rule.
8.3 Analysis
ICT for Surveillance
Within the policy documents, ICT is described as a tool to monitor
different phenomena, to classify them, and to act upon those classi-
fications. For example, the 2009 work programme states that “[t]he
power grid needs new ICT-based monitoring and control systems to
take on its growing complexity and distribution” (EC 2008, 62). In
this statement, the value of ICT is in its capability to monitor complex
exchanges as they happen. The same idea also appears in a different
context in one of the objectives within the 2011 work programme:
Home energy controlling hubs that will collect real-time
or near real-time data on energy consumption data from
smart household appliances and enable intelligent automa-
tion. (EC 2010, 75)
The role of the technologies remain similar in the home context.
Both examples begin from traces of energy consumption. In the first
case, ICTs control power grids by monitoring activities of different
sources that produce or require energy, and intervene upon that pro-
cess based on the categorisations they produce. In the second case,
ICTs are used to monitor the energy consumption of inhabitants as
they use different appliances, and to categorise the activities to coin-
cide with different automation schemes.
Analysis 135
The projects financed by the work programmes within Challenge
6 retain the same role for ICT. For example, the SmartHG project
gathers “real-time data about energy usage from residential homes
and exploit[s] such data for intelligent automation pursuing two main
goals: minimizing energy usage and cost for each home” (SmartHG
2012). Similarly, the FIEMSER project aims to build “a monitoring
and control system to optimize in near-real time the local generation-
consumption matching” (FIEMSER 2013), and the Adapt4EE project
“treat[s] occupants as the central reference point” and “analys[es] oc-
cupancy behaviour (presence and movement)” (Adapt4EE 2011).
The term optimisation appears regularly in the energy domain as a
challenge that can be solved using ICT. In optimisation problems, an
ongoing process considered sub-optimal is improved by monitoring
and categorising. The policy documents request the optimisation of
different activities, such as “generation–consumption matching” (EC
2008, 66), the “dynamics of energy supply and demand” (EC 2010,
74), and the “use of energy” (79). Although the term is commonly
used, a clear definition of what would be considered optimal in these
contexts is not provided. The variables that should be considered for
the cases of optimisation, and the evaluation criteria by which the
optimisations would be measured are also not described. The texts
focus on demand and consumption, hinting that the variables to be
optimised are found at the consumer level. Statements such as “be-
havioural changes in the society at large” (EC 2008, 67) point in the
same direction as well. This statement on behavioural change is note-
worthy, and we explore this issue further in the next section.
Moving from policy documents to the project descriptions, the
term optimisation continues to occur frequently. Although in some
cases the term remains ambiguous, for example in the case of the
project description for IDEAS (“a neighbourhood energy manage-
ment tool to optimise energy production and consumption” (IDEAS
2012)), in other cases the projects provide different targets for opti-
misation which entail different forms of evaluation. For example, the
SmartHG description states that it aims to “minimise the home en-
ergy bill and usage (local optimisation) with respect to a given price
policy computed to attain global (grid level) optimisation” (SmartHG
2012).
In more general terms, the policy documents suggest several opti-
misation processes which aim to shape consumers’ energy consump-
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tion using ICT-based surveillance. This basic model is then reflected
by numerous projects, all of which propose to implement some vari-
ants depending on what type of surveillance is used and which mech-
anisms are considered to shape energy consumption.
Changing User Behaviour
In their roles as surveillance tools, ICTs are used in attempts to change
user behaviour. In the policy documents, this change is described as
raising user awareness, and aiding users in decision making. Under the
ICT for Energy Efficiency objective from the 2009 work programme,
the aim of the projects are described as producing “[i]ntuitive user
interfaces that help end-users save energy while maintaining the de-
sired comfort levels” (EC 2008, 66). The intuitiveness of interfaces are
emphasised as important properties for saving energy, and discomfort
is positioned as the opposing force that must be avoided. The possi-
bility of creating discomfort by introducing new ICTs into the lives
of the inhabitants is preempted by this statement. The same work
programme provides a little more detail on what users might require
in a different objective, Environmental Services and Climate Change:
“Projects should be driven by the possibility for a range of users, in-
cluding non ICT-skilled users, to plug-in their own use cases and get
access to customised information and decision support.” (67) These
users, now positioned as information seekers, provide their needs to
the ICTs and receive advice from them.
Although the above statements hint at an aim to change behaviour,
the policy documents themselves rarely mention behaviours explic-
itly, except in the case of driving, where projects are expected to de-
velop “[n]ew tools, systems and services supporting energy-efficient
driving and driver behaviour adaptation” (EC 2010, 80). The intent
to alter behaviour using ICT is much more apparent in the project
descriptions. The ENERsip project provides a typical example: “The
outcome of the adoption of ENERsip will allow setting new behavioural
patters in the society and reduce overall intense economic dependence
on energy” (ENERsip 2013). Similarly, the FIEMSER project pro-
poses “solutions based on a rational consumption of energy, local gen-
eration and an increase in the consciousness of the building owners
towards their energy consumption habits” (FIEMSER 2013). Both
projects also echo the aim set by the work programmes to build in-
Analysis 137
tuitive interfaces while maintaining the desired comfort levels using
the same words as the programme. Some projects propose different
mechanisms for promoting behavioural change such as financial in-
centives (E–Price 2013), mixed reality technologies (IDEAS 2012), as
well as gaming and social networking (EEPOS 2012).
The project descriptions construct a chain of causality beginning
from ICT-based surveillance, continuing with behavioural change, and
concluding with energy savings or reduced CO2 emissions. The ten-
sion in this chain is most visible when we consider the set of decisions
that must be made to construct the these technologies. For exam-
ple, what is required to set new behavioural patterns? Which patterns
would be preferred, and how would those who do not behave in accor-
dance with the patterns react to it? Considerations along these lines
are not present in the texts we have examined.
Consequences
The primary outcome that Challenge 6 aims at is using ICT to “assist
in reshaping the demand side of our energy-dependent society, reduc-
ing energy consumption, and subsequently CO2 emissions” (EC 2010,
74). In addition to environmental goals, the work programmes men-
tion different bureaucratic requirements in reference to international
commitments, and economic goals such as maintaining competitive-
ness, reinforcing industrial and technological positions, and establish-
ing an open energy market (EC 2008).
More specifically, the programmes refer to the need to aid commu-
nication and the transfer for information as goals that should be met
by the projects. For example, the 2011 document describes part of its
focus as the “[f]uture electricity distribution grids applying seamless
communications systems to increase the connectivity, management,
automation and coordination between suppliers (including renewable
sources), consumers and networks” (EC 2010, 74). In this statement,
ICT makes different contexts more amenable to management by con-
necting them. Consumers and suppliers of energy are linked by the
flow of information, and the connection reshapes the demand side of
society.
The projects financed under different objectives within the chal-
lenge begin with these goals and provide more specific solutions. The
GreenCom project describes a smart grid that provides “[a] value
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based demand control based on individual consumer contracts with
attractive tariffs, reward/penalty clauses and other elements will al-
low intelligent energy demand management and control” (GreenCom
2012). In line with the goals of the work programme, in this project
ICT allows the consumers to enter into contracts where they can be
rewarded or penalised, aiding the management of their demands on
the supplier side.
Surveillance technologies allow the projects to begin from resi-
dential contexts and link them to energy goals as well. The SmartHG
project states its expected outcome as: “gathering real-time data about
energy usage from residential homes and exploiting such data for intel-
ligent automation pursuing two main goals: minimising energy usage
and cost for each home” (SmartHG 2012). In contrast to the diverse
ICTs proposed for saving energy, the home itself is represented as a
homogeneous space for energy consumption surveillance. The PEB-
BLE project extends the homogeneity further:
Through user-interfaces humans act as sensors communi-
cating their thermal comfort preferences to the PEBBLE
system, and in return the PEBBLE system returns infor-
mation with the goal of enhancing energy-awareness of
the users. The generality of the proposed methodology
affords a universality that transcends regional, behavioral,
environmental or other variations. (PEBBLE 2012)
In this statement, ICT is used to abstract away the irrelevant prop-
erties of the inhabitants, and to construct their involvement as a vehi-
cle for voicing input. By discarding local contexts, it becomes possible
for the system to transcend variations and to offer a universal solution.
Not all projects describe their users primarily as sensors. For ex-
ample, the INERTIA project offers “fine grained control [. . . ] while
also protecting privacy and autonomy on the local level, fully respect-
ing prosumers preferences and needs.” (INERTIA 2012). The inhab-
itants are described using the term prosumers, which this project de-
fines as consumers who produce energy using the proposed technolo-
gies, although there is also a recognition that the systems come into
contact with users who have different needs and different preferences.
These users are made into a coherent group in this brief statement by
referring to how they are expected to interact with the system. At the
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same time, the designers recognise the potentially different needs and
preferences of the users, although the specifics of that difference are
not defined in the descriptions.
In general, the work programmes and the project summaries re-
veal very little concern about the heterogeneity of the stakeholders
involved in their visions. Goals pertaining to aiding trust, safety, and
inclusion, or preventing privacy breaches, marginalisation, and exclu-
sion are not voiced by these texts. The underlying assumption regard-
ing outcomes is that energy savings and the reduction of emissions
are bound to occur if the users cooperate with ICTs and individually
make decisions compatible with the continued functioning of these
systems.
8.4 Discussion
In the texts we have analysed, surveillance systems generate infor-
mation by monitoring individuals and recording traces of their be-
haviour. These traces are then communicated back to the individuals
in an attempt to change their behaviour. Depending on the goals of
the project, the individuals are either provided financial incentives to
convince them to consume energy differently, or they are taught to
behave differently using feedback generated by surveillance systems.
As we have stated previously, the assumption that behaviour can be
altered by providing information presumes a theoretical stance that
identifies the individual’s outcome of deliberation as the cause, and
the behaviour as the effect. The theory postulates that the individual
can be informed using ICT, and the individual, who is presumed to
be acting rationally by applying a cost-benefit analysis to decisions, is
expected to change their behaviour after receiving information from
the surveillance systems. We argue that there are two problems with
assuming this theoretical stance when designing and developing ICTs
for sustainability. First, the assumption that behaviour can be manip-
ulated using information about energy consumption is questionable.
Second, it neglects to address the negative societal effects of employ-
ing surveillance to influence behaviour while arguing for increased
surveillance.
The assumption about behaviour change through consumption
feedback is questionable primarily because it overemphasises individ-
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ual choice while neglecting a whole range of other factors involved
in shaping human behaviour. Information may be important in in-
fluencing how people behave, but there are a series of events between
rendering information and behavioural change. First, the information
must reach the user. This is a matter of both timing and presentation.
The user must have the time required to perceive and interpret the in-
formation, and it must be presented in a way that allows the user to do
so while in the midst of other ongoing events. In a home setting this
accounts for high variation of activities, not all of which come with a
large degree of spare time. Second, the user must possess the experi-
ence as well as the analytical expertise to interpret the information and
to figure out how to act upon it. When targeting virtually everyone,
ranging from children to elders, from formally uneducated to profes-
sionals and academics, from people that have spent their whole life in
their current setting to people who just arrived from a life spent on
the other side of the planet, the user population displays an extreme
variation with regard to ways of interpreting and acting upon infor-
mation. In addition to taking the time and possessing the expertise to
make sense of the information, the user must also have an interest in
doing so. Both the policy texts and many of the project descriptions
from our analysis seem to assume that people have a general interest
in changing their behaviour to save energy. Alternatively, the texts
assume that financial or altruistic incentives can motivate people to
take an interest. It is hard to find empirical evidence in support of
this assumption. Even if people are informed and motivated to adopt
new behaviour, a number of other factors may work against change.
Established practices related to behaviour do not only constrain what
type of behaviour is possible, they also help shape motivations to be-
have in certain ways. Social norms play an important role in affecting
behaviour, as do physical constraints. One popular example in the
energy saving domain is the possibility of automatically delaying the
start of the laundry machine until early mornings when there is a sur-
plus of electricity in the network, when it is cheap, or when the CO2
emissions from electricity production are low. However, that might
imply having to hang the wet laundry to dry in the morning instead of
at night, which would conflict well-established practices of morning
routines filled with activities like having breakfast, sending children
to school, and commuting to work. In addition, the noise from the
washing machine centrifuging during early morning hours is likely to
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interfere with the common practice of sleeping at night. Therefore,
the assumption that users will change their behaviour as a result of
information pertaining to energy consumption being made available
through an “intuitive” user interface, without careful consideration
of other factors that affect this process, can in general be considered
flawed.
The definition of the term optimal in the materials we have exam-
ined reflects the viewpoints of their designers and stakeholders. To
identify optimal resource consumption, surveillance systems are pro-
posed for monitoring ongoing events, and for classifying the recorded
traces. However, categorisations and classifications are not neutral;
they encode the preferences of their designers, show what their design-
ers have deemed should be visible, and hide what they have deemed
not worth seeing. For example, a shortcoming of the financial in-
centives is made apparent through the emphasis on the proposed ex-
change of lowering energy consumption to obtain financial benefits.
The exchange contains an internal contradiction: the saving of energy
motivated by financial gain can only be an optimal behaviour if it
generates more income per unit time than other methods of wealth
generation such as salaries. For those with higher incomes, the time
and attention spent on acquiring the best deal from the system is less
likely to be higher than their current income per unit time. On the
other hand, those with lower incomes, those who would benefit more
financially from the financial incentives, are only able to participate
if they invest time and acquire the technological competence required
to operate the systems. For those who are able to learn to operate the
system, interpret its results, and make the necessary changes, the sys-
tem grants certain benefits such as lower energy costs. Marginalisation
becomes visible at this level, where those who are not able to interpret
the system become unable to enjoy its benefits, primarily expressed as
a financial gain in the documents (e.g., they pay more because they
do not know when it is cheapest to run the washing machine). Thus,
the technologically and financially privileged can afford to ignore the
system and disregard the disadvantages of lost profit while the under-
privileged are marginalised further. By targeting the overlap between
technological competence and positive financial gain, the idea to pro-
vide financial incentives to motivate behavioural change minimises the
number of users likely to benefit from the system.
The focus on individual behaviour and choice by different EU
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projects is questionable on its own. Given the limitations of the
model, the possibility of change using such frameworks seems small.
However, the problem is not limited to model choice. After all, dif-
ferent disciplines use different methods and theories to understand the
world, and when those methods do not yield results, they may be re-
vised, or other methods can be used in their place. The problem with
using these particular theories, of providing information to change
behaviour, is that it is done with very little attention to possible nega-
tive social consequences. Large sums of European research funding in
ICT design and development, generated largely through taxation (EC
2013c), are expended on technologies that may not contribute with
any positive effect for society, but also induce negative social effects,
partially due to their uncritical use of surveillance. We argue that the
lack of focus on possible negative social effects like marginalisation,
exclusion, privacy breaches, and reduced trust raised by these quanti-
fying methods, both at the policy level and at the project level, points
to a general lack of engagement with these issues among ICT projects
financed under FP7.
By opening the judgements of the designers to critical debate,
concerns can be identified, voiced, discussed, and ultimately resolved
through negotiation, preferably as an integral part of the design pro-
cess. In this view, conflict is assumed to be a necessary component
of social negotiation, but debates about assumptions can aid in min-
imising structural conflict that deeply advantages some subjects over
others. If the assumptions are not challenged early in the design pro-
cess, it becomes possible for the failure of the system to be blamed on
the non-cooperative behaviour of the inhabitants. The system goes
unused, and the end result does not contribute towards sustainability
goals.
8.5 Conclusion
In summary, our analysis shows that the belief that human behaviour
can be monitored at the individual level to generate different signals,
and that these signals can be used to influence individuals to behave
differently is well represented in both FP7 policy documents and de-
scriptions of funded FP7 projects related to sustainability and energy
efficiency. However, this is promoted and proposed almost entirely
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without references to the great number of other factors that deter-
mines human behaviour. Failing to do so, the texts provide little evi-
dence to the fact that the potential behavioural change caused by this
chain of events holds any promise for positively affecting energy con-
sumption.
Meanwhile, both FP7 policy documents and descriptions of funded
projects present a view of human behaviour and society seen pri-
marily from a quantifying, managerial position. This position priv-
ileges counting, tracking, and efficiency, but it fails to address poten-
tial negative effects introduced by the surveillance technology, such
as marginalisation, exclusion, and discrimination. In the policy doc-
uments and the project descriptions, surveillance systems are used to
assist in reaching sustainability goals, and the potential positive effects
are highlighted without considering the undesirable consequences of
surveillance for those that are to be monitored.
This is not to suggest that there is no potential in applying surveil-
lance technologies for the purpose of achieving sustainability goals
with regard to environmental and energy efficiency. This may still
very well be the case. However, in order to realise that, the design
space must be expanded to cover more factors involved in shaping hu-
man behaviour, and the judgements of the designers and policy mak-
ers must be voiced in a critical debate where concerns for social effects
can be identified, analysed, and discussed.
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Appendix
Projects Objective Name
12 ICT-2007.4.1 Digital libraries and technology-
enhanced learning
9 ICT-2007.5.1 Personal health systems for mon-
itoring and point-of-care diagnos-
tics
13 ICT-2009.4.2 Technology-enhanced learning
10 ICT-2009.5.1 Personal health systems
10 ICT-2009.6.1 ICT for safety and energy effi-
ciency in mobility
13 ICT-2009.6.3 ICT for energy efficiency
8 ICT-2011.1.3 Internet-connected objects
16 ICT-2011.5.1 Personal health systems (PHS)
8 ICT-2011.5.3 Patient guidance services (PGS),
safety and healthcare record infor-
mation reuse
12 ICT-2011.5.4 ICT for ageing and wellbeing
13 ICT-2011.5.5 ICT for smart and personalised in-
clusion
9 ICT-2011.6.1 Smart Energy Grids
14 ICT-2011.6.2 ICT systems for energy efficiency
9 EEB-ICT-2011.6.5 ICT for energy-positive neighbour-
hoods
17 ICT-2011.8.1 Technology-enhanced learning
The distribution of the 173 projects over the 15 selected objectives.
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Information and communication technologies are not value-
neutral tools that reflect reality; they privilege some forms of
action, and they limit others. We analyse reports describing
the design, development, testing, and evaluation of a European
Commission co-funded syndromic surveillance project called
SIDARTHa. We show that the reports construct the concept
of a health threat as a sudden, unexpected event with the po-
tential to cause severe harm, and one that requires a public
health response aided by surveillance. Based on our analysis,
we state that when creating surveillance technologies, design
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choices have consequences for what can be seen, and for what
remains invisible. Finally, we argue that syndromic surveil-
lance discourse privileges expertise in developing, maintaining,
and using software within public health practice, and it priori-
tises standardised and transportable knowledge over local and
context-dependent knowledge. We conclude that syndromic
surveillance contributes to a shift in broader public health prac-
tice, with consequences for fairness if design choices and priori-
tisations remain invisible and unchallenged.
9.1 Introduction
The term syndromic surveillance describes a collection of methods
within the field of public health surveillance. These are characterised
by their use of secondary sources, referring to data collected for a
variety of purposes only indirectly related to population health. For
example, over-the-counter medicine sales, or records of ambulance dis-
patches from a hospital, or records of emergency room visits can be
considered secondary sources because these data are not collected with
the primary intent to perform public health surveillance. Using this
formulation, syndromic surveillance is often positioned as an efficient
use of already collected data (Mandl et al. 2004).
Within the discourse of syndromic surveillance, numerical rep-
resentations of populations and the application of statistical analyses
are essential to the task of constructing meaning from diverse sources
of surveillance data. The use of these types of surveillance methods
follow a long tradition of health discourses where individuals and pop-
ulations are constructed as knowable and governable by establishing
comparative systems to analyse their similarities and differences (Fou-
cault 1977, 190). Equally important is the idea of disease as a collection
of symptoms and signs observed by a medical gaze (Foucault 1973,
88-106). These discourses inform and guide the practice of syndromic
surveillance.
We analyse reports describing the design, development, testing,
and evaluation of a European Commission co-funded syndromic surveil-
lance project called SIDARTHa (System for Information on Detec-
tion and Analysis of Risks and Threats to Health). We start with the
assumption that information and communication technologies (ICTs)
are never neutral. They necessarily reflect the viewpoints of their de-
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signers, the influence of others involved in their construction, and
consequences of the material limitations encountered during their de-
velopment. With our analysis, we aim to identify how a syndromic
surveillance discourse privileges or excludes specific types of knowl-
edge and practices. We show that the discourse of syndromic surveil-
lance constructs the health threat concept as a sudden, unexpected
event with the potential to cause severe harm, and one that requires
a public health response aided by surveillance. Based on our analysis,
we state that when creating surveillance technologies, design choices
have consequences for what can be seen, and for what remains invisi-
ble. Finally, we argue that syndromic surveillance discourse privileges
expertise in developing, maintaining, and using software within pub-
lic health practice, and it prioritises standardised and transportable
knowledge over local and context-dependent knowledge. We conclude
that syndromic surveillance contributes to a shift in broader public
health practice, with consequences for fairness if design choices and
prioritisations remain invisible and unchallenged.
9.2 Background
Partially due to its origins in communicable disease surveillance, most
syndromic surveillance systems are engaged primarily in the detection
of unexpected events. This type of detection is typically performed
by first calculating the proportion of the number of individuals in
the population suffering from a health condition to the total size of
the population, called prevalence, which is then compared at different
time points. Many statistical methods exist to perform much more
complicated versions of this calculation, taking into account other fac-
tors such as season, geography, migration, etc., but almost all retain
the notion of prevalence comparison.
The earlier applications of syndromic surveillance were charac-
terised by the use of health-related data that precede diagnosis, and
the continual monitoring of disease indicators to detect outbreaks of
communicable diseases earlier than traditional methods (Mostashari
and Hartman 2003; Buehler et al. 2004; Henning 2004). More re-
cently, the definition of syndromic surveillance has broadened to in-
clude the monitoring of non-communicable diseases and other health
conditions such as heat-related illnesses, injuries caused by tornadoes,
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or respiratory illness after wildfires (Buehler et al. 2009).
Traditionally, these activities are performed by a central health au-
thority that conducts surveillance for a particular geographical region,
and reports to another institution that is tasked with monitoring a
wider region, terminating at the health authority with the widest ge-
ographical coverage. For example, when a local clinic encounters a
patient with a reportable communicable disease, it reports the case
to the regional centre that collects the cases. The regional centres re-
port to the national centre, and the national centre might report to
an international health body, such as the European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control (ECDC).
A well-known example of syndromic surveillance is Google Flu
Trends (Ginsberg et al. 2009; Google 2013), which uses search queries
entered by users into Google as indicators of influenza outbreaks. The
developers of the system have claimed that they can “accurately esti-
mate the current level of weekly influenza activity in each region of
the United States” (Ginsberg et al. 2009, 1012), although the estimates
have not always been accurate (Cook et al. 2011; Butler 2013). While
the system itself is well-known, it is highly unusual as it is run by
a private company. The majority of syndromic surveillance systems
are used by public institutions such as regional and national health
authorities.
Many different types of ICTs are used for communicable disease
surveillance. Bravata et al. (2004) provide a broad review of 115 sys-
tems and identifies those that provide syndromic signals. Other re-
views focus on syndromic surveillance, and include more recent sys-
tems (Chen, Zeng, and Yan 2009; Cakici 2011). Additionally, the
Triple-S project provides an extensive list of syndromic surveillance
systems used within Europe (Triple-S 2013).
Challenges
Syndromic surveillance has been challenged both by public health
practitioners as well as scholars from various disciplines studying pub-
lic health and related domains. One of the earliest challenges was by
Reingold (2003) who asked: “If syndromic surveillance is the answer,
what is the question?” Reingold points to the scarce resources within
the field of public health, and challenges those who call for the fur-
ther development of syndromic surveillance to detail not how detec-
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tion could be improved, but if public health response would be im-
proved in any way if these systems are implemented. He emphasises
the importance of building capacity within the public health depart-
ments instead of collecting and analysing data externally, an activity
often performed by for-profit corporations in departments without
academic partners. In a discussion on the difficulties of creating a
nation-wide syndromic surveillance Mostashari voices concerns about
the relationship between detection and response capacity:
We have 80 per cent of the nation covered but we really
have nothing covered, because signals come and go, and
an e-mail maybe is sent out, and there’s no local capacity
. . . If you’re doing analysis for a thousand different towns,
villages, cities, whatever, every day you’re going to find
alarms. (USMI 2003; cited in Fearnley 2008b)
Similarly, Heffernan et al. (2004) state that although their syn-
dromic surveillance systems have been beneficial in detection, they are
“essentially ‘smoke detectors’ and call for prompt investigation and re-
sponse if they are to provide early warning of outbreaks” (Heffernan
et al. 2004). They continue to recommend that efforts for bioterror-
ism preparation should focus on hiring well-trained public health pro-
fessionals with responsibilities that are broader than just bioterrorism.
Fearnley (2008b) analyses the debates surrounding the develop-
ment and use several nation-wide syndromic surveillance systems in
the U.S., and identifies a central conflict: the early syndromic surveil-
lance systems were designed primarily for national bioterrorism pre-
paredness, but the data collection and reporting were assigned to pub-
lic health institutions tasked with maximising the health of human
populations. These systems collected data from many different, non-
traditional sources, and transferred them to health departments. How-
ever, the collected data were not immediately helpful, because “[m]ore
information means more interpretive work, without certain benefits;
and more detected events requires more epidemiological responses,
without (at this point) the necessary epidemiological resources to un-
dertake them” (Fearnley 2008a, 84). Fearnley points out that without
the resources to interpret the incoming data, the newly developed sys-
tems were not helpful to epidemiologists.
In syndromic surveillance systems, collecting data is the key to
tackling public health problems. All syndromic surveillance systems
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are constructed with the assumption that gathering more data helps
public health authorities make decisions. Analysing the practices that
accompany ICT-based surveillance systems in public health, French
(2009) identifies the assumption that more data are helpful as a conse-
quence of an immaterial conception of information:
[. . . A]n immaterial conception of information, whether
implicit or explicit, assumes that information signifies in
the same way regardless of time or place. As a conse-
quence of this assumption the significance of information-
processing practices is minimized; the material diversity
of such practices, and the effort required to unify them, is
underestimated. (111).
As French argues, data collection also comes at a cost. It requires
significant amounts of work to standardise data, to connect systems,
and to ensure that data are transferred correctly from one place to an-
other. Ignoring the cost of collection, or more broadly, the material
dimensions of information, causes problems for ICTs. The very im-
mediate consequence is that it requires more work. This is the work
of maintaining and interpreting.
In their extensive study of classification, Bowker and Star point
out that data entry is never a trivial task: it requires trained staff to
perform, it is prone to mistakes with respect to the classifications be-
ing used, and there are always cultural variations in what is interpreted
as worthy of recording and what is omitted (Bowker and Star 2000,
107). Additionally, they state that there is always a tension between
the standardisation of lists centrally, and their use locally (139). Fi-
nally, they emphasise that “all category systems are moral and politi-
cal entities” (324). As syndromic surveillance systems rely heavily on
rigid classification schemes, they exhibit these characteristics.
Based on a study of medical records, Berg and Bowker also ar-
gue that data collection and recording methods influence how work
is organised, and which practices are considered to be part of that
work (Berg and Bowker 1997, 532). Similarly, emphasising data collec-
tion and information generation in public health surveillance modifies
the definition of activities that belong to public health, and some types
of expertise are prioritised over others. For example, when syndromic
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surveillance is used, familiarity with developing and maintaining soft-
ware becomes an important requirement for public health practice.
Given the costs and risks of immaterial conceptions of informa-
tion, and the work standardisation, the question of benefits, or what
there is to gain remains. The concept of immutable mobiles, intro-
duced by Latour (1988, 227), provides a way to engage the question.
Latour uses the term to refer to objects that are archivable and com-
parable regardless of their age, place of origin, and context of use.
For example, an entry in a table listing the admissions to the emer-
gency room can be considered an immutable mobile because, unlike
the locally bound emergency room, it can be transported easily, com-
pared to other descriptions, or even be organised in charts and statis-
tics to construct an aggregated view of events that occur in emergency
rooms. The complexity of the world is overcome by translating it into
intelligible and stable objects, and for this reason, immutable mobiles
are capable of exerting power over great distances. As their power is
tied to their simplicity, the work of keeping the object stable is of-
ten invisible. However, the structures that maintain it, such as the
layout of the rows and columns in a table, or the procedure for fill-
ing out the details of each entry must also remain constant across
places and contexts for the object to remain immutable. Therefore,
its immutability can only be accomplished by mobilising people and
material resources, and by keeping them together. By categorising
syndromes, collecting data, and creating graphs, the output of the
peripheral surveillance systems are brought closer to each other, but
constant work is required to uphold the categorisations.
9.3 Analysis
SIDARTHa is designed to be installed at health institutions to mon-
itor sources of emergency data, including records of emergency dis-
patches and reports from emergency practitioners. The system has
previously been tested in Göppingen, Germany and in Leuven, Bel-
gium. According to the list of European syndromic surveillance sys-
tems provided by the Triple-S project, SIDARTHa is currently being
used in the Autonomous Region of Cantabria in Spain and in the state
of Tyrol in Austria (Triple-S 2013).
We chose to analyse the SIDARTHa project as it is one of the
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largest syndromic surveillance systems developed in Europe, and it in-
volves multiple partners from different member states. Similar projects
which focus on single health institutions separately instead of one cen-
tralised system have also been developed in the U.S., such as RODS (Es-
pino et al. 2004), but the organisation of public health authorities in
U.S., divided between the federal and the state levels differs from the
European context where the division is between member states and
EU-wide public health efforts. Although the majority of syndromic
surveillance systems in the last decade have been developed and used in
the U.S., we consider ourselves more qualified to analyse a European
project due to our previous experience in public health surveillance in
an EU member state (Cakici et al. 2010).
Our analysis is based primarily on the seven project reports pub-
lished by the SIDARTHa project between the years 2009 and 2010.
They describe the process of design, development, testing, and evalua-
tion of the SIDARTHa syndromic surveillance system. These reports
form a suitable corpus for discourse analysis because the authors de-
scribe different stages of the project in detail, and they state their
reasons for their decisions. The earliest reports focus on literature
reviews and pre-studies, later reports describe the design and devel-
opment of the system, and the most recent ones discuss testing and
evaluation. This progression allows us to observe changes and shifts
in the project and see how different ideas evolve throughout the design
and development of the system.
We began our analysis by reading the seven project reports, and
marking all sentences that make knowledge or truth claims related
to the overall argument, state hypotheses, or present research ques-
tions. We continued by marking sentences which inform the reader
about the existence of entities outside of the text. In this category
we included any statements that refer to uncertainty, because such
statements also provide insight into what is considered to exist only
partially outside the text. We also marked all sentences that refer to a
group of human subjects, because these statements show how the text
constitutes subject positions that are relevant to its own argument.
After this process was completed, we read only the marked sentences
for each report, and tried to group them according to common themes
based on either the topics they discuss, or the frequency of the words
they use. We examined these themes in relation to knowledge, truth,
and subject positions. We repeatedly asked the question “what is con-
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sidered true in this statement?”, and wrote down our interpretations
while keeping in mind the identified themes for each report, the col-
lection of marked sentences, as well as the unmarked sentences refer-
enced by the marked ones.
What is a Health Threat?
In the SIDARTHa reports, the aim of the project is stated as detecting
public health threats (Ziemann et al. 2009, 1). The reports further de-
scribe their goal as helping public health authorities to become aware
of health threats earlier, or even to prevent them. The scope of the
term health threat within the project reports is very broad: it refers
to diseases, both communicable and non-communicable (1), but it
also refers to other events such as floods, heat waves, and even vol-
canic eruptions (Rosenkötter, Ziemann, et al. 2010). Additionally, it
can refer to acts of bioterrorism, which most commonly refers to the
intentional release of biological agents such as anthrax into the air in
large quantities with the intent to harm others (Ziemann et al. 2009,
7).
From the perspective of syndromic surveillance systems, health
threats first become visible when other surveillance systems capture
their traces. For example, several people living in the same district
might write about suffering from shortness of breath and digestive
problems on social media platforms, or a person experiencing high
fever and a sore throat may visit the emergency room where her visit
is recorded in the admission logs. In both cases, the experiences of
these individuals are recorded, and those records are then accessed by
syndromic surveillance systems. For these systems, the health threat
is best defined in terms of data and signals: “Early detection of pub-
lic health threats in general relies on the components: timely and
reliable data; the sensitivity, specificity; and timeliness of signals de-
tected.” (Rosenkötter, Kauhl, et al. 2010, 3)
Syndromic surveillance relies on the presence and the functioning
of other surveillance systems. For example, the primary motivation
for tracking ambulance dispatches is not to generate signals for syn-
dromic surveillance. Ambulances are dispatched to retrieve patients,
and the signals are used for a variety of purposes. Ambulance drivers
may need to track their working hours, or hospital administrators
may need to know how many ambulances are available to respond in
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case of emergencies, etc. Every departure and arrival of the ambu-
lance is logged for a multitude of reasons, and syndromic surveillance
systems depend on these logs, but the logs themselves are not pro-
duced specifically, or at least not primarily, to support the practice of
syndromic surveillance.
The SIDARTHa reports describe a system that can be used to col-
lect emergency data in different health institutions in multiple Euro-
pean countries independent of one another, each with their own rules
and regulations for gathering data. To form a more homogeneous set
of records, the designers propose a coding standard to convert the lo-
cal data to the SIDARTHa-compatible version. Organisationally, the
raw data remains locally stored, as one of the aims of the system is to
ensure that the collected data does not leave the collecting institution
or regional authority.
The standardised data format is a string of numbers with different
fields. The designers state that “[t]he minimum data set for syndromic
surveillance must contain enough information to produce the num-
ber of cases per day for temporal syndromic surveillance” (Garcia-
Castrillo Riesgo et al. 2009, 6). It includes seven variables: the anony-
mous case identifying number, date, geographic reference, syndrome,
age, gender, and severity. The final three variables are called modifiers,
because these are not essential to constructing the number of cases,
but the information contained within them may be relevant for cer-
tain syndromes such as gastroenteritis (or stomach flu) in children or
heat-related illness in the elderly. These particular variables are chosen
based on a survey of availability within the countries that participate
in the SIDARTHa project, and it is the minimal set of properties that
all the participants are able to provide.
Using the standard, it is possible to represent each field using num-
bers, even when receiving data from different sources. For example,
the case identification can be filled using the call identification code
if the data are provided by an emergency medical dispatch centre, or
it can be filled using the patient identification code if the provider is
an emergency department. The date is converted to a series of unam-
biguous numbers by specifying the order that day, month, and year
appear in the string. Geographic reference is more heterogeneous, the
numbers contained in this field can refer to X and Y coordinates gen-
erated using the global positioning system (GPS), health zone codes,
post codes, or community codes. Attempting to fit gender into the
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form brings the ubiquitous problem of coding gender as a binary, and
the transition from sex to gender in the system vocabulary. The orig-
inal specification of the standard provides “0” for male and “1” for
female, and the final implementation of the system changes the order
and adds a third category, “unknown” (Garcia-Castrillo Riesgo et al.
2010, 33).
All of the variables we have described above pertain to the iden-
tification of persons and their locations. The actual work of describ-
ing syndromes occurs in the remaining two variables: syndrome and
severity. The syndrome category requires the largest amount of work
to convert into a number. Syndromes are divided into six categories:
influenza-like, gastrointestinal, respiratory, intoxication, environment-
related (heat-related), and unspecific. Since the system is designed to
be compatible with many different sites, a multitude of conversion ta-
bles are provided to make possible the homogeneous coding of cases
for any SIDARTHa system. The coding manual provides a series of
tables to allow this conversion, where the codes of other, more es-
tablished standards such as the International Classification of Diseases
(ICD) can be converted to the SIDARTHa standard (Garcia-Castrillo
Riesgo et al. 2009).
At the end of this conversion, the health threat is narrowed from a
wide variety of uncontrollable events to a series of numbers that can
be transmitted without change, and one that refers to the same thing
regardless of context. Unlike the data collected in each institution,
which carry marks of local practices particular to each case, the result-
ing string is constructed to function independently from its context.
It is easily comparable and combinable across different databases. In
Latour’s terms, this standardisation creates an immutable mobile that
can be used for statistical analysis in any institution. Freed from their
earlier contexts, these strings of numbers start expanding their con-
texts in a different direction to affect the world. They are collected
by the SIDARTHa software, and classified using different detection
algorithms.
The classification may be only of change over time, or it may also
include a spatial component that connects the data points to partic-
ular places using GPS coordinates or postal codes. Although the al-
gorithms vary depending on the input and the intent, the primary
purpose of this analysis is to divide the data points into two groups:
expected and unexpected. The data points that end up in the expected
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category are not of high importance to the system designers. These
may indicate low-risk diseases in low volumes, or a seasonal varia-
tion in an illness (implying that the change occurs every year). The
designers of SIDARTHa are much more interested in the unexpected
category. This category includes all the data points that have been
marked by the system as deviating from the norm. These unexpected
events are all potential health threats within the system.
The designers state that one of SIDARTHa’s strengths is its flexi-
bility: “[T]he SIDARTHa system can easily be adjusted to cover addi-
tional health threats, in this case the volcanic ash cloud with new syn-
dromes such as traffic accidents and cardio vascular syndrome.” (Pin-
heiro et al. 2010, 10) This flexibility is not only due to the way the
system has been constructed, but also because of how the discourse
of syndromic surveillance describes health threats. In another report,
they point out that “[o]ne important feature of syndromic surveil-
lance is flexibility, which allows the generation and monitoring of
syndromes according to suddenly emerging, potential health threats”
(Rosenkötter, Kauhl, et al. 2010, 3). In this definition, a health threat
is a sudden event which has the potential to affect population health.
The words “suddenly” and “potential” highlight the issue of the ab-
sent subject in the definition: For whom is the event sudden, or un-
expected, and what is meant by the potential to affect? The concern
about sudden events can be viewed from the perspective of public
health authorities who would be expected to respond to an event.
Suddenness can then be stated relative to how long it would take for
the authorities to act (by contacting the patients, by visiting the clin-
ics, by issuing public notices, etc.) when the health threat appears.
Defining the limits of the word “potential” are much more difficult.
For example, an influenza outbreak can sometimes spread rapidly in
a population but result in only minor suffering as the infected experi-
ence the discomfort of a sore throat. However, it can also cause major
illness in those who are infected, and even become life-threatening for
those who already suffer from other conditions. Complicating the de-
cision even further, the difference between the two is often not clear
until its effects are experienced by individuals. The public health re-
sponse is required to negotiate this conflict, and come to a decision
about the limits of the potential of a disease to affect the population.
In the SIDARTHa reports, a particularly unusual event serves to
highlight the vital need for the systems to be able to intervene in re-
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sponse to health threats, even in cases of non-detection. Following
the eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland in 2010, the
project consortium developed a method to evaluate the potential pub-
lic health impact of the ensuing ash cloud. The event is described as
offering a suitable scenario for testing the system, although the au-
thors also point out:
This report uses the term ‘volcanic ash cloud’ without
determining if the ash cloud was a cloud or rather a con-
tamination. Therefore it should be understood that the
term ‘ash cloud’ used throughout this report is not to be
understood as a scientific term. It should be further noted
that the authors do not intend to give any prejudice on the
question if there was any risk to health at all caused by the
ash cloud as such. The intention of this rapid assessment
was to test the capability of the SIDARTHa concept and
pilot syndromic surveillance system to be timely adjusted
for monitoring a suddenly occurring event potentially af-
fecting health [emphasis in the original]. (Rosenkötter,
Ziemann, et al. 2010, 3)
A sudden event, and its potential to affect health both appear in
this justification for performing the ash cloud assessment using the
SIDARTHa system. Establishing an event as a health threat occurs
before the investigation begins, but the results of the investigation do
not fully resolve the status of the event either. In the four SIDARTHa
implementation sites in Austria, Denmark, Germany, and Spain, the
system identifies no significant correlation between the volcanic ash
cloud and the unusual signals of respiratory conditions reported dur-
ing the same period. The authors state that “further in-depth analysis
of case characteristics is necessary” (16), but also mention that their
investigation, and the fact that it was possible to perform it at all,
demonstrates the “flexibility of syndromic surveillance systems to be
used for ad-hoc surveillance after suddenly occurring events” (16). In
the booklet Generic Public Health Preparedness in Europe, a brief de-
scription of the SIDARTHa project is accompanied by several quotes
from Dr Thomas Krafft, the scientific-technical coordinator of the
project. Commenting on the volcano investigation, he states:
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The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Con-
trol asked us to test out SIDARTHa during this time to
see if there were any health impacts from the volcanic ash
plume . . . . We found no increased demand for emergency
care services. It is important to be able to distinguish be-
tween ‘real threats’ and ‘perceived threats’. (EU Health
Programme 2011)
This division between real and perceived threats positions SIDAR-
THa, and by extension syndromic surveillance, as the arbiter of truth
for public health practice in the implementation sites. The system
does not establish a correlation, but it does not establish a definitive
lack of correlation either. The operations of SIDARTHa are also per-
ceptions, although they are perceptions of expertise, supported by
advanced ICTs and public health authorities. The real in the quote
can be interpreted as describing events that public health authorities
should act upon to improve the health of a population; the perceived
can also be interpreted as events that they should act upon to reassure
the population that there is no health effect. In either case, the de-
tection possibilities offered by SIDARTHa are geared towards shaping
the type of public health response following an event.
In the beginning, the traces of different individuals are collected
in various public health surveillance systems, and converted into the
SIDARTHa standard to create a more uniform unit that is compat-
ible with the different methods of statistical analysis. Up until this
point, the traces of individuals shed their context until only the bare
minimum remains. The contents of that bare minimum are defined
by the SIDARTHa standard. After reaching that point, the work of
inscribing a new context into the numbers begins. The first step is the
statistical analysis, which constructs the objects that public health in-
stitutions can act on, followed by the visualisation of the results which
show the traces in the unexpected category. The process that begins
with the set of recorded traces and eventually becomes the evidence
for the existence or the non-existence of the health threat depends on
a long chain of translations between different systems and different
mediums. When the authors assert their claim as “[e]mergency care
demand shows a pattern allowing for detection of unusual aberrations
from the expected demand” (Baer et al. 2009, 20), they refer to the
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large web of surveillance systems that individually construct and link
the patterns, detections, aberrations and expectations.
Design Choices and Expertise
The SIDARTHa system uses emergency care data to monitor health
threats. The project researchers divide it into four data sources: emer-
gency medical service (EMS), emergency medical dispatch (EMD),
emergency physician service (EP), and emergency department (ED)
data. Each source has different properties that make it more or less
suitable for inclusion in a syndromic surveillance system. For exam-
ple, the authors note that ED data are often collected electronically,
while EMS data are filled in paper forms that are then transferred to
the computer, making the latter more difficult to connect to an ICT-
based surveillance system (Ziemann et al. 2009, 20). The authors also
mention that emergency data covers only severe cases because patients
with mild symptoms are not very likely to call the emergency medical
service or to visit an emergency department (22). At the same time,
emergency departments receive patients and respond to calls outside
the working hours of other health services (22).
The decision to use emergency data for syndromic surveillance
has consequences for the types of events that can be detected, and
for those that are likely to remain invisible. In this case, one conse-
quence is being able to detect severe cases, and not being able detect
mild ones. For example, the authors state that “since gastrointesti-
nal problems do not mainly lead to the need of emergency medical
care treatments these outbreaks can only be identified by a syndromic
surveillance system if the outbreak occurs under special circumstances
(i.e., symptoms in a group from abroad)” (Pinheiro et al. 2010, 15).
The system itself makes events that manifest with acute symptoms
more visible. This is in line with the vision of syndromic surveillance
as a tool of preparedness for sudden, unexpected, and highly danger-
ous events. By beginning with the aim to detect health threats, and
then setting up a system that is suited to the detection of severe illness
rather than mild illness, the designers contribute to the definition of a
health threat. In the previous examples, the health threat was a sudden
event with the potential to affect health, whereas now a health threat
is specified further as an event that can cause severe illness with sharp
and sudden symptoms.
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Keeping the agency of users in mind, once the system is opera-
tional it could also be used to detect mild cases depending on how the
users choose to use the system. However, the design choices do con-
strain the use in this case, since the system itself is designed to run on
its own automatically, and changing it requires expertise of the kind
that is much more commonly associated with a software developer
than an epidemiologist. To modify the system to detect mild cases,
the system would need to be connected to different data sources which
would require knowledge about how and where the data are stored,
how they can be imported into the SIDARTHa system, as well as
an understanding of the statistical methods to make them compatible
with the newly connected data source. Although such a scenario is
certainly possible, it is also clear that a different skill set is privileged
in public health practice when syndromic surveillance is involved.
During the development of the SIDARTHa system, the ICT com-
pany BeValley programmed the system to match the specifications of
the designers. In the evaluation report, the authors state that “Be-
Valley agreed to adjust and update the system in the future but the
question remains how this can be sustained also with additional fund-
ing” (Pinheiro et al. 2010, 10). They also ask: “If the regional system
cannot easily be repaired by the future users how does that affect the
usefulness and acceptance of the system?” (11). The authors anticipate
that future users in emergency care institutions will have ICT staff
who can install the software and program the data transfer (11), but
they do not elaborate on neither whether emergency care institutions
do in fact have such capacity, nor if that capacity should be found
within emergency care. The expertise required to perform public
health surveillance shifts if SIDARTHa or a similar syndromic surveil-
lance system is introduced, and that new practice privileges ICT ex-
pertise.
Finally, the work of classifying and sorting does not end with the
programming and installation of the system. During the data analysis
study, Rosenkötter, Kauhl, et al. (2010) report numerous mismatches
that need to be resolved locally by the practitioners attempting to per-
form analyses based on emergency data. For example, the authors find
that it is not possible to analyse unspecific syndromes using the Aus-
trian emergency physician service data due to repeated entries for the
same incident, while using the emergency department data the only
option is to analyse unspecific syndromes because the source does not
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list the reasons for care. The Belgium emergency physician service
data arrive with delay, causing difficulties in developing a syndrome-
specific coding, and the emergency department data is not possible
to analyse fully because the systems recording the data have changed
recently. The authors also describe the necessity of taking into ac-
count ICD shortlists used by physicians in different sites. These lists
lump the detailed categories of the ICD into larger groups, allowing
the physicians to quickly assign codes without referring to the exten-
sive ICD documentation every time. However, the mappings of these
shortlists differ from site to site, and they do not combine easily when
centralising the data. It is not possible to ignore the shortlists either,
because similar cases may be assigned to different syndromes if the
mappings in the shortlists are not taken into consideration. Although
these events may sound as exceptions to the rule of smooth classifica-
tion, as Bowker and Star point out, the work of classification always
includes these complexities and tensions.
9.4 Conclusion
We have demonstrated how a discourse of syndromic surveillance
constructed the health threat concept as a sudden, unexpected event
with the potential to cause severe harm, and one that requires a pub-
lic health response aided by surveillance. Based on our analysis of
reports from the SIDARTHa project, we stated that when creating
surveillance technologies, design choices have consequences for what
can be seen, and for what remains invisible.
We argued further that syndromic surveillance discourse values
standardised and transportable knowledge more than local, context-
dependent knowledge, and it privileges expertise in developing, main-
taining, and using software within public health practice. We argued
further that syndromic surveillance discourse privileges expertise in
developing, maintaining, and using software within public health prac-
tice, and it prioritises standardised and transportable knowledge over
local and context-dependent knowledge.
ICTs are not neutral tools that reflect reality. They privilege some
forms of action, and they limit others. They are imbued with values,
and different people benefit or suffer from their use differently. Fearn-
ley states that “[s]yndromic surveillance itself, with its orientation
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towards unexpected events and nonspecific objects, inevitably moves
epidemiology in new directions.” (Fearnley 2008a, 84). French’s anal-
ysis of ICT use within public health defines some of these new direc-
tions:
[. . . A]n over-arching immaterial conception of informa-
tion imbues some kinds of information with more im-
port, for surveillance, than other kinds of information.
Specifically, this conception encourages the collection of
abstract, digitized signifiers while simultaneously marginal-
izing other kinds of embodied, contextual information.
Indeed, the pursuit of immaterial information for public
health surveillance produces a dominant but superficial
epidemiology at the expense of other potentially more ef-
fective epidemiologies. (French 2009, 6)
Syndromic surveillance systems are not costless solutions because
gathering information and sustaining surveillance requires work. They
also require a different kind of expertise that is not always found in
public health institutions. Moreover, syndromic surveillance relies on
a particular definition of health threat which focuses on catastrophes
and rare events. To perform syndromic surveillance within a public
health institute is to modify public health as a practice. This is not
problematic in itself since practices can always change, but the ques-
tion that we need to ask remains: What does syndromic surveillance
mean for fairness? If it orients public health towards the detection of
catastrophes, or sudden events with severe consequences, what hap-
pens to other types of events that do not produce such signals? For
example, to what extent can syndromic surveillance deal with chronic
illness, or aid those who suffer from health issues due to poverty? Pub-
lic health practice is a large field, and there may be a place different
surveillance systems that monitor different types of illness. However,
discussions of syndromic surveillance should not stop at sensitivity,
specificity, and timeliness, but also address questions of fairness.
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